Peace Negotiations and Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remains on the front line between Russian-occupied and Ukrainian-held territory. As part of any peace agreement or cease-fire, the plant and the satellite town of Enerhodar need to be transferred out of Russian control. Leaving the ZNPP under Russian occupation will ensure that the plant remains an increasingly salient radiological threat to Ukraine and to Europe and will allow Russia to continue using the nuclear power plant to house military equipment and personnel. At the same time, ensuring the safety of the plant following a hand-over from Russian occupation will be a major undertaking; Ukrainian partners should be ready to assist.

Russian Mismanagement of Plant Operations

The ZNPP was captured by Russian forces in early March 2022 and has been under Russian control since. While the targeting of energy infrastructure is an established aspect of armed conflict, the presence of highly radioactive nuclear material at Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) makes them uniquely dangerous and – as such – irresponsible targets. Attacks on NPPs are prohibited under international humanitarian law if such attacks risk harming civilians. A direct attack on a reactor unit is not necessary to risk a serious nuclear accident; damage to water or external energy supply or to other auxiliary systems resulting from attacks or from poor maintenance – as has happened multiple times at the ZNPP – could equally lead to the failure of an NPP’s regular operating and safety systems. In the worst case, this could lead to the release of radioactive material to the surrounding environment.

Over the course of the last three and a half years, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated a serious disregard for the safety of the ZNPP and its personnel. The Russian occupiers have tortured, detained and otherwise harassed Ukrainian staff and the residents of the satellite town of Enerhodar. In July 2022, a diver at the plant died from the injuries inflicted on him by the Russian occupiers after he refused to comply with their instructions. Reports of torture of ZNPP staff have been well documented. According to information shared with the author, as of August 2025, at least 19 residents of Enerhodar – including at least a dozen ZNPP employees – are confirmed or suspected of being under Russian detention. Some of those detained have already been tried in Russia and convicted to lengthy sentences. A recent Reuters report details the extent of the harassment and intimidation to which the Russian occupiers have subjected the residents of Enerhodar.

Russia also continues to maintain a military presence – including military personnel and equipment – at the facility. Photos and videos shared on a Telegram channel monitoring Russian activity at the plant- some of which have also been reported on by Reuters – appear to show Russian military personnel discharging weapons, storing military equipment and holding barbecues on the grounds of the ZNPP. Not all of the images could be verified independently. The IAEA team located at the ZNPP has also recently reported hearing outgoing artillery fire from ‘very near the site perimeter’; Ukrainian officials have long been warning that the Russian military has been using the ZNPP to stage attacks against Nikopol and other Ukraine towns on across the Dnipro River from the plant. Ukrainian military is, for its part, unlikely to be able to mount any kind of meaningful response, at the risk of damaging the plant and causing a nuclear accident.

This is all in addition to the wider challenges and risks of operating a nuclear power plant in a war zone. This has included repeated loss of external power supply and serious challenges with water supply to the plant, which have worsened over the last few weeks. The plant is also suffering from shortages of qualified personnel. Many Ukrainian staff left after the start of the occupation. As of February 2024, personnel who had not signed contracts with Rosatom – the Russian state enterprise whose subsidiary has taken over the operation of ZNPP – have been barred from the facility. Recruiting staff from Russian NPPs to come work in a warzone cannot be an easy task; the author heard multiple stories from individuals familiar with the recent state of affairs in Enerhodar and at ZNPP of unqualified personnel being recruited to fill vacancies.

Despite all this, statements by the leadership of Rosatom (the Russian state nuclear enterprise whose subsidiary has assumed control of the ZNPP) and observed activity near the plant point to persistent Russian plans to restart operations at the plant, which would be an exceptionally irresponsible move under the current conditions. The plant’s reactors have all been in cold shutdown since spring 2024 meaning that the reactors are not generating energy and therefore have significantly reduced water, external energy and personnel requirements. Reactors in cold shutdown also allow more time and options for addressing system malfunctions and preventing a serious accident. The isotopic composition of fuel in reactors that have been in cold shutdown is also different than that of operational reactors, with the latter posing much greater risk to human health and the environment. A decision to restart the reactors would massively increase the risks of a nuclear accident and the scale and consequences of any such incident, particularly under the current wartime conditions.

The Risks of Continued Russian Control

For all of the above reasons, no peace settlement or cease-fire agreement can be complete or sustainable while Russia maintains control of the ZNPP and Enerhodar. Russian inability to operate the plant safely will only grow worse with time, as Rosatom struggles to procure spare parts for the plant’s systems, to find qualified and willing personnel to operate the plant and perform the necessary maintenance. In the meantime, the plant’s systems will continue to degrade both due to normal wear and tear and the unique stresses of wartime operation.

The Russian operators of the plant are also likely to come under increasing pressure from Rosatom leadership and the Kremlin to restart operation of at least some of the ZNPP reactor units. According to company leadership, as of 2023, Rosatom had allocated RUB 20 billion for the ZNPP and the city of Enerhodar, with another RUB 90 billion to be allocated through 2026. Meanwhile, public financial records made available on a third-party Russian webpage show that the Rosatom subsidiary that has taken over control of the ZNPP posted RUB 12 billion in net losses in 2023.

The operators of the plant will be motivated to demonstrate both to Moscow and to the wider international community that they are able to restart and operate the facility – to maintain the flow of funds from the former and as propaganda for the latter on the apparent technical prowess of the Russian nuclear enterprise and the value of the ZNPP as a trading chip in negotiations. Moscow may try to sell surface level renovations – along the lines of Russian ‘restoration efforts’ in other parts of the occupied territories – as a sort of nuclear Potemkin village, painting over the dire state of both the plant and life in Enerhodar. As discussed earlier, the plant cannot be allowed to restart under the current conditions, at the risk of exacerbating the likelihood of a serious accident, which could have consequences not only for Ukraine but also other parts of Europe.

Furthermore, so long as the ZNPP remains in Russian hands, Russia will be able to use it to terrorise Ukrainian territory and whatever forces – Ukrainian or international – may be put in place to enforce a peace agreement or ceasefire. The plant is almost directly on the border between the currently Russian-occupied and Ukrainian-held territories, only 13 km as the crow flies from the city of Nikopol. If a peace agreement or a temporary ceasefire freezes the conflict at the current lines of contact, Russia would be left with what is essentially a sanctuary for its forces about the size of London’s Hyde Park on the border; Ukrainian or NATO forces would be unlikely to return fire against the NPP – especially if the plant were to restart operation – at the risk of causing a significant radiological incident that could contaminate occupied Ukrainian territory and of violating international legal provisions related to such attacks. A Russian military presence at the plant would be even more inappropriate if the territory around the ZNPP becomes designated as some kind of buffer zone or no-man's-land.

Options for the Future of the Plant

Ideally, the ZNPP would be returned to Ukraine – its rightful owner and the only country with the necessary expertise and regulatory measures in place to operate it safely. However, Russian leadership is unlikely to hand back to Ukraine what it has viewed as an important piece of war booty.

A more workable approach, in the short-term, may be to hand over the plant’s ownership to some kind of international task force or consortium, or to the IAEA. The territory of the ZNPP and a surrounding perimeter, which should include Enerhodar, could be designated a neutral enclave. The author has previously outlined the feasibility and sufficiency of a one km demilitarised zone around NPPs, though the size of the ZNPP enclave could be informed by the status of the territory around it following any peace or cease-fire agreement. This would resolve the threat of the plant being used to base military personnel and equipment and would also help significantly reduce the risks to the plant from any military activity that may break out in the plant’s vicinity.

IAEA stewardship of the ZNPP would have the benefit of the neutrality and credibility of a United Nations organisation being in charge. However, the nuclear watchdog is not in the business of operating major enterprises and pieces of critical infrastructure; as such, it is likely to lack the personnel, management expertise or financing to single-handedly take over the management of the plant. Furthermore, the extent of Russian influence within the Agency has previously raised concerns over the Agency’s ability to engage effectively on issues of nuclear safety in Ukraine. The IAEA Deputy Director General that heads up the Agency’s Department of Nuclear Energy – which is the most logical department to be put in charge of managing the ZNPP – is a Russian national.

An alternative arrangement could be some combination of IAEA and private sector management of the plant. Such an arrangement would benefit from IAEA expertise and credibility, while also addressing some of the outlined challenges by leveraging private sector capacity, expertise and investment. European, American and potentially other private sector companies (for instance, from South Korea, Japan or even China) could be offered incentives and loans by national governments or multilateral organisations like the OECD or the World Bank to safely maintain and help manage the plant. The latter lifted its ban on financing nuclear energy projects only this past June.

The presence of foreign interests on the ground would hopefully also provide a certain deterrent against future military attacks on the facility. US proposals earlier this year to purchase the ZNPP were ultimately misguided; Kyiv has not been open to the privatisation of its nuclear facilities and the plant is not Moscow’s to sell. However, the idea of foreign investment in the restoration of the facility is a sensible one and President Zelensky has expressed an openness to such an approach.

Ideally, following any hand-over, the ZNPP would be operated by Ukrainian personnel – including those who left the plant since 2022 – as they are the only ones intimately familiar with the plant and certified to operate it. However, Russia may insist on the presence of Russian personnel at the plant, at least in the short-term. A multilateral workforce, which could include some Russian operational – not management – staff may be acceptable to Kyiv. A multinational workforce of operators familiar with both VVER reactor technology and the European-built reactor command and control systems would also help address the challenge of assembling a large enough workforce to operate the ZNPP safely.

With a cessation in hostilities in the vicinity of the plant, a thorough safety assessment and maintenance effort, and the reconstruction of key auxiliary and safety systems – like redundant connections to the external electrical grid and water supply (the latter being, admittedly, a particular challenge, in the absence of the Kakhovka Reservoir) – one or two reactors could likely be brought back online, given time. However, this would require the requisite expertise and significant financial investment. Ukraine can provide the former but will need significant foreign support for the latter. The plant would have to be examined top-to-bottom to take stock of damage and degradation, likely preceded by a large-scale demining operation. The value of the necessary investment is difficult to estimate with any accuracy, as it would depend on an assessment of the state of the plant following Russian departure, but could reach into the billions of dollars.

This would, therefore, not be a small financial ask, especially in a political climate in the US and a number of European countries that has already turned against increasing material support for Ukraine. However, support for the reconstruction of critical national infrastructure may be more palatable to some constituencies than further military spending (though the two should, of course, not be mutually exclusive). Once operational, the plant could be critical in backfilling persistent shortages in Ukrainian energy generation and thus be a meaningful contributor to Ukrainian reconstruction efforts following a cease-fire or peace agreement. This is in addition to the earlier-discussed reasons for which a safe transition away from Russian occupation of the plant is critical as part of any peace settlement or ceasefire. Should foreign companies be involved in the maintenance, management and operation of the plant, investments into the ZNPP could also be credibly presented as benefiting domestic industries.

Avoiding a Precedent-Setting Mistake

Despite Russian claims of a readiness to negotiate a peace agreement with Ukraine following the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, any efforts to that end remain non-existent and Russia’s assaults on Ukrainian civilians in Kyiv and elsewhere have continued unabated. However, once any such negotiations get underway, the ZNPP must be on the table and removed from Russian control. In fact, a Russian offer to give up control of the ZNPP could serve as an initial gesture of Moscow’s intention to engage in further negotiations in good faith.

In the meantime, and to encourage Russian cooperation on this point, Ukraine’s partners need to double down on the negative incentives of continued Russian occupation of the plant. For instance, expanding and ensuring enforcement of sanctions on Rosatom staff and the company’s global operations – and tying these designations directly to the company’s assumed ownership of the plant – can help drive home the fact that continued control of the plant will bring with it more pain and little benefit.

A failure to end Russian control of the ZNPP will have consequences well beyond the war in Ukraine. If Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine’s nuclear energy infrastructure and military seizure of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant goes unpunished, it will be a lesson for others on whether they can get away with something similar in the future. The war in Ukraine has been precedent-setting in many ways; this is one precedent that can still be avoided.

© RUSI, 2025.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

For terms of use, see Website Terms and Conditions of Use.

Have an idea for a Commentary you'd like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we'll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. View full guidelines for contributors.