Briefing on the Strait of Hormuz Crisis: Implications for Russian Energy Revenues

This discussion focused on the structural differences between the 2022 European gas shock and the current 2026 Gulf crisis, highlighting how the disruption of a critical maritime chokepoint has created a simultaneous shock across oil, liquified natural gas (LNG) and shipping markets and how it impacted Russia’s revenues in this context.

Unlike the 2022 crisis, which centred primarily on European pipeline gas and evolved gradually, the 2026 Strait of Hormuz disruption triggered an immediate shock across interconnected global oil, LNG, refined product and maritime shipping markets. It was stressed that while the 2022 market shock allowed time for rerouting, LNG substitution and demand adjustment, the current crisis is constrained by limited alternative export routes and insufficient bypass pipeline capacity relative to the volumes that normally transit the Strait.

Participants observed that Russia's energy revenues rebounded sharply following the onset of the Gulf crisis, primarily due to rising global oil prices and increased market volatility. Oil revenues rose particularly strongly as Brent prices exceeded $100 bbl during the peak of the disruption. However, part of the rebound also reflected seasonal dynamics, as February traditionally represents one of the weakest months for Russian oil exports before volumes recover in March and April.

At the same time, it was noted that the revenue impact was partially mitigated by intensified Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian energy infrastructure, including refineries and storage facilities, which continued to disrupt processing capacity and export logistics.

The discussion highlighted that Russia's revenue gains remain externally driven and vulnerable to market volatility. While higher prices temporarily compensated for logistical inefficiencies and transport constraints, Russia's export system continues to face structural weaknesses, including dependence on long-distance shipping routes an elevated freight costs.

A significant part of the discussion focused on how China, India and Turkey – the largest Russian oil importers - adjusted their import structures in response to the Gulf crisis and disruptions across global energy markets.

In China, crude oil imports declined in April 2026 due to elevated global supply risks. It was noted that Chinese refiners reduced purchases after the March oil price spike weakened refining margins, particularly among independent ‘teapot’ refiners. At the same time, increasing reliance was placed on large strategic and commercial oil inventories accumulated during late 2025 rather than additional imports. 

In India, Russian crude volumes were partially absorbed during the crisis while the broader import structure simultaneously became more diversified. Although Russia remained India’s largest crude supplier, imports declined for a second consecutive month in April 2026, falling by roughly 20% month-on-month. Operational constraints also contributed to lower Indian crude imports. As a result, the reduction in imports appeared to stem mainly from refinery outages and lower operational throughput rather than a slowdown in domestic consumption.

Turkey faces a different challenge, with declining imports linked primarily to disruptions in Russian Black Sea export infrastructure. Ukrainian drone strikes targeting refineries and ports in the Black Sea, alongside disruptions affecting Novorossiysk, constrained Russian export availability through Black Sea routes. The decline in Turkish crude imports was therefore driven largely by supply-side disruptions rather than weaker domestic demand, particularly as imports of oil products remained comparatively stable throughout the period.