How Low-Skill Russian Sabotage Drives High-Stakes Outcomes
Russian reliance on amateur saboteurs enables an escalating campaign across NATO but creates a less-visible risk of unintended escalation by operational dysfunction.
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WRITTEN BY
Dr Daniela Richterova
Guest Contributor
- Jim McLeanMedia Relations Manager+44 (0)7917 373 069JimMc@rusi.org
Footnotes
Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 3–6.
Documents from liaison meetings between the KGB and its Czechoslovak equivalent, the State Security Service (StB). Archiv bezpečnostních složek, ABS-12320 ‘VLAST’; Richterova, ‘The Long Shadow’; Kevin Riehle, ‘Lessons from History about Russian Sabotage’, Euro-Atlantic Bulletin (Vol. 6, No. 4, 2025).
Kahn, On Escalation, pp. 3–6.
These figures reflect publicly attributed and confirmed incidents as recorded in Emma Burrows, ‘Russia wants to drain Europe’s security resources with sabotage campaign’, AP News, 18 December 2025. The true scale of the campaign is likely larger, given the challenges of attribution and the fact that governments may choose not to publicly assign responsibility for political, diplomatic or operational reasons. The available data therefore captures only the visible portion of a broader campaign.
Private archive.
Author’s transcripts of evidence presented Rex v Earl.
Interview with Dominic Murphy.
Author’s transcripts of evidence presented Rex v Earl.