Beijing Learns from Trump’s Relationship to Europe and Putin

The recent Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, along with subsequent meetings between European leaders, President Trump, and President Zelensky in Washington, largely confirmed Beijing’s earlier perceptions of the state of the transatlantic relationship. For China, both events underscored the unpredictability of US diplomacy under Trump and the opportunities this presents, often without requiring any action beyond maintaining the current course.

Trump's Inconsistency Helps China

One of the main lessons for Beijing is the inconsistency of President Trump. His frequent shifts in position make it challenging to understand his stance on any particular issue. Unpredictability is generally not something Beijing prefers; instead, it values predictability and stability in international relations. However, Beijing has adopted a ‘wait and see’ position, exploiting the vacuums created by the US in the global arena to decrease the United States’ overall influence. It is likely that this pattern of exploiting US-created vacuums – especially in multilateral settings and rule-setting arenas – will continue and intensify as Trump’s foreign policy remains transactional and unpredictable.

For international trade, this means slow shifts in international standards driven by China, increased compliance risks, and potential extended dependency on Chinese-led institutions. Analysts, such as Da Wei, director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing, and Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, highlight how Trump's foreign policy actions, including alienating US allies and dismantling agencies like USAID, benefit China by reducing American power and resistance to Chinese outreach. This allows Beijing to improve ties with US allies, capitalise on US vulnerabilities and position itself as a stable alternative in international relations.

Alliance Reliability

While the European participants and President Trump appeared largely in agreement at the Washington meeting following the Alaska Summit, it has not escaped Beijing's notice that the transatlantic alliance is experiencing eroding trust and rifts. China has long viewed Europe predominantly through the lens of the United States, accusing Europe of being merely its puppet, and has thus been encouraging European strategic autonomy. This narrative has supported its preference for a weakened or completely dismantled transatlantic alliance.

During his second term, China unsurprisingly quickly exploited the changed tone in Trump’s diplomacy towards Europe. Perhaps the most forthright comment came already in March 2025, from Lu Shaye, China’s special envoy for European affairs, who said he was ‘appalled’ by how the Trump administration had treated its European allies, urging ‘European friends’ to compare Washington’s policies with those of China’s goodwill and ‘win-win’ cooperation. Already then, Lu Shaye hinted that a peace deal for Ukraine should include China, as it should ‘not be determined solely by the US and Russia.’

China-US diplomacy under President Trump has often been characterised as transactional and unreliable for allies. Even to its closest allies in the Washington meeting in mid-August, President Trump’s promises were vague and inconsistent. This creates opportunities for China to exploit divisions in the transatlantic alliance, in Europe and Asia. Beijing’s perception of US alliances as weak also reinforces its narrative of the West being in decline. This should act as a warning for regions like Taiwan and the Philippines, where similar dynamics could unfold if the US prioritises deals with China over defending its allies.

Before agreeing to participate in the meeting in Alaska, Russian President Putin called President Xi. Notable from the call was President Putin’s assertion that ‘strategic partnership coordination between Russia and China will not change under any circumstances’, and that ‘Russia will continue maintaining close communication with China’. Moscow thus recognises the importance of considering China’s strategic interests when engaging with the US. This was later also demonstrated by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, who watered down Western ideas of security guarantees by stating that ‘the real security guarantees for Ukraine would have to involve its biggest ally, China’.

China’s own perception of alliances has included systematic condemnation. Still, it can also be easily labelled as camouflaging its own alliance-building, albeit in a different form from traditional Western alliances. Although China’s ‘model partnership for a new era’ with Russia can be easily seen as an alliance, and Russia has called China its ally on several occasions, China’s official speaking points condemn alliances. For China, NATO and its alliances are reminiscent of the confrontational blocs of the Cold War era. While China traditionally does not form equal alliances, labelling such structures as partnerships should not mislead into believing that these formations, whether bilateral or multilateral, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, are not tools for China to advance its geopolitical ambitions.

For China, the Symbolic Nature of the Alaska Summit Revealed European Anxieties

Chinese state media, such as CGTN and Xinhua, described the Alaska Summit as largely symbolic. They saw it as a way for Russia to break a diplomatic deadlock and allow the US and Russia to demonstrate strength – President Trump as a peacemaker independently of allies, and President Putin challenging Western isolation narratives. Interestingly, while the Alaska Summit helped President Putin somewhat to break his isolation, the US, acting without allies, performed in isolation, much to China’s satisfaction. The symbolic nature of the talks also served China well. As long as the dialogue remains ongoing, China can hope to avoid secondary sanctions and benefit from the US’ attention being predominantly directed elsewhere, away from the Indo-Pacific.

The recent gatherings in both Alaska and Washington have exposed European anxieties, along with the emergence of different coalitions within the European Union. Following the Alaska Summit, the Chinese state mouthpiece Global Times described European leaders as desperately trying to sway Trump but feeling intensely powerless.

The level and commitment to supporting Ukraine varies among European Union member states, and this has no doubt been noted in Beijing. It may not be surprising that China’s most uncomplicated ties are with those who are not close supporters of Ukraine, such as Hungary and Spain. In addition, Beijing almost certainly did not just pay attention to those who travelled to Washington with Zelensky, but also to those who didn’t. In this regard, China has tightened its relationship with European non-EU states such as Serbia and Georgia.

The outcome from the recent meetings, with no formal resolutions reached, allows Russia to buy time and gain legitimacy. This works well for Beijing, as it not only secures itself, at least temporarily, from the imposition of secondary tariffs but also gives it time to advance its geopolitical agenda, not least regionally and in the Global South; for example, China has various defence agreements with 35 countries in Africa.

Without Russia agreeing on ‘just peace’ in Ukraine, the war can drag on for a long time. This scenario could benefit China but be a terrible one for Europe in the long run. If US policy fluctuates, Europeans could face high costs, and the fragile existing unity might weaken due to economic fatigue, domestic populism and political divisions, resulting in a loss of momentum and reduced aid for Ukraine. Together, Russia and China can influence unity in a way that the Europeans alone risk filling the gap, helping Ukraine only temporarily.

De-escalation Tactics

The recent meetings and engagements illustrate a model of a ‘dignified exit’ from escalations, a strategy China might adopt in its disputes, such as in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, to de-escalate without making any concessions. Chinese coverage has emphasised how the no-deal Alaska outcome and Washington's pressure on Europe have instead heightened US-Europe tensions. European leaders united behind Zelensky, announcing aid packages and stressing the importance of inclusion in talks, but this was seen as a reactive display of weakness.

Conclusion: More Upside than Downside for China

The recent events have created opportunities for China, if not to attract, at least to keep Europe away from US-led containment efforts. Although, for the time being, due to security dependencies on the US, most European countries have chosen not to confront the US in trade negotiations and it is unlikely that Europe will establish normalised trade with China. However, China has demonstrated that it pushes forward sedulously, looking for vacuums and openings it can exploit. Engagement efforts with Brussels have already commenced, with China attempting to pursue economic deals and even proposing roles in Ukraine's reconstruction and peacekeeping to enhance its credibility. This supports China's long-term goal of dividing Western unity, as a weakened transatlantic alliance and a divided NATO give Beijing an advantage in global competition.

Various future scenarios can favour Beijing. For the short and medium term, as long as Presidents Xi and Putin remain in power, Beijing can trust that Russia will stay by its side. Hence, a potential thaw in US-Russia relations could actually benefit China globally. By parroting its neutrality, China can sustain its ‘no-limits’ partnership with Moscow while avoiding US escalation and additional economic pain. Such development could indirectly pressure Taiwan, as the US transactionalism signals an unsure commitment to distant allies.

Continuing war in Ukraine has so far had little consequences for China and the US President’s unpredictability works in favour of Beijing. Market-driven concessions have so far followed the US containment of China, and China has successfully utilised the critical minerals’ dependence as its geopolitical leverage. In addition, even if the US were to move on to sanctioning China, China has for over a decade actively built its self-reliance and is likely more prepared to bear the consequences of a heightened trade war than the US is.

Overall, Chinese sources have framed the current developments as evidence of a declining US hegemony, with Trump's actions accelerating the emergence of a multipolar world. China sees no reason to change its position on Ukraine, continuing to promote a political resolution to the war and positioning a role for itself in post-war Ukraine.

Beijing also views itself as being in a strong position, with considerable leverage, especially as it is one of the world's largest oil importers and has thus far avoided sanctions. The Trump-Putin Alaska summit and subsequent meetings with European leaders have provided Beijing with valuable insights into US diplomacy, the reliability of US alliances, and opportunities to strengthen its position on the global stage.

© RUSI, 2025.

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