US Naval Build-Up Highlights Sea Power Projection in Latin America

When news broke earlier this year that the UK government was in talks with Brazilian counterparts to sell HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, two assault ships that had not been to sea since 2023 and 2017, respectively, and due to be scrapped as part of widespread defence cuts, the signals pointed at a larger exchange of weapons systems between both countries.

Brazil has a recent track record of buying and refurbishing British vessels such as the NAM Atlántico, formerly the UK Royal Navy platform HMS Ocean, which lead also to a four year contract with Babcock International Group to deliver maintenance and systems support.

No surprise caused then that on board HMS Mersey during the recent DSEI conference, Brazilian representatives signed off the purchase of the HMS Bulwark. The vessel will be used for cargo and personnel transport, essential during humanitarian emergencies as part, chiefly, of the protection of the Blue Amazon, Brazil’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) rich in natural and mineral resources. ‘This closer relationship strengthens diplomatic ties between the two countries’, said Admiral Edgar, Director-General of Materiel of the Navy.

Brazil’s naval acquisition strategy mixes second hand purchases with the local Tamandaré-class programme, a series of frigates being built locally with German shipbuilder Thyssenkrupp. The plan strategically incorporates a series of indigenous companies such as Embraer, and foreign companies including multinational MBDA and the Italian-owned Leonardo, to help develop its domestic defence industry. First-of-class frigate Tamandaré is planned to enter commissioning later in 2025, with other ships doing the same until 2029.

Cooperation with the US

Yet, Brazil is running its dual tracked defence diplomacy with Western and Eastern nations. Closer ties with China have followed during the recent years, from including the PLA Marine Corps in joint military exercises in 2024, to promoting the attachés Brazil sends to their Beijing embassy to the rank of general. Whilst the UK-Brazil relation might remain a healthy one despite the Chinese factor, US-Brazil relations are not going through their best moment.

The defence bilateral relation between both countries goes back almost two centuries and in modern times, the War Department cites, almost all US Southern Command-sponsored exercises in the region feature participation by Brazil.

In July, Washington cancelled its participation in the Space Conference of the Americas in Brasilia, and shortly afterwards Brazil cancelled Operation Formosa, the exercise that hosted Chinese troops last year, citing budget limits. Diplomacy is not marrying well the Trump-Lula da Silva balance, two presidents that stand for different world views and see the future of the global order in opposing directions.

However, the United States is by far a pivotal actor in shaping Latin America’s naval trajectory, even as new actors make alliances with old friends.

Naval cooperation has historically centred on interoperability through exercises such as UNITAS, the longest-running multinational maritime exercise in the world, which regularly brings together US Navy forces with Latin American partners.

Military Build-Up in the Caribbean

The US has supported maritime domain awareness initiatives, providing radar and command-and-control systems to enhance partner navies’ capacity against illegal fishing, narcotics trafficking and other transnational threats. These measures reflect a dual US strategy: sustaining a technological edge in high-end warfighting while reinforcing partnerships that secure collective control over key sea lanes in the Pacific and Atlantic.

The current US Southern Command’s deployment to waters in the Caribbean Sea near Central and South America is an unprecedented naval build-up. Aimed at taming the drug trafficking flows stemming mostly from Venezuela, the military standoff in the Caribbean Sea adds a layer of urgency to Latin America’s naval modernisation, reinforcing the idea that maritime power is both a tool of deterrence and geopolitical signalling.

Washington’s freedom of navigation patrols near Venezuelan waters, combined with Caracas’ militarisation of its exclusive economic zone and tensions with Guyana, highlight how contested maritime spaces can escalate into flashpoints involving global powers. This confrontation serves as a reminder that naval acquisitions are not only about replacing outdated platforms but also about preparing for scenarios where regional disputes intersect with the strategic agendas of extra-hemispheric actors. Latin American states are investing in more capable and versatile fleets to safeguard their sovereignty, protect resources and avoid being caught unprepared in the event of great power rivalries spilling into their maritime domains.

Washington is aware and working its way to cement military relationships where possible. Most recently, the State Department gave its the approval for the sale of twelve F-16 units to the Peruvian Air Force priced at $3.42 billion. Washington’s recent approval underscores its determination to maintain influence in the region’s defence procurement markets.

Lima had been eyeing new warplanes to replace their aging fleet making trips to Sweden to see the JAS-39 Gripen. The moves come following the recent green light from the US to let Argentina buy F-16s from Denmark, potentially making these two countries plus Chile a triangular zone of F-16 dominated skies.

Peru is undergoing heavy defence purchases that are depleting its strained defence budgets. Last year Peru selected HD Hyundai Heavy Industries the contract to work with Peruvian state-owned SIMA in the construction of one frigate, one OPV and two landing crafts units by 2029, a big win for the South Koreans above bids made by Spain, Italy and the Netherlands shipyards. Meanwhile, SIMA has earned itself a good reputation as builders, showing encouraging new projects such as the BAP Río Huarmey and BAP Río Nepeña christened early in the year as part of a series of new units designed to boost Peru’s maritime domain.

European Replacement Frigates

Colombia, the closest country to the hotspot that Venezuela has become, signed in late 2024 between Damen and Colombian shipbuilder COTECMAR to build a frigate on its shipyard based the SIGMA 10514 series, which Damen previously built for Indonesia and Mexico. Saab also came on board with to provide their combat management systems, sensors and radars for the new frigate scheduled for delivery in 2030.

As well, new players such as the Turkish defence complex have been making inroads in search for getting a piece of the current naval modernisation wave. HAVELSAN signed an agreement with the Chilean Navy for the upgrade of their M-class frigates with ADVENT command-and-control capabilities, becoming the ninth country worldwide to join this combat ecosystem.

Chile is on route to replace at least eight frigates averaging over 30 years old of service. The Navy launched its National Shipbuilding Plan considering frigates, auxiliary ships and logistic units. A first of its kind and part of the programme is the polar icebreaker, Almirante Viel key for the country’s Antarctic projection. Chile is expecting heavy competition for who will become the main partner in constructing their frigates. Although Babcock’s Arrowhead 140 frigate design is a strong contestant, news about the picked provider will come only in 2026. Earlier in the year, unconfirmed reports circulated about a potential sale to Chile of the HMS Argyll, as an addition to their fleet which currently has three ex-RN Type 23s in service.

Argentina, on the other hand, is trying to make a limited purchase of frigates eyeing potential offers of two Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates from Denmark, as a continuation of their recent partnership for acquiring F-16 planes. In July, their Ministry of Defence confirmed that the Navy was in negotiations with the Royal Danish Navy to replace the recently decommissioned ARA Hércules and ARA Heroína. The Iver Huitfeldt-class could give the Argentine Navy revamped air defence, surface warfare and anti-submarine capabilities with a vessel that has proven NATO operations experience. Recently, however, these frigates failed to operate and Denmark halted the necessary repairs forcing its replacement from the Danish Fleet. Another option for Buenos Aires will be the Italian Maestrale-class, recently decommissioned, with anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

What It All Means

The procurement choices expose the intricate web of strategic partnerships and competing defence suppliers. The reliance on European shipyards, the entry of Turkey’s companies into Chile and the strong hand of South Korea in Peru all show how Latin America has become a competitive market for global defence industries.

These dynamics create long-term dependencies that go beyond technology transfer and into training, maintenance and shared operational concepts. They also illustrate how naval modernisation is being used by governments to leverage diplomatic capital and negotiate their place in the evolving international order.

Ultimately, naval modernisation in Latin America is a visible signal of ambition. While Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina are at different levels of capability and budgetary strength, all four are investing in navies that can protect resources, deter adversaries and project power regionally and beyond. The process will be uneven, constrained by fiscal realities and political shifts, but it underscores a fundamental truth: the oceans remain central to the prosperity and security of the continent.

The trajectory of these naval programs will not only shape Latin American defence balances but also determine how external powers, that is, Europe and increasingly Asia, engage with the region in the decades to come. For Washington, the task will be to balance its global commitments with a sustained presence in Latin America, ensuring that the modernisation of regional navies does not drift into the orbit of rivals such as China and Russia, whose influence is slowly expanding through defence diplomacy.

© RUSI, 2025.

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