Beware Russia Bearing Arms Control Gifts

President Vladimir Putin’s offer to maintain New START limits on US and Russian strategic nuclear forces for one more year deserves serious consideration by the Trump administration. However, rather than reflexively accepting what looks like an oasis in the arms-control desert of the new-nuclear era, US officials must consider why Putin is making this offer now. As part of a cold, serious analysis the Trump administration needs to establish its own priorities in a confrontational US-Russia relationship, its overall deterrence strategy and its nuclear arms control policy, and see whether Putin’s proposal – or perhaps another deal – could serve those interests. In doing so, the US should take stock of what it can gain from Putin’s offer, and what it risks losing if it rejects the deal in pursuit of something better.

What did Putin Offer?

On 22 September, President Putin announced that ‘Russia is prepared to continue observing the treaty’s central quantitative restrictions for one year after 5 February, 2026.’ He described New START as having ‘played a constructive role in maintaining balance and predictability in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons’ and warned that a ‘complete renunciation of this treaty’s legacy would, from many points, be a grave and short-sighted mistake.’ Despite Putin’s suspension of the agreement in 2023, it is notable that he consistently praises the agreement. In 2017, Putin reportedly raised the prospects of extending the New START Treaty as part of a broader suite of strategic stability discussions, which Trump rejected. The Russian quickly agreed to a five-year extension of New START in February 2021, the right decision as the Biden administration explored stabilizing relations with Russia through the first year of the four-year term.

However, the landscape shifted dramatically after February 2022. Amid the higher nuclear temperature after invading Ukraine, Russia suspended implementation of New START in 2023, but made a political commitment to adhere to the New START central limits – 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads on land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles, and one warhead counted for each deployed long-range bomber, 700 total deployed missiles and bombers, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers. Putin is now proposing to retain these limits that Russia is abiding by, along with the US.

The numerical limits on strategic nuclear forces are the core of the New START Treaty. The agreement contains other extremely important provisions, such as requirements for eighteen on-site inspections per year, daily information on the status and location of treaty accountable nuclear forces, and biannual data exchanges which offer a snapshot of each country’s strategic triad. These are all provisions with which Russia no longer complies. Unlike the US, with an open government budgeting process, Congressional hearings and votes on nuclear weapons funding, Russia provides very little information to the public on the status of its nuclear forces, except when publicizing nuclear exercises or accomplishments in flight tests.

Why is Putin Offering this Now?

In many ways, it makes sense that Russia wants to avoid a competition in strategic nuclear forces with the US. Some analysts believe that Russia possesses an advantage given the near completion of its nuclear modernization, while the US is not yet deploying new systems. However, a closer look reveals that Russia faces a series of important constraints on its nuclear arsenal that makes the idea of nuclear competition with the US a bad one.

Consider the state of Russia’s military and economy following its invasion of Ukraine. The new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, the RS-28 Sarmat, faced incredible developmental setbacks, including a recent test where the missile exploded in its silo, devastating the ICBM launcher, support infrastructure and the surrounding environment. The missile is designed to replace the aging SS-18 Satan ICBM, a large, liquid fuelled ICBM developed in the 1960s and a cornerstone of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, deploying the highest-yield warheads in Russia’s inventory to target hardened targets, such as enemy silos and underground command and control facilities. The SS-18s were designed and maintained by Pivdenmash in modern-day Ukraine; Russia’s lack of homegrown large ballistic missile expertise is one important consequence of the war they began, and likely part of the reason for ongoing difficulties in the heavy ICBM program.

One of Russia’s new strategic systems, a nuclear-powered, nuclear armed cruise missile not accounted for under the New START Treaty, faced several failures as well. Ukraine further attrited Russian strategic forces with its bold ‘Operation Spiderweb.’ Public reporting suggests that the attack destroyed up to one-third of Russia’s nuclear capable bomber fleet.

The fact that Russia is facing challenges in modernizing its nuclear forces should be no surprise. The coalition of Ukraine-supporters placing export control restrictions and sanctions on Russia intend to starve the military industry of technology and components. Russia faces extreme shortages in technologies necessary for modern nuclear weapons delivery systems, such as microelectronics, space-grade components and propulsion systems for advanced aircraft. While Russian officials offer public statements of year-after-year progress in nuclear force modernization, delivery system replacement timelines continue to grow. And new signs point to a shift in Russian defence industry: away from nuclear modernization to focus instead on medium range conventional capabilities, such as the new Oreshnik, as the meat grinder of the Ukraine conflict is seen as continuing for far longer than Russian leaders anticipated in early 2022.

Russia retains vast advantages over the US in nuclear material stockpiles and the ability to produce warheads. However, without delivery systems, Russia is unable to meaningfully race against the US strategic nuclear weapons limited by New START. The US also could deploy more warheads on these delivery systems – roughly 3,700 to Russia’s 2,800 – and will begin deploying brand new delivery systems by the end of the decade. In short, Russia’s purported advantages in nuclear modernization are overrated, and largely a carryover of analysis before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

What Analysis should Occur in Washington?

US experts and officials have long supported limiting Russia’s nuclear forces. President Trump, after an ill-fated attempt at trilateral nuclear dialogue with Russia and China, pursued a bilateral arms control effort with Russia in 2020. The Biden administration extended the treaty in 2021 and offered, on multiple occasions, negotiations for a follow-on agreement even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, administration officials should carefully interrogate the offer on the table. Adhering to New START limits for one more year may disproportionately constrain the US, and free Russia to exhaust money and material on other urgent defence priorities. Putin’s willingness to limit Russian forces, if the US reciprocates, should be considered in the context of his last arms control offer: a moratorium on intermediate-range missiles offered after Russia produced and deployed those same capabilities in violation of the INF Treaty, restricting US missile deployments while Russia continued to expand its arsenal of banned missiles. Putin’s recent history of one-sided arms control offers deserve a sceptical review.

An agreement to limit deployed strategic nuclear forces accountable under the New START Treaty would bound something like 95% of US nuclear forces. The US maintains around 200 non-strategic nuclear warheads (NSNW); meanwhile, Russia maintains approximately 2,000 – nearly half its warhead stockpile – as well as non-strategic nuclear delivery systems, and exotic long-range delivery systems which are not limited by the existing New START Treaty. There is a good reason US arms-control proposals in the last decade focused on capturing all warheads, including NSNW, and more recently sought to include the four long-range nuclear delivery systems Putin announced in 2018: Burevestnik (Skyfall), Sarmat, Poseidon and Kinzhal.

Additionally, the US asked Russia to return to a dialogue to discuss strategic arms control and a return to full implementation of New START, including verification measures, which Russia rejected. Moscow is unwilling to permit verification and monitoring of its strategic nuclear forces, a key US priority, while expecting the US to adhere to numerical limits that ameliorates stress on Russia’s military industrial base. US officials should consider whether another year of New START limits, without verification of Russian strategic forces, is satisfactory. Policy makers must keep in mind that Russia may have already breached the same limits last year, and the lack of verification activities contributed to the United States refusing to officially certify Russia’s compliance with the Treaty.

Finally, the US is in the midst of considering how best to maintain deterrence against China in a multiple nuclear adversary environment, while China’s nuclear force undergoes a transformation. This could entail deploying additional warheads or delivery systems in the coming years. US officials need to study these measures, to estimate the deterrence value, costs and timelines, and determine whether changes to US nuclear posture are worth it. They would be reluctant or even prohibited from doing so if the US agrees to these limits with Russia, out of fear of breaking the deal. The US needs to clarify how one additional year of limits may constrain this necessary analysis.

So, How Should Washington Respond?

The US can benefit from a new nuclear weapons deal with Russia. Engaging in open competition with both Russia and China in the decades to come will drain limited US defence resources, exacerbate tensions and lead many countries to wonder whether the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty – an agreement that requires the official nuclear weapons states to take meaningful steps toward disarmament – has any merit. However, it would be malpractice for President Trump to accept this deal on its face. The US government needs to analyse Putin’s deal, press for additional details, and most importantly, assert a clear US position that takes into account global deterrence needs, US-Russia relations, and arms control priorities. That kind of response may lead to a productive conversation on strategic instability and the need for new guardrails to reduce nuclear risks in the contemporary security environment.

© Pranay Vaddi, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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