The Impact of Ukraine on Space Security and Nuclear Deterrence

A growing number of space actors and rapid technological advances elevate the strategic importance of space in international affairs. Space systems now underpin the global economy, critical infrastructure, military power and, crucially, nuclear deterrence.

The space domain and global nuclear deterrence are fundamentally intertwined; developments in one inherently affect the other. During the Cold War, advances in space technology and nuclear weapons converged, driving integrated strategic thinking. Treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which banned nuclear weapons in orbit, and the Anti‑Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), which constrained space‑based missile defence, served to fuse space governance with nuclear‑stability considerations.

Moreover, Sputnik’s 1957 launch, though publicly alarming for Washingtonwas privately welcomed for establishing the principle of satellite overflight, paving the way for US reconnaissance satellites vital for nuclear targeting. Similarly, SATCOM emerged from nuclear necessity when high‑frequency radio proved unreliable for assured command-and-control of nuclear forces. The US and Soviet investments in manned spaceflight were likewise driven less by prestige than by the requirement to interpret reconnaissance data at a time when satellites had limited communication channel bandwidth and lacked the intelligence to decide what mattered.

The scale and character of space capabilities employed in Ukraine mark a step change in space-enabled warfare. Kyiv has leveraged commercial and third‑party space services to generate disproportionate military advantage on the battlefield. For example, high‑resolution satellite imagery has boosted situational awareness and countered Russian misinformation efforts, while commercial SATCOM has provided diversity and redundancy for command‑and‑control. Furthermore, ISR satellites combined with GPS guided munitions have allowed Ukraine to locate, identify and strike Russian assets, including those deep within Russian territory.

Importantly, the conflict has also shown that the infrastructure underpinning these services has itself become a target. Russia’s pre‑invasion cyberattack on commercial satellite modems underscored this vulnerability, as did Ukraine’s subsequent strikes on a Russian satellite‑communications hub in December 2023nand June 2024. The war has therefore challenged assumptions about who can exploit space capabilities in conflict and has heightened incentives for adversaries to deny each other access to space‑derived advantages.

The impact of the space domain in Ukraine on space security and nuclear deterrence can be best recognised through three interrelated lenses – politics, technology and strategy.

Politically, the Ukraine conflict has become a major contributor to an increasingly unstable international security environment and a more competitive multipolar order. This volatile strategic climate will almost certainly complicate efforts to reform the outdated global space governance framework, widely recognised as in urgent need of modernisation. Given nuclear deterrence's dependence on space systems – and the rising contestation and weaponisation of space highlighted by the Ukraine War – significant risks to deterrence stability may lie ahead.

Technologically, the conflict has showcased a range of emerging space capabilities, effectively serving as a global laboratory in which state and non-state actors observe, test and assess the effectiveness of space systems in modern combat. Sophisticated space-based ISR systems including Synthetic Aperture Radar, which negates concealment through cloud cover or darkness, and hyperspectral sensors capable of detecting distinctive chemical signatures of specific materials could have profound implications for nuclear deterrence by enhancing surveillance and targeting of nuclear forces. Similarly, counter-space capabilities, particularly in the cyber domain, will likely receive further investment in light of Ukraine’s experiences. Increased use and proliferation of such capabilities heighten risks of miscalculation and misinterpretation at times of high tension or crisis.

Strategically, the Ukraine conflict carries numerous nuclear dynamics. These include Russia's repeated nuclear sabre‑rattling, the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, the resurgence of 'Euro‑nuke' debates and perhaps most consequentially – the perception of Ukraine's 1994 disarmament as a strategic error. Collectively, these dynamics have reinforced nuclear weapons' position as the ultimate guarantor of national security and the central pillar of national defence strategies. Consequently, arms‑control and disarmament initiatives are likely to stall, while states modernise existing nuclear force structures. Given the entanglement of nuclear and space systems, such modernisation will inevitably drive further developments in the space domain. Trump's proposed 'Golden Dome' is an early signal of this trajectory.

These three implications create a perfect storm of strategic instability. The political ramifications of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine reduce the likelihood of enhanced space governance. Simultaneously, the war has demonstrated the operational value of modern space capabilities, which will almost certainly be integrated into nuclear deterrence architectures. Concurrent to both these dynamics, the war has reinforced nuclear weapons' primacy within national security policies. Taken together, these factors raise pressing questions for the future of space security and nuclear deterrence.