Ukraine Prepares for a Russian Summer Offensive

US President Donald Trump had been calling for a ceasefire in Ukraine from his inauguration in late January. But when Ukrainian negotiators met their Russian counterparts in Istanbul last week, Russia continued to make maximalist demands and claimed that it was prepared to fight for years. Russia cannot sustain operations indefinitely, but for now Moscow thinks its leverage over Ukraine will build over time and since Trump has strongly implied that he will withdraw from negotiations the Russian military is set to intensify its operations.

The rate of Russian advance began to accelerate over the autumn of 2024. Russian advances then stalled as Ukraine adapted to Russian assault tactics and imposed a 15 km deep belt of attrition that prevented Russian troops reaching the line of contact in sufficient numbers to break through. Ukraine has suffered throughout this period from a shortage of troops, with recruitment still below the level needed to maintain the force. But Russia’s ability to inflict casualties on the Armed Forces of Ukraine was not matched by an ability to take ground.

April and early May of 2025 saw a reduction in the intensity of Russian operations, partly as a result of performative ‘ceasefires’ around Easter and Victory Day, and the redeployment of forces following the collapse of Ukrainian positions in Kursk. Russian recruitment, however, has exceeded Kremlin targets for every month of 2025. Having shuffled commanders and built-up reserves of equipment, Russia is now set to increase the tempo and scale of attacks.

The word ‘offensive’ conjures up visions of rapid manoeuvres by large mechanised units. The Russians lack the force quality to operate in this way. Instead, its summer offensive will likely have a soft launch with a steady increase in the number and scale of assaults across a broadening area around the main axis. Indeed, there are indications this process has already started.

Russia has spent some time suggesting that it might threaten Kharkiv and testing Ukrainian defences in Sumy and Zaporizhzhia. These attacks have either been intended to fix Ukrainian troops away from Donbas or forestall further Ukrainian raids across the Russian border. The main Russian effort into the summer will once again be against the key towns of Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. Russian forces continue to plan against orders to complete the occupation of Donetsk.

Accompanying the intensifying attempts to take ground, Russia has also been innovating to work out how to degrade Ukraine’s layered drone defences. Ukraine has, for some time, been expanding its ability to knock down Russian reconnaissance drones using its own drone interceptors, thereby blinding Russian units that would otherwise direct glide bombs and ballistic missiles against targets in the Ukrainian rear. The Ukrainian interceptors, however, are guided by small radar, and Russia is now systematically working to locate and target these radar stations.

Another important line of effort for the Russians is attacking Ukraine’s UAV pilots. Here the methodology is to use direction finding, signals intelligence and reconnaissance to pinpoint the location of pilots and then target them with wire guided drones and glide bombs. This has become more effective as Russia has increased the speed at which it can pass information between its units.

Separate from Russian attacks on the front will be the continuation of a high tempo of deep strikes against Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and bases. The Russians understand that these have an impact on the civilian population in Ukraine and the international community. The Kremlin will want to suggest a deteriorating situation as negotiations continue and to signal to Europe that the rear is not safe, to discourage European militaries from putting forces in country.

Another point of leverage that Russia will endeavour to exploit is the tensions between the United States and its NATO allies and the potential for significant US troop withdrawals from Europe following a force posture review this summer. Intensifying attacks on Ukraine before and during the Hague summit is likely to be used to try and disrupt a NATO summit that is supposed to focus on spending to resource the alliance’s regional plans, and instead make it about Ukraine, where there is a divergence of priorities between Washington and allied capitals.

The picture is therefore of a challenging four months for the Ukrainian military as US materiel support runs out. This will place a premium on the efficiency of Ukrainian drone and artillery operations, the ability of Ukrainian commanders to preserve their troops, and the continuity of supplies flowing from Ukraine’s international partners.

Much hope has been vested in the possibility that President Trump will become frustrated with Russian intransigence and that the United States will begin to put pressure on Russia. But Trump essentially ruled this out during a phone call with President Putin on Monday, where he essentially signalled that the US would leave negotiations to the Russians to slow-roll, while offering the prospect of trade, and therefore sanctions relief.

It must be hoped that disengagement is not accompanied by the active obstruction of European efforts to sustain Kyiv’s war effort, such as by preventing the purchase of US equipment to gift to Ukraine. So long as the US allows re-export, Europe should be able to meet most of Ukraine’s needs. Shortages of air defence interceptors and guided multiple launch rockets will present tactical problems, but the impact can be mitigated.

If the US or Europe were to begin to expand sanctions against Russia, however, it would be timely. Russian stockpiles of legacy Soviet equipment, from tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, to artillery pieces, will be running out between now and mid-autumn, such that Russia’s ability to replace losses will be entirely dependent on what it can produce from scratch. At the same time, while Russia can fight another two campaign seasons with its current approach to recruitment, further offensive operations into 2026 will likely require further forced mobilisation, which is both politically and economically challenging.

Russia’s economic outlook also darkens as we approach 2026. The collapse in the oil price following Donald Trump’s tariff policy will severely limit Russian revenue, while its reserves are becoming depleted. More aggressive enforcement against Russia’s shadow fleet and the continuation of Ukraine’s deep strike campaign could reduce the liquid capital that has so far allowed Russia to steadily increase defence production and offer massive bonuses for volunteers joining the military. If Ukraine can deny Russia from reaching the borders of Donetsk between now and Christmas, and Kyiv’s international partners are diligent in degrading Russia’s economy, Moscow will face hard choices about the costs it is prepared to incur for continuing the war. Under such conditions the Russians may move from Potemkin negotiations to actually negotiating.

There is a darker possible future, in which the summer offensive overpowers Ukrainian defences to take key towns in Donbas, after which Russia pivots to attacking Kharkiv in the autumn, while once again switching its deep strike campaign to degrade Ukrainian power generation and distribution ahead of the winter. Under such circumstances, the Russians hope that they can steadily convince Europe to pressure Ukraine to sue for peace, even on unacceptable terms. It is the belief that this trajectory is possible that is keeping the Kremlin prepared to plough on, despite the chronic underperformance of its arms. Ukraine and its partners must strip the Kremlin of its illusions.

© RUSI, 2025.

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