Why Central Asia Focuses so Much on Railways

Too much coverage has been given to the ‘great power rivalry’ or ‘competition’ when it comes to understanding the railway drive and the creation of new transport corridors in Central Asia. Yes, Russia and China continue to dominate the rail trade in the region. But does their involvement translate into influence and sweeping access to their own territory and goods? History has shown us that it is not so straightforward.

A Railway Economy 

Railways have been the chief means by which both China and Russia have striven to establish special positions in Central Asia. For Russia, the existing Central Asia rail network serves three purposes: a symbol of its Soviet history, a lifeline for sanctions evasion and a geographical re-routing of trade to the East. For China, the railways forms part of the Eurasian land bridge, a key component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The two largest Chinese railway projects in Central Asia are the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and a 272km rail line from Ayagoz in eastern Kazakhstan to Bakhty on the Chinese border.

The tracks laid are components of several larger transport corridor projects underway in the Eurasia region. There are currently 90 transport corridor (domestic, regional and international) projects totalling over $52.8 billion underway or planned in this space.

The six largest projects are:

• The EU Global Gateway and Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), a land route that is endorsed by the EU and the EBRD, runs from China through Kazakhstan to the Kazakh Caspian seaports, or to the Turkmenbashi seaport in Turkmenistan, bypassing Russia.
• The Transport Corridor of Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), an EU sponsored project, launched in 1993, involves Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, and aims to simplify transport documentation, implement digital systems and harmonise legal frameworks along the route from Western Europe to China, via the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.
• The Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), is a US and EU sponsored project which aims to connect Central Asia with the West, bypassing Russia via China, Kazakhstan and through to the Kazakh Caspian seaports of Aktau or Kuryak.
• The Russia-led International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), otherwise known as the Iranian route, a 7,200-kilometer corridor that connects India with Russia via Iran and includes several branches, such as an eastern branch that runs through Central Asia.
• The China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), developing rail, land and sea routes to connect China and Europe through Central Asia.
• The Lapis Lazuli Corridor, a Western backed regional railway project linking Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.

With railways being about much more than just tracks and gauges, alongside the rail infrastructure there is also the growth of digital infrastructure in Central Asia. This includes the domestic electrification of rail lines, high speed trains, coordinated corridor management, AI-based planning, wagon number recognition and GPS tracker integration.

What are Central Asia’s Railway Ambitions and Why is it Important for Them?

Railways dominate Central Asia’s internal transport because of its vast geographic size, its landlocked, mountainous terrain, and weather conditions. Because railroad infrastructure is expensive and difficult to build, the Soviet-era network is still largely in place today, with new connections (between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Iran) coming operational or still under construction. The Central Asia rail network remains a poignant Soviet legacy. For the Central Asian states, this rail network, which is part of the Northern corridor, via Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus, continues to be the main channel for trade with the EU.

The good news is that Central Asian leaders are increasingly aware of how outdated railways, with missing links and junctions, have been hindering their countries’ – and people’s – progress, and they are striving to respond. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have invested the most in their railways. Uzbekistan has a railway network of around 7,400km and in 2025, Uzbekistan will invest over $1 billion in railway modernisation. The country also plans to electrify 65% of its railway. Kazakhstan has a railway network of approximately 16,000km and by 2030 plans to modernise 5000km of track and repair 11,000km. On 18 July 2025, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan to develop a feasibility study on the long anticipated Trans-Afghan railway line, an Uzbek led project initiated back in December 2018, that seeks to establish a direct railway link from Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan, ultimately providing Central Asian countries access to the Indian Ocean via Pakistani ports of Karachi, Gwadar and Qasim.

Russian Railways has agreed to take part in the feasibility study and considers the Trans-Afghan railway as an eastern branch of the Kremlin’s ongoing ambitions vis-a-vis the INSTC project. On 20 August 2025, Iran and Turkmenistan also agreed to build two new railway lines at the Sarakhs border crossing as part of the INSTC.

How Should Western Policymakers Consider the Railway Factor in their Relations with the Central Asian States?

From a Western perspective, railways in Central Asia are important for two reasons: Firstly, the Central Asian rail network is a pressure point for Moscow. This is because due to the direct rail network linking Russia and Central Asia, it serves as a sanction-proof route and a vital lifeline for Russia’s wartime economy. For this reason, Central Asia’s railway can become a conduit for sanction evasion and the re-export of sanctioned goods from Europe and the US into the Russian market.

Western exports to Central Asia were growing, export volumes from Central Asia countries to Russia rose by nearly a third in 2022. Western countries are not blind to this. Russia has traditionally been Central Asia’s biggest trading partner and remains an important security, military partner and where many migrants have moved for labour. Secondary sanctions on third parties found to be involved in the re-export of dual-use goods or opening financial channels to Russia have been imposed on select Central Asian companies.

Secondly, the Central Asian decision makers interest in railways provides a strategic opportunity for the West to participate in areas that matter to them the most. The answer is not for the UK, EU, and the US to jump in and build their own railway route to Central Asia. Nor is the answer to tell the countries of Central Asia to stop rail trade with Russia and China.

The aim for Western outreach should be to facilitate the Central Asian leaders’ ability to have greater control of their trade routes. Central Asian leaders are striving to build new railway connections, and are looking to Russia, China and the West for assistance. While it is important to acknowledge that Russia will remain a key strategic, economic and security partner for the Central Asian states, the West must first build its credibility in the region.

Conclusion:

Looking to the future, Russia and China’s active participation in Central Asia’s railway projects show that they are playing the long game. Western outreach efforts therefore must consider the railway factor. This means being flexible in sanctions enforcement and complementing it with economic support, to create a competitive railway market with the involvement of western private sector companies in the design and project implementation and engage in practical cooperation in exchanging best practises and latest technology transfers. But this is not without risk.

Western policymakers need to make sense of three things: how these railway projects can hinder the effectiveness of their sanctions on Russia, Iran and possibly China in the future if it continues expanding in the Indo-Pacific; and how it will impact their long-term foreign policy ambitions in the region. The EU, UK and the US would require the support of Turkey, India and UAE to sustain these efforts. As we read about nearly every day, so far Russia and China are answering their call. Are we?

© Sophia Nina Burna-Asefi, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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