The Alaska Summit as Theatre: Moscow’s View Beyond Ukraine

Friday’s much-anticipated summit between Presidents Putin and Trump in Alaska concluded and immediately generated another, this time in Washington. The dissection of these kind of events tends to be couched in identifying the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the proceedings, but the very fact of the meeting is an extraordinary piece of political theatre, rife with symbolism.

For Russia, the Alaska summit was never about Ukraine, which was nominally part of the agenda, but a foil for what Putin really wanted to discuss – the future of US-Russia relations. The summit, the post-mortem of it and the subsequent meetings in Washington can be linked together by three key threads.

First, these events demonstrated how Russia conceptualises its place in the world, and the enduring importance of history. Second, as part of this, it highlighted the significance with which the Kremlin affords its bilateral relationship with the United States. And third, it revealed a self-conscious element, as to how Putin is managing the perception of his leadership with his other allies.

Russia in the World

Barring a few disgruntled military bloggers rueful about the prospect of territorial concessions, the consensus in the Russian media is that Alaska was an unmitigated success; with Europe and Ukraine sidelined from the conversation, the leaders of Russia and the US were portrayed as calmly assessing matters of state. Much has also been made of the perceived rupture (razriv) of the West’s united front against Russia, hailing an apparent end to attempts to diplomatically freeze Russia out. The conclusion appears to be that the satisfactory result of the meeting was a return to diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy.

All of this is premature, given the extensive discussions in Washington, with more bi-and tri-laterals anticipated. But it gives us some indication about the degree of rumination going on in Russia about the country’s place in the world.

A country rooted in its history and bound (and assisted) by its physical geography, Russia views itself as a civilisational power with a kind of global exceptionalism, occupying a unique place in the world and given spiritual purpose by its Orthodox Christian tradition. Supported by its geographical size; significant reserves of natural resources and its nuclear and military clout, the Kremlin considers this exceptionalism to be the driver and legitimiser of Russia’s interventions in most regional and global affairs. This idea grounds Russia’s foreign policy interests in a historical context that broadly account for what can be called the country’s ‘national interests’. It is partly for this reason that President Putin and his senior diplomats often issue long lectures on Russia’s version of history both in the media and in seemingly inappropriate diplomatic settings – in Alaska, Putin used the brief time he had in his closing speech to do similar.

The idea of Russia being heir to a great historical tradition is detailed in its foreign policy strategy and is the lens through which it conducts itself abroad. To this end, Russia published its Foreign Policy Concept in the middle of the war in March 2023, updating it from 2016. The Concept offers a rough guideline as to Russia’s shifting international mindset, and it is revealing. Russia describes itself as a ‘Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power’, sitting at the nexus of these swathes of territory, capable of moving across all three concepts. This allows Russia to emphasise different facets of its foreign policy at will – calling forth its rich Asian heritage when engaging with Chinese partners, or its Islamic roots when engaging with the Middle East.

Talking to the Americans

Russia has called forth different facets of its foreign policy toolkit when engaging with the Americans. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept offers a clue here too – although references to the US are buried among more important partners, one line stands out, where the Concept refers to the importance of the US and Russia’s ‘special responsibility for strategic stability and international security’. This suggests that Russia and the US have a mutual and unique burden to shoulder as great powers – even though Russia is responsible for this original instability. Although the Concept was written at a time of extremely poor relations with the US, it on paper leaves the door open for engagement, maintaining that should the US interact with Russia based on ‘sovereign equality’, then relations can progress further. The clear implication is that for Russia, engagement as political equals on a par is key.

The importance of this was evidenced in some of Russia’s behaviour around the summit. First, the make-up of the Russian delegation for the Alaska summit was revealing. Russia put forward a strong political showing, featuring a group primed to talk about almost anything of note that could come up. Heavy hitters like Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov could speak to the diplomacy side; Kirill Dmitriev of investment fund RDIF was on hand should matters concern the Arctic or emerging technology; Finance Minister Anton Siluanov was there in case sanctions came up; Minister of Defence Andrei Belousov on the military angle and Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov on the politics. This was a group prepared for any eventuality. Although their skillset was ultimately put to little use – the meetings were cut short – it showed that between the US and Russia, there is still much that could be discussed.

Second, if the summit itself was rife with symbolism, Putin’s stop on the way to Alaska in the Far Eastern city of Magadan and meetings with the Chukotka governor carried with it dual messaging. Described as a ‘working trip’, the messaging appears to show a dedicated and involved president focusing in detail on domestic affairs. The reality is that Putin has not visited Magadan since 2011, and the Far East has long complained of a lack of attention (and funding) from the federal centre, even though Putin appeared to be across many fine details of the region’s economic performance.

The framing was clear and externally directed – that Russia was trying to show the summit as an almost mundane part of Putin’s many daily tasks; first a fish-oil processing factory, then President Trump. This could have been designed to offset any potential mismanagement of the summit – if it all went wrong, then it was just another meeting in Putin’s day. It suggests that despite the Russian media’s playing up of the ‘historic’ summit in the first place, it was tempered by the Kremlin’s caution in case it failed. This careful management of the power balance shows the importance to the Kremlin of meeting as equals.

Russia and Friends

Words aside, Putin’s actions before and after the summit were revealing about where Russia sits in the global world order. Putin has been careful to line up his political ducks in a row and is conscious of how his actions towards the US are being perceived by his allies.

On the eve of the summit, Putin held calls with President Xi Jinping, Belarus’s President Lukashenko, and the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. At the same time, Vyacheslav Volodin, speaker of the Duma (parliament) was in Pyongyang with a parliamentary delegation, his second visit in nearly as many months – North Korean troops are still fighting alongside Russian soldiers in Ukraine, and Putin also briefed President Kim about the upcoming summit. Two days after the summit, Putin updated his counterparts in Belarus and Kazakhstan about the discussion with Trump, as well as holding calls with Indian Prime Minister Modi.

All of this demonstrated Putin’s keenness to manage the perception of his leadership among Russia’s allies, should any of them be alarmed that a potential defrosting of US-Russia ties might throw a spanner in the works of their burgeoning alliances.

The intrinsic value of all these discussions depends on whether diplomacy and dialogue are viewed as important tools of national security. If so, then whether either side has agreed to anything tangible is less relevant – the proceedings have demonstrated what Russia believes to be a priority, and what it does not.

© RUSI, 2025.

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