North Korea’s Chemical Imports: Technical Assessment 2

This report assesses shipment-level trade data for imports of chemicals and equipment into North Korea that could be used to produce chemical warfare agents (CWAs). It is impossible to ascertain the uses of the imports this report analyses. However, two chemical imports from China do have particular relevance to the development of CWAs: sodium fluoride and disodium sulfate. The former appears on the Australia Group (AG) Export Control List of Chemical Weapons Precursors, while the latter can be readily converted into sodium sulfide – yet another AG-listed precursor. Similarly, one chemical exported from India to North Korea in 2017, phosphorus trichloride, is scheduled by the Chemical Weapons Convention and was banned in 2006 by the UN Security Council Resolution 1718 Committee for export into North Korea.

Beyond these three chemicals, UN Comtrade reports that from January 2015 to December 2024 North Korea imported at least 667,820 tonnes of chemicals and 2,124 tonnes of relevant machinery, plant or laboratory equipment that could be of particular relevance for producing CWAs. Additionally, in the same period, Project Anthracite has determined that North Korea imported at least another 37 shipments of goods across these same HS codes from Russia and India. These wide-ranging codes include many dual-use chemicals, goods and materials capable of sustaining or progressing North Korea’s CWA production capabilities.

This data could reveal domestic demands and important trade relationships for North Korea’s chemical industry needs, caused by a lack of capability, efficiency or priority. Specifically, this report identifies a dependency on Chinese exports, minimal crossovers between Russian and Indian companies and the types of goods they export into North Korea, possible indications of a lack of industry ability for some basic chemical production processes, and unreliability in countries’ reporting of exports to North Korea.

North Korea does not publish its trade records. Thus, the trade data discussed here is mirrored import data as reported by the exporting countries, which is dependent on those countries’ willingness to provide records of their trade with North Korea. As such, quantity specifics, item descriptions and consignee information were often missing from shipment details, limiting the potential findings of Project Anthracite’s analysis.

Because countries are unlikely to want to be seen as supporting or sustaining anything resembling a North Korean capacity for CWA production, it is possible that the data analysed in this report could have been redacted, obfuscated or misreported, and the mirrored imports identified in this report alone are highly unlikely to satisfy North Korea’s import requirements for its chemical industry. Therefore, it is likely that the results presented in this report are minimum shipments for the goods that do appear in the data.