Hostile States and the Far Right: Converging Tactics

Gender and identity have long been politically contested, but in the last decade these debates have been more systematically weaponised and exploited, particularly online. Controversies range from disagreements over trans rights and gender recognition, abortion and reproductive autonomy to ‘culture war’ debates on migration and national belonging. They are also increasingly central to contemporary threat landscapes because they can convert everyday social questions into high-stakes identity conflict, which makes them attractive for both domestic extremists and external adversaries. These narratives have deep historical roots in global far-right and authoritarian politics. They also feature prominently in the domestic moral sovereignty projects of several hostile states, which helps to explain why states such as Russia, China and Iran can exploit similar frames in UK and Western information environments by plugging into existing far-right ecosystems and narratives.

This paper argues that gender, sexuality, race and religion are foundational to understanding how transnational far-right movements mobilise and how hostile states pursue influence, disruption and strategic advantage. The same gender- and identity-coded frames that far-right actors use to define belonging and identify threats also provide ready-made entry points for hostile states seeking influence and disruption. This focus does not imply that hostile states only engage with the far right or only weaponise identity and gender narratives. Russia in particular has shown a willingness to exploit any divisive theme on the left, right or centre. However, this paper focuses on the far right specifically (rather than extremism or populism as broad categories)1.  because identity-based narratives are among the most consistent and universal tools within far-right mobilisation. They are attractive for exploitation by hostile states because they already have substantial traction in many target societies and are built around emotional narratives that convert into anger, fear and mobilisation more easily than many left-wing narratives.

Far-right movements across regions draw on a broadly shared ideological repertoire consisting of narratives around traditional values, anti-feminist backlash, child protection panics tied to LGBTQI+ visibility and rights, and narratives around demographic replacement and ‘invasion’. These narratives travel seamlessly across borders because they operate as shortcuts or bridges between cultures and geographies. They combine fears around national survival, demographic change and economic and social order into emotionally charged claims about protecting children, families and the ‘real’ nation. In doing so, they enable transnational connections between otherwise disparate extremist actors, and they lower the barrier for alliances with religious ultra-conservatives and other anti-rights coalitions.

Hostile state actors, including most prominently Russia, but also to varying degrees Iran, China and others, have recognised both the transferability and the strategic utility of these themes, and are weaponising gender and identity-based narratives as part of wider hybrid threat campaigns. Rather than inventing new divisions, these actors amplify existing fault lines in target societies, with the understanding that polarisation can erode trust in institutions, weaken social cohesion and distract from shared security priorities. They often position themselves as moral counterweights to a ‘decadent’ West, echoing far-right tropes on feminism, LGBTQI+ rights, migration and ‘corrupt elites’. In some cases, this convergence extends beyond rhetoric. Reporting and analysis over many years has pointed to Russia’s efforts to cultivate sympathetic far-right political allies in the West, particularly in countries where influential far-right or hard-right parties can help normalise pro-Kremlin narratives or obstruct collective policy (for example, in France, Italy, Austria or Germany), through a mix of financial and logistical support, alongside media amplification and narrative backing. More commonly, however, influence is indirect. This includes state-backed messaging that circulates into domestic ecosystems where far-right influencers, outlets and networks select, adapt and repurpose it for their own mobilising goals. This creates reinforcing cycles between far-right movements and ideologies and hostile state actors, even in the absence of formal coordination.

This paper examines this reinforcing cycle, looking at how gender and identity serve as ideological anchors for far-right movements globally, and how these anchors create entry points for hostile state influence operations that seek to polarise Western democracies. First, it determines how gendered narratives function as ideological anchors and mobilisation tools for far-right groups and actors, and how they often attach to and intensify other identity-based narratives on migration, race, religion and ethnicity. Second, it explains why these gendered frames travel so effectively across borders and platforms, and why they are operationally useful to hostile states seeking influence and disruption. Third, it maps the main mechanisms through which convergence happens, which often include ambiguous, indirect activity where foreign interference functions as a force multiplier rather than a single cause. Fourth, it applies these insights to UK-specific case studies to illustrate how gendered threat narratives can contribute to intimidation, community tensions and mobilisation risks in the UK information environment. Finally, while the phenomenon is global, the paper closes with UK-specific recommendations for government departments, regulators, policing and local resilience stakeholders to strengthen monitoring, attribution and proportionate responses.