What to Make of the $4.2 Billion Kazakhstan-US Locomotive Deal?

Trump’s dealmaking strategy has taken an extra shine with the recent US Wabtec and Kazakh railways $4.2 billion diesel locomotive supply and support contract signed on 22 September, on the sidelines of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to New York for the UN General Assembly meeting. The deal provides for Wabtec to supply 30 new Evolution series TE33AT diesel 1,520 mm gauge locomotives to Kazakhstan Temur Zholy (KTZ), the national railway operator, annually from 2027-2036, and provide maintenance services. This is an extension of the current contract, which was set up to 2026. The diesel locomotives will be produced in Astana at Wabtec’s wholly owned Lokomotiv Kurastyru Zauyty factory, one that also exports to customers in the CIS region. This move is intended to support Kazakh Railways’ ongoing expansion and fleet renewal plans to gradually decommission locomotives that were built in the 1970s and 1980s.

Much has been said about how it will boost Kazakhstan as a hub for the US-backed Middle Corridor, a transport route connecting Europe and China via Central Asia, Caucasus and the Caspian Sea bypassing Russia. However, a closer assessment of the deal in the current context provides a mixed picture.

Overview of Kazakhstan’s Railways:

Kazakhstan has the largest railway network in Central Asia, with around 16,000 km of track. The mainline railway network operates a 1,520 mm CIS gauge, designed for a load of 21-23.5 tonnes per axle, but axle gauge is being upgraded to 25 tonnes in much of the network. Much of the country consists of desert and rugged mountainous terrain known as Kazakh Steppe. The country borders Russia, China, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Geography and history bind Kazakhstan and Russia. From the northwest to the northeast, the longest border is shared with Russia. In the east and southeast, mountains separate the country from Kyrgyzstan and China. In the west, the Caspian Sea forms the border. The main concentration of the railway lines falls on the northern section of the border with Russia.

During the Soviet era, Kazakhstan’s economic connections were orientated northward. Even today, freight turnover on the Russia connections is much higher than the elsewhere, despite Western sanctions. Russia is Kazakhstan’s second-largest source of foreign trade and investment. Over 23,000 Russian companies and Russian-Kazakhstani joint enterprises currently operate in Kazakhstan, 4,000 more than in 2023. This amounts to over half of the foreign companies in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan remains highly dependent on Russian rail and maritime infrastructure for trading with Europe, as well as facilitating transit cargo between China and Europe. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state-owned enterprise KTZ, was founded in 1997 to manage and operate the country’s railway network. To this day, railway infrastructure and traction falls under the control of KTZ.

Lost amid the hubris are the broader challenges that US rail transit through Kazakhstan faces. On the whole, Kazakhstan relies significantly on Russian transport infrastructure as well as its trade and security, and is influenced by Russia’s internal politics. In terms of Kazakhstan’s railway network, new and smart locomotives are not the hardest area to increase efficiency. Upgrading what is above the rails is not such a difficult task. However, the locomotives will not be as effective if the groundwork is worn out. While official railway data in Kazakhstan is not publicly available, according to the Kazakh Transport Minister Nurlan Sauranbayev, 57% of railway tracks are in disrepair in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has 16,000 km of track, and 5,000 km of railway track are planned to be built and upgraded by 2030, with another 11,000 km in the process of repair.

Progress on the repair of the tracks has been much slower compared to the purchase of locomotives. As of 15 September 2025, 450 km of track out of the planned 512.7 km have been repaired, bringing the total repair volume to 1,481 km nationwide. The track repairs being carried out involve complete replacement of rail supports and track gauge, ballast cleaning, track alignment in both longitudinal and horizontal planes and roadbed rehabilitation. The main work underway is the replacement of wooden sleepers with reinforced concrete ones, levelling of ballasts, improvement of the railway bed and straightening of tracks.

Russian engineering, train systems, and customs certification still dominate Kazakhstan’s rail network. The KTZ passenger and freight train schedule still relies on traction calculations set in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The new locomotives and freight cars are supplied by US Wabtec, but also by French company Alstom, China’s CRRC, Spain’s Talgo and Russia’s Sinara, with each running at different speeds and affecting the train schedules. As such, further engineering research is needed to test and calculate the traction and braking tests, among other calculations, to amend the scheduling. Most transport corridors have a north-south direction because most railway lines were constructed during the period of the Soviet Union. Consequently, freight turnover on the Russia connections remains much higher than elsewhere. Also, Kazakhstan’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union increases Russian leverage over Kazakhstani trade and tariff policies.

But any such engagement cannot overlook the fact that the US would need to invest heavily across the region, especially in terms of logistics and transport infrastructure, if the White House’s goal is to challenge Russian and Chinese dominance in the region and to secure minerals and energy resources. It is estimated that €18.5 billion is required to ensure the Middle Corridor’s commercial viability, among several other weighty problems the corridor faces.

Russia and China’s Response:

Publicly, Russia has refrained from obstructing the US deal, cognizant that overt opposition could alienate Astana and its Central Asian neighbours. Russian officials have largely stayed muted while the United States expresses its interest in accessing Central Asia’s minerals and supporting Kazakhstan’s role in the Middle Corridor, a multimodal transport corridor project that bypasses Russia and runs through Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia and China.

Privately, however, Moscow is unlikely to concede its influence willingly. In what is a complex and fluid environment, the balance sheet would still place Russia as the most prominent external power in Kazakhstan, in terms of primarily: i) its high-level political relationships; ii) its security cooperation in the region; and iii) arguably, its range of investment projects in these countries. Following the deal and Tokayev’s trip to the US, on 26 September 2025 President Putin and Tokayev had a phone conversation ahead of his upcoming state visit to Russia. On the call to Putin, Tokayev reportedly ‘shared his impressions of his visit to New York for the 80th session of the UN General Assembly and his contacts with the leaders of several foreign countries.’

For example, before and after the Wabtec deal was announced, there was a flurry of diplomatic and high-level activity between Russia and Kazakhstan in the railway space. A few days before the deal was announced, on 16 September 2025, the 16th meeting of the joint working group on strategic cooperation between Kazakh Railways and Russian Railways was held in Vladivostok, Russia. It was announced that both Kazakh and Russian railway operators will sign an agreement to further bolster the development of the Russia-led International North South Corridor Project and further increase Russian transit cargo through Kazakhstan. On 25 September 2025, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov commented on the US Wabtec and Kazakh Railways deal, describing it as a purely ‘commercial matter.’ He stated, ‘Astana remains a "very close" partner of Moscow, and that bilateral trade and economic cooperation is multifaceted.’

While no official response by China has been made, it is probably because Beijing does not have much to lose through the deal. China is a dominant player in Kazakhstan’s infrastructure, particularly in railways. China’s state-owned rolling stock manufacturer, CRRC, has been actively expanding in Kazakhstan’s railway sector and the wider Central Asian region for over a decade now under the banner of the Belt and Road initiative, a Chinese project to connect China by land and sea with Europe via Eurasia. The China-Europe transport route remains a key supply chain of East-West flows. China has been constructing a third railway border crossing with Kazakhstan at Baqty as well as developing the Light Rail Transit high speed passenger train in Astana and exporting Chinese railway technology with the joint ‘Smart Railway Project’ between Huawei and KTZ.

US Military Rail Logistics in Kazakhstan:

It is worth mentioning that US railway interests in Kazakhstan, particularly in locomotives, has a history. Back in 2009 when the US military and NATO allied forces were present in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan served as a crucial ground logistics route that made up the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The main method of transport of US and allied forces military supplies through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was by railways. This formed part of the so called Russian NDN route which ran through Riga-Moscow-through Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan, border at Termez-into Hairaton in Afghanistan. The concept of the NDN originated in August 2008 when the US CENTCOM Commander asked for northern ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Afghanistan to augment vulnerable supply routes through Pakistan.

During Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014), according to US congressional reports and a former Central Asian local logistics forwarder, the main issue facing the supply to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan was the great need for ‘tractive effort’ due to the outdated and worn-out locomotives along the Russian, Kazakh and Uzbek Northern Distribution Network (NDN) ground routes. This had substantially increased transport costs and added to delays along the ground route. Despite that, the railway transport route through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan into Afghanistan had quickly become the much-preferred route, logistically speaking and by 2011, close to 75% of all military cargo was hauled in by rail and road along this direction.

What Next?

The question now is how Kazakhstan and the wider Central Asia region will be framed in the upcoming Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy, which is reportedly nearing completion, and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 15th Five-Year Plan.

The lead-up and the events surrounding the Wabtec deal in New York are indicative of Trump’s posturing of Kazakhstan in Washington’s broader South Asia strategy. Trump’s vow to ‘reclaim’ Bagram Airport in Afghanistan, which he made in early September 2025 during his visit to the UK, signals broader US strategic thinking of Kazakhstan. It indicates some continuity in Trump’s worldview. Under the first Trump administration, Kazakhstan was considered an important part of Trump’s South Asia foreign policy. Trump described the Bagram air base not only as a lost military asset but as a strategic resource that could be used to monitor China. At this stage, Trump’s Bagram comment seems rhetorical, but it does carry real-world consequences for the Central Asia region. This logistically and financially would be a big task and could shake up the region dramatically.

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan would face pressure to quietly facilitate logistics or intelligence support, which could strain ties with Russia, Iran and China at a time when these countries are investing heavily in building alternative transport infrastructure routes in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Despite the Taliban publicly ruling out foreign troop presence and flat-out rejecting Trump’s wish to take back Bagram, Trump’s comments seem to suggest that closed-door, discreet, high-level negotiations between Washington and the Taliban have been taking place. Notably, at the backdrop of the Wabtec deal, Chinese, Russian, Iranian and Pakistani foreign ministers and representatives met on the sidelines of the 80th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York and openly opposed any move to reinstate military bases in Afghanistan.

Western leaders should also keep watch on two key upcoming events later this year: Tokayev’s state visit to Russia in October and the Russia-led International North-South Transport Corridor conference in Astrakhan in November.

We are at an interesting juncture when it comes to railways, geography and political alignment in Kazakhstan and the wider Central Asia region. The US Wabtec locomotive deal with KTZ is only one part of a broad portfolio of economic contracts Kazakhstan has been strategically securing with the US and China, and Russia.

In that sense, our understanding of whether Russia can put pressure on Kazakhstan’s railways is important to identifying where the Kremlin’s red lines are and where Tokayev will come down in his balancing strategy, if Moscow decides to exert pressure. It is a new way of thinking about infrastructure that reflects the way politics and logistics are changing across the region.

© Sophia Burna-Asefi, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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