The Nuclear Question – Darya Dolzikova

'The future of the Iranian nuclear programme – a key driver of Operation Epic Fury, and Operation Midnight Hammer before it – remains unresolved under the released MOU. The nuclear-related parts of the MOU gloss over in the space of more or less two paragraphs what has been at the heart of nuclear negotiations with Iran for over two decades. The devil will, of course, be in the details, as the two sides work to figure out how precisely to operationalise those two aspects of the MOU over the coming months.'

'The document appears to propose a much more comprehensive lifting of US sanctions on Iran than had been the case under the JCPOA, by undertaking to ‘terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran’, including both primary and secondary US sanctions. This will be a colossal – if not impossible – undertaking. The US has woven a complex web of sanctions and other economic and financial restrictions on the Iranian economy since 1979. Many of these are unrelated to the nuclear issue but rather target Iranian human rights violations and support for terrorist activity. As the Biden Administration discovered when it tried to negotiate a return to the JCPOA, lifting all US sanctions is both legally and politically difficult. Trump can expect to run into the same challenges.'

'As for negotiating limits on the Iranian nuclear programme, the US has set for itself a tall order to come to a final agreement in sixty days. Negotiating over what the future of the programme should look like and how to get there (what is needed, what is possible, and how long it will take) will require a complete understanding of the current state of Iran’s nuclear programme – both the damage done by US and Israeli strikes and any efforts Iran may have made to salvage or rebuild its programme over the last year. This will require an initial extensive baselining exercise, ideally by the International Atomic Energy Agency. While JD Vance has recently mentioned that the IAEA would be allowed back into Iran, Tehran and the Agency have not confirmed this as of writing and the MOU makes no mention of systematic IAEA inspections.'

'Establishing the current state of the programme also goes to the question of what paragraph nine of the MOU refers to as the ‘status quo’ of the Iranian nuclear programme, which Iran commits to maintaining over the course of the negotiations. It is odd phrasing. Specifying a moratorium on all enrichment, or a commitment not to reconstitute damage or advance the nuclear programme, for the period of negotiations would have been much more reassuring. Without knowing what exactly the 'status quo' looks like, it is difficult to assess the non-proliferation virtues of this particular provision.'

'A final resolution of the nuclear question will still have to address the key challenges that the JCPOA grappled with. How much uranium will Iran be allowed to enrich and stockpile? To what levels of enrichment, using what kinds and numbers of centrifuges and which facilities? What will happen to any enriched uranium that will be down blended? Will Iran be allowed to engage in R&D and production of advanced centrifuge models, which it could presumably quickly install and use to enrich in future? How will the IAEA verify Iranian compliance with any agreed upon provisions?'

'These may seem like finnicky details to a US administration that appears content with broad Iranian promises not to procure or develop nuclear weapons. But they go to the heart of whether a future Iranian nuclear programme once again comes to the threshold of weaponisation or whether the final agreement meaningfully addresses the threat of a future nuclear-armed Iran. Following the extensive assault that Iran has suffered on its territory, its missile capabilities and its government leadership, it is now more important than ever to establish strict and verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear activities. The risk is that – in a rush to claim victory and flaunt his dealmaking skills – Trump will be content to agree to the first thing he feels he can spin to audiences at home, regardless how toothless. Then proverbial can of the Iranian nuclear programme will then be kicked further down the road, where it will land at the feet of the next administration to deal with.'

Comment by Darya Dolzikova, Senior Research Fellow, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy