IRAN MOU
Both the existence and vagueness of the MOU are consequences of the US and Israel’s difficulty in translating military superiority into enduring political success.
'There is little detail in the MOU as published which covers the military aspects of the war – including, strikingly, Iran's ballistic missile programme, which was one of the main targets of the US and Israeli campaign. Meanwhile, the US has agreed to end its blockade of Iran, as an early and obvious concession. These are just the terms for future negotiations, rather than any substantial agreement in themselves, and the ceasefire could easily fall apart given continued exchanges of fire in Lebanon and northern Israel, Iranian intransigence, or a change of mind by President Trump. But the existence and vagueness of the MOU are a consequence of the difficulty that the US and Israel have found in translating their clear military superiority into an enduring political success. Ambitious initial goals – regime change, elimination of the ballistic missile threat, and end to support for proxies – have been downgraded or are not mentioned. All could form part of the talks, but the US has not yet been able to construct a military route to resolution.'
'For its part, the Iranian regime has found its approach to deterrence totally inadequate, and its conventional military power and threat are much reduced. But they have learned that the ability to threaten civilian traffic through the Strait of Hormuz does result in economic leverage. This has given them some breathing space, and provided the IRGC with an achievement they can claim as success, even if the victory is hollow, and military survival does not do much for the regime’s shattered internal legitimacy.'
Comment by Matthew Savill, Director of Military Sciences
