Criticism of the 'Reverse Kissinger'

In recent years, the idea of ​​the so-called ‘reverse Kissinger’ has become increasingly popular in the United States, which is based on the alleged possibility of the US government reaching an agreement with Russia to break its strategic cooperation with China, thereby reducing the combined threat. Supporters of this idea are inspired by the results of the US policy in the 1970s to improve relations with China, which was the product of advice given to American leaders during this period by the National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Certain elements of the ‘reverse Kissinger’ strategy have been observed in US policy towards Russia in the last six months, which is recognized by both experts and individual representatives of the US administration. At the same time, this approach has not yet had any impact on Russia’s aggressive behaviour in the European theatre, but has probably only encouraged China to pursue even greater strategic rapprochement with Russia, the lack of alternative to which is increasingly being stated by the leaders of both countries. Given the dangers associated with such rapprochement, including for European and global security, it is appropriate to critically assess the idea of ​​a ‘reverse Kissinger’, identify its main shortcomings and try to propose an alternative strategy.

The US Sacrifice of Taiwan

First of all, it is worth honestly admitting that the original ‘Kissinger’ is significantly overestimated, mythologized, and its frankly negative consequences are mostly not taken into account at all. The official version is that through a number of strategic concessions to China, the US managed to worsen Sino-Soviet relations.

Among these concessions, it is worth paying special attention to the unprecedented betrayal by the US of its official ally at that time, the Republic of China (the official name of Taiwan), which led in 1971 to the replacement of Taiwan by communist China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the withdrawal of US troops from the territory of Taiwan, the unilateral rupture of all US-Taiwan security agreements, and the loss of diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as an independent country not only by the US, but also by the vast majority of countries in the world.

If we add to this the comprehensive promotion of foreign direct investment in China, including from US companies, as well as the opening of China's access to global markets, which has transformed China into the world's largest economy, the current Chinese threat to both global security and Taiwan is a direct consequence of Kissinger's strategy.

Moreover, this strategy not only created new threats, but also did not lead to the results at which it was supposedly aimed. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC and the withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan in 1979, Soviet-Chinese relations only began to improve. The two communist countries, which, due to ideological differences, had been in a state of acute confrontation since the late 1950s, which included direct military clashes between the parties over disputed territories in the area of ​​Damansky Island in 1969, resolved most of the contentious issues during the 1980s and moved on to direct cooperation.

As early as 1982, in his speech in Tashkent, the leader of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev expressed hope for the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, and also emphasized that, unlike other countries, the USSR had always recognized Taiwan as part of the PRC. In the same 1982, the foreign ministers of the two countries met for the first time in 20 years. During the negotiations, the Soviet leadership was presented with three main requirements of the PRC for the normalization of bilateral relations – a reduction in the number of Soviet troops on the common borders, an end to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (where the Chinese provided large-scale military assistance to the rebels long before the first American Stinger missiles appeared there in 1986). As early as 1984, the countries signed agreements on economic and technological cooperation and created a special bilateral Committee to develop this cooperation. The volume of bilateral trade doubled in the first year after the signing of the agreements.

The beginning of ‘perestroika’ in the USSR did not stop the Sino-Soviet rapprochement. In 1986, the leader of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev declared his readiness to eliminate the ‘three obstacles’ and announced a significant reduction in Soviet troops in Mongolia, their partial withdrawal from Afghanistan and promotion of the normalization of Vietnamese-Chinese relations. In February 1989, Soviet troops completely left Afghanistan, and in May of the same year, Gorbachev met with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, after which the latter issued the directive ‘End the past, open the future’, which officially ended the period of geopolitical confrontation between the two countries.

In 1991, Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation was resumed, and in 1992, not only the supply of weapons but also the transfer of sensitive technologies began. Already in the 1990s, China, thanks to this, switched from operating second-generation aircraft to fourth and fourth+, received modern anti-ship missiles and shipboard air defence systems. In 1996, the countries agreed on the licensed production of 200 Su-27s in China with the transfer of technology. And this was only the beginning. China began a confident move towards the status of the only state in the world capable of competing with the United States in the conventional field. It is noteworthy that China's obvious efforts to modernize its military capabilities and assistance of the Russian Federation in this regard did not affect Western policy in any way - in the 1990s, Western investments in production facilities in China increased sharply (over 400 billion dollars in ten years), and in 2001 the country became a member of the World Trade Organization with virtually unlimited access to global markets.

…Toward a Greater Unity Between China and Russia…

Thus, Kissinger's strategy not only did not destroy the Russian-Chinese alliance, but on the contrary, restored it from the ashes of a thirty-year geopolitical confrontation, and also created the prerequisites for the current economic and military power of the PRC, which would never have arisen under other conditions. It is obvious that the strategy of ‘reverse Kissinger’ – an attempt to reduce the threat of China using this power against US interests by appeasing Russia – has even less chance of success. Moreover, ‘reverse Kissinger’ is a direct path to further strengthening bilateral Russian-Chinese cooperation and increasing the threat of direct military conflict between the US and China.

Since the announcement by some high-ranking representatives of the new US administration of their commitment to the ideas of a ‘reverse Kissinger’, cooperation between Russia and China has only increased. China, which after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine took a cautious and expectant role, began to respond much more actively to Russia’s constant and insistent calls for maximum rapprochement. In 2025, the intensity of bilateral meetings at the highest level reached a historical record. In addition to the obvious defence and economic cooperation (an important element of which are joint efforts to de-dollarize the global economy and naval cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region), in the spring of 2025, agreements were reached between Russia and China on the interaction of special services (the Russian FSB and the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC), state propaganda (the Russian Ministry of Culture and the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC), and even the placement of a joint nuclear facility on the Moon (Roscosmos and the China State Space Administration).

The culmination of the current dubious successes of the ‘reverse Kissinger’ can be considered Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow to participate in the Victory Parade in 2025, despite the fact that the Chinese side had long hesitated about expediency of the visit. During the visit, the parties signed an agreement on deepening strategic partnership, more than 20 other interstate and interdepartmental documents, and made a joint statement, in which they emphasized the further strengthening of not only military-technical, but also military cooperation, including the organization of joint sea and air patrols. President Xi also called Putin an ally in building a new world order for the first time and expressed support for the Russian Federation in the war against Ukraine, emphasizing the fairness of Russian demands on Ukraine and the West.

It is obvious that the search for compromises with Russia and increased pressure on China only encourages the parties to get closer. In the end, there is nothing surprising in this. The main ideologist, initiator and driver of such a rapprochement, as well as the construction of a broader anti-Western coalition, which should include not only Iran and the DPRK, but also the countries of the Global South, is Russia. The leaders of the Russian Federation and Putin personally have repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing world order, which is based on the global dominance of the United States, for decades, and demanded its revision in favour of dividing the world into spheres of influence between several ‘great powers’. Even in his famous interview with Tucker Carlson, which for some reason was so popular with certain American politicians and experts, Putin openly says that he believes that the United States, as a global empire, is in the process of its decline, and the American leadership should not try to resist this, but instead adapt to the reality in which new centres of geopolitical influence around China will inevitably appear, among which Russia will play an important role.

As already noted, Putin is consistent in his ideas about changing the world order and has been expressing them for a long time, practically from the very beginning of his presidency. At the same time, Russia's claim to the right to be one of the ‘great powers’ that should divide the world into spheres of influence is based exclusively on military potential, and especially on leadership in the field of nuclear weapons. Russia, whose economy is comparable to the economy of Canada, no longer has any tools either to achieve or maintain its status as a great power, except for the military, and therefore there are no other means for this except war. The ideal situation for changing the world order in favour of the Russian Federation would be a global war, which Russia, like the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1939, not only seeks, but also encourages in every way.

Undoubtedly, the most desirable scenario for a global war for Russia would be a war between the United States and China, which would not only weaken these two countries, but also allow Russia to more confidently focus on the European theatre. Russian analysts close to the Kremlin quite frankly state that such a scenario is desirable for Russia. In addition, it is known that Russian intelligence is actively collecting information about possible triggers for such a war, among which the conflict around Taiwan is considered the most promising. It can be assumed that Russian intelligence is not limited to collecting information about such triggers, but also actively contributes to their aggravation through its own influence agents in Taipei, Washington and Beijing. In fact, it was thanks to the work of such agents in Tokyo under the leadership of Richard Sorge, and in Washington under the leadership of Ishaq Amerov, that the Soviet Union managed to provoke Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and, as a result, the Japanese-American war. In this context, the appointment of Dmitry Polyansky, who previously served as the head of the Russian mission in Taiwan for three years, as the first deputy representative of the Russian Federation to the UN in 2018, seems not in vain. In his new position at the UN, Polyansky has already distinguished himself with several public statements that provoke aggravation between the US and China, as well as the DPRK.

…Built a Stronger and More Self-Assured China

China is certainly also interested in revising the existing geopolitical status quo, but unlike Russia, it has all the capabilities to achieve its goals without destroying the world order. Moreover, today China is perhaps the most competitive player precisely within the existing global rules, which it skilfully both uses and abuses. It is these rules that have allowed China to become the leading manufacturing economy in the world, on whose products all other countries depend without exception. In fact, the policy of economic isolationism pursued by President Trump is an admission of the fact that the United States is losing to China on the field that was once built for American global dominance.

China is not only not interested in a direct military confrontation with the West, but also in the military seizure of Taiwan. At the same time, China is deterred from using military force against Taiwan not so much by the risk of intervention in the conflict by the United States, which has not had any obligations to provide Taiwan with military assistance since 1979, as by the inevitable application of economic sanctions by the entire West in such a case, as well as the acceleration of the search for an alternative to China as a universal supplier. Unlike Russia, China has something to lose in the event of war and is not interested in spheres of influence, since it can most profitably realize its interests in a globally competitive world.

The vast majority of experts also agree with this assessment. Thus, in a study conducted by CSIS with the participation of 64 leading experts on China in 2023, only 11 percent of experts believed that China would seek unification with Taiwan at any cost in the next 15 years, while 44% defined the horizon as 2049, and 42% generally answered that China could wait as long as necessary, provided that such an opportunity remains. 80% of experts did not see in Chinese military manoeuvres an indicator of preparation for an immediate military solution to the Taiwan issue.

Accordingly, in the Russia-China tandem, Russia is the one most interested in the alliance, the most aggressive in its methods, and the most maximalist in its aspirations. Russia is purposefully seeking a global war as the only way to restore its great power status and sees its war of conquest in Ukraine as a tool for destroying the existing world order, including by demonstrating the inability of either the United States or the West as a whole to be reliable security providers even in Europe. China is certainly interested in Russia weakening the West, but it itself does not seek to participate in a blatant violation of international law. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China took a relatively cautious position in its interaction with Russia, primarily due to its reluctance to suffer the negative economic consequences associated with secondary sanctions.

The current US position that Russia will not be punished for waging an aggressive war of conquest against Ukraine makes Russia much less toxic for cooperation with China. Moreover, the actual recognition of the possibility of capturing new territories with impunity significantly increases the risk of Chinese military aggression against Taiwan and other countries in the region, to which Russia is clearly pushing China. Thus, the joint statement of the leaders of the two countries, which was published on May 8, 2025 in Moscow, in the original version prepared by the Kremlin, contained wording on joint actions to economically and militarily contain Japan. At the request of the Chinese side, these words were removed, which once again indicates that China remains committed to the non-confrontational model.

Thus, to weaken Sino-Russian cooperation, reduce global threats, and deter China from moving from a regime of, albeit tough, competition to a regime of confrontation with the West, agreements with Russia are counterproductive. Russia in this situation is an example of behaviour undesirable for the West, which should be punished, not encouraged. The best way to deter China from crossing red lines is to demonstrate what can happen in the event of such a transition. China has something to lose and may be content with preserving the existing global status quo, where leadership is a subject of competition that does not involve the use of military force. Preventing China from moving to acute confrontation is possible and requires the United States to reach an understanding with China on several principles. The most important of these are: recognition of the need to avoid a US-China military conflict; China’s agreement to refrain from the use of military force against Taiwan; joint control over the non-proliferation of sensitive technologies (including preventing their transfer to the Russian Federation, Iran and the DPRK); maintaining global financial and trade stability.

Reaching an understanding on these issues would not only avoid the risks of escalation but would also allow China to engage in pressure on Russia to restore European security. The Chinese leadership’s willingness to join in such pressure would likely be even greater if, along with a draft of a strategic competition agreement that would enshrine the above principles, President Xi also received reliable intelligence on Russian operations to provoke a Sino-American military conflict.

© RUSI, 2025.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the authors', and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

For terms of use, see Website Terms and Conditions of Use.

Have an idea for a Commentary you'd like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we'll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. View full guidelines for contributors.