National Security Marks Chile’s Presidential Runoff

On Sunday 16 November, Chile held presidential and congressional elections renewing half of the Senate and the entirety of the Deputies chamber. Since none of the eight presidential candidates obtained more than 50%, the country will proceed to a runoff on Sunday 14 December between the top seeded, the communist candidate Jannette Jara, who heads a left-wing coalition, and the right-winger José Antonio Kast, who is seeking the presidency for the third time.

Although the right had hoped to secure a majority in both chambers and ideally the 4/7 quorum needed to modify certain laws, the results fell short due to major parties deciding to run on separate lists. As a consequence, the composition of Congress will not change significantly and the next government (2026-2030) will have to negotiate with the opposition, likely pursuing more moderate security and economic policies, by far the biggest worries among Chileans.

In the campaign trial, most presidential candidates presented similar diagnoses on public security. They agreed that crime levels are high, Chileans feel fear and instability, organised crime has strengthened considerably, the porous northern borders with Bolivia and Peru are a major contributor to illegal and uncontrolled immigration, some territories have been overtaken by narco‑criminal groups due to state abandonment and that terrorist activity linked to Mapuche-radicalised groups in the Araucanía region must be reduced.

Despite a harsher tone supporting iron-fist policies, Chile needs not just a security state but a national security architecture that includes intelligence, military modernisation and cross-border cooperation, to counter the rising transnational crime reshaping politics and policy in the country.

A New Security Architecture

Candidate Jara aims to maintain President Gabriel Boric’s public security approach: letting public prosecutors lead police efforts on organised crime and referring low policing to municipalities, even though, in reality, municipal security teams lack enough authority. For border control in the so-called Macrozona Norte, Jara would like to have the police as the main security actors, supported by the army. In the southern areas affected by Mapuche insurgency, the Macrozona Sur, the marine corps and the army should continue carrying most of the burden, allowing police and prosecutors to operate in Arauco, Biobío, Malleco and Cautín, some of the hot spots of rural violence. Here the armed forces remain deployed under constitutional emergency provisions which, due to constant use, have effectively ceased to be ‘exceptional.’

Jara frames both northern and southern challenges as criminal issues requiring police solutions rather than national security threats requiring a whole‑of‑government approach. One reason observers believe Jara has struggled and may fail to win the presidency, is that she represents too much of the current government that has failed to deter crime despite a battery of measures that included the recent creation of the Ministry of Public Security.

José Antonio Kast, by contrast, projects the opposite image. His campaign is built on two pillars: security and economic growth. According to recent polls, voters think he is better positioned to lead on these two areas than Jara. Kast assembled a team, together with collaborators of Evelyn Matthei, a centre-right candidate defeated in the first round, dominated by retired generals and admirals known for their toughness. Kast brought in figures like former mayor Rodolfo Carter, known for effective crime‑fighting strategies in La Florida, a commune in Santiago.

Kast’s coalition (made up of the Republicans, Libertarians and Social Christians) adopted a hard‑line stance on narco‑crime, illegal immigration and insurgent violence in the southern macrozone. His potential administration is bound to implement ‘emergency plans,’ including intensified use of military technology in the borders and some troops likely in major cities to support police in combating organised crime.

The main risk of this approach is the potential mission drift of the armed forces, weakening strategic and deterrent capabilities. It is unlikely the runoff will soften Kast’s security stance, yet the composition of Congress will constrain his agenda, especially regarding budgets, legislation enabling greater military involvement, or a shift toward a national security approach rather than one focused solely on internal security.

The creation of a genuine national security governance model demands a robust and effective intelligence system. Congress is debating reforms to the 2004 intelligence law. A revised bill should better integrate the currently weak and inefficient National Intelligence Agency with the military services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, police forces, the prison service, the foreign ministry and other relevant government agencies such as customs, tax authorities and anti‑money laundering units.

Internationally, Chile’s relations with Peru and Bolivia will shape the next government’s ability to confront irregular migration and transnational trafficking networks. Under Jara, collaboration would likely follow the limited existing frameworks led by police and civilian agencies. Kast, by contrast, may seek to expand intelligence sharing with other countries invested in countering regional criminality, such as Ecuador or Argentina and foreign partners such as the US, UK, Spain and Italy in line with his emphasis on stronger state coercive capacity. Argentina, for example, is launching a new border patrol-style initiative aimed at strengthening coordination with police and intelligence agencies to better tackle cross-border trafficking. For Chilean candidates, a shift toward a more effective cooperation in the neighbourhood will be indispensable to any national security reform.

Diplomacy: Continuity or Change?

Despite these challenges, foreign policy remains underdeveloped for both candidates. Jara is expected to maintain Boric’s approach, though less personalist and less prone to provoking foreign leaders such as Donald Trump. Her government would emphasise multilateralism, which they view more as an end than as a means of advancing national interests. They would continue supporting former president Michelle Bachelet for UN Secretary‑General, maintain strong support for Palestine and criticism of Israel and uphold a respectful posture toward China. Ukraine and Taiwan would not be priorities.

Kast’s campaign has been vague on foreign policy. However, he is likely to rely on the more experienced internationalists from the centre-right, some who might have already worked under the late president Sebastián Piñera. Kast’s guiding principle would be the national interest. Multilateralism would be instrumental rather than ideological. Neighbouring countries and China would remain key priorities and a closer relation with the United States should be expected.

Whoever wins will inherit a set of fragile but indispensable bilateral relationships. With Argentina facing its own internal battles, Peru navigating political volatility and Brazil seeking greater regional influence, Santiago will need a steady diplomatic hand.

Not Enough on Defence

Under any of the two contestants, national defence will be overshadowed by the demands of public security, particularly under a Kast government. The risk is that military support for internal security could undermine training, equipment maintenance and strategic modernisation. A focus on border control and counter‑insurgency could crowd out long‑term investment in armoured forces, F‑16 upgrades and the replacement of frigates and submarines. This will be closely watched by Chile’s traditional defence partners, such as the UK, which aims to sell Type 31 frigates to the Navy as replacements for vessels nearing the end of their service life.

Kast is expected to appoint experienced defence professionals, in contrast to the current administration and Jara’s team, even though the old centre‑left once dominated such expertise. This could improve defence governance. Still, a major challenge for both candidates is the shortage of troops. Along with initial military actions to secure borders and suppress terrorism in the south, a priority will be rebuilding army and marine corps capability.

Reconciling Domestic and Foreign Affairs

Latin American countries face a dilemma balancing national security and economic sustainability. At the same time, the region’s uptake in military modernisation, for example, in Chile but also in Argentina, Peru and Colombia, signals not merely resource protection, but a long-term geopolitical ambition. Reconciling these external pressures with internal security demands makes reforming national security architecture a critical task.

Beyond domestic challenges, the next administration must position Chile within a South America pulled between geopolitical competition. Jara’s presidency would align more naturally with left governments from Brasilia to Beijing. Kast, meanwhile, would likely recalibrate these ties through a more conservative, market-friendly lens, prioritising stability and shared interests as well as ideological affinity. He has recently said his favourite international leader is Georgia Meloni and in 2021, during his previous run for the presidency, made a trip to Washington where among other right-wing politicians he met with then Florida senator Marco Rubio.

Now that the US has published its National Security Strategy, countries like Chile may play a pivotal role to Washington’s ‘America First’ principle that seeks renewed alliances and partnerships in the region. Nonetheless, whether Latin American governments can realistically contribute to Washington’s collective security expectations remains a significant operational and strategic challenge. Concerns span multiple fronts, from combined maritime patrolling to countering cybersecurity threats, areas where many countries must significantly upgrade capabilities to meet US national security standars. Candidates like Jose Antonio Kast, who already enjoy a degree of affinity with the White House, could find a unique opportunity to align their national security playbook with that of a friendlier, yet demanding United States.

The direction chosen on 14 December will influence not only Chile’s internal security trajectory but also its role within the shifting strategic landscape of the Southern Cone.

© RUSI, 2025.

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