Darya Dolzikova​ comments on US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities

The precise details of any further damage that the latest US strikes have caused to Iran’s nuclear sites is unclear. However, the fundamental reality remains that military action alone can only roll back the programme by degrees, not eliminate it fully. There are thus a number of key questions to consider: how much damage to the programme is enough for Israel and the US to feel that they have reduced the programme sufficiently for the time being? What effect have the strikes had on Iran’s resolve to advance and potentially even weaponise the programme? And what are Israeli and US plans moving forward to manage what remains a persistent - albeit degraded - threat?

If Fordow was indeed seriously damaged in the latest round of strikes - which remains unclear - that would certainly be a significant blow to Iran’s ability to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) has been key to Iran’s nuclear programme, enriching uranium to 60%, more efficiently than at Natanz. Further attacks on Natanz and Isfahan - depending on the nature and extent of the damage - would have also helped set the programme back further.

However, questions remain as to where Iran may be storing its already enriched stocks of HEU - as these will have almost certainly been moved to hardened and undisclosed locations, out of the way of potential Israeli or US strikes. It is also unclear what secret facilities may exist inside Iran that Tehran could use for continued centrifuge production, enrichment and weapons-relevant activities. There is also currently no information on the state of the facility at Kolang Gaz La, not far from Natanz, which has been under construction inside a mountainside - reportedly deeper than the FFEP.

Besides the actual physical capabilities, Iran retains extensive expertise that will allow it to eventually reconstitute what aspects of the programme have been damaged or destroyed. The Iranian nuclear programme is decades old and draws on extensive Iranian indigenous expertise. The physical elimination of the programme’s infrastructure - and even the assassination of Iranian scientists - will not be sufficient to destroy the latent knowledge that exists in the country.

Finally, while military strikes and assassinations can degrade the technical nuclear capabilities and expertise that underpin the nuclear programme, they risk having the exact opposite effect on Iran’s threat perceptions and calculations. Deterring US military presence and action in the region - let alone against its own territory - has long been assumed by analysts to be one of the drivers of Iranian advances on its nuclear programme. The latest round of strikes and the fact that the US has - for the first time - carried out direct attacks on Iranian territory may very well result in a decision in Tehran that the only option they have for an effective nuclear deterrent is to produce a nuclear weapons capability.

It is as yet unclear what Iran’s response to the latest round of strikes may be. Retaliatory strikes against US assets in the region is one possibility. However, the escalatory risks that they presents could help to mitigate that risk somewhat. An Iranian announcement of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is also now a real possibility. The NPT allows member states to withdraw “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” The events of the last week could arguably give Tehran the justification it needs to that end. A withdrawal from the NPT (which would have to follow a three-month notice period) would likely see the international community lose all visibility of the Iranian nuclear programme and could - long-term - become a catalyst for broader proliferation in the region.