Russia’s First Oil Export to Afghanistan Via the Iranian Railways: a Closer Look

Russia reportedly exported 5,000 tonnes of diesel fuel by rail for the first time to Afghanistan via the semi-built Khaf-Herat railway in the first weeks of November 2025. A few days prior, construction had begun on an oil depot at the Roznak railway station in Herat province to facilitate the storage and distribution of petroleum products. Around the same time, a private consignment of 1,120 tonnes of Iranian diesel was also sent to Afghanistan via the Khaf-Herat railroad.

These developments give off a well-planned tactical PR stunt by the Kremlin, Taliban and Tehran. Indeed, the oil on rail to Afghanistan looked pre-baked. It illustrated an image of shared determination between Iran, Russia and Afghanistan, forging their own path outside of Western markets. It would give them much to talk about and champion ahead of two key transport conferences: the first International Conference of Governors of the Caspian Littoral States, which will be held on 18-19 November 2025, in the northern Iranian city of Rasht; and the 3rd Astrakhan International Forum in Russia, which will be held from 26-28 November 2025. In both, the Russia-backed International North-South corridor, otherwise known as the Iranian route, a 7,200 km corridor that connects India with Russia via Iran, is the central theme.

It is tempting to see these developments as an achievement in Moscow and Tehran’s quest to craft a new supply chain architecture away from the West. Yet the deeper structure of logistics, the current state of Afghan politics, and the timing of these oil trade runs ahead of two key transport corridor conferences organised by Moscow and Tehran, indicate that the fundamentals challenging the viability of this railway route endure. Still, the larger picture tells us two things: one of growing Iranian and Russian influence among certain factions of the Taliban leadership. And a rising but bounded Taliban agency, in which the leadership can sometimes resist, broker or concede key projects.

What is the Khaf-Herat Railway Project?

The Khaf-Herat railway is a 225 km standard-gauge (1,435mm), non-electric rail line linking north-eastern Iran to western Afghanistan. First proposed in 1975 to primarily transport iron ore from the nearby mines in Afghanistan to cover the supply shortage in Iran. A secondary factor was to connect Iran with China and Central Asia via Afghanistan. These oil exports from Russia are the most promising so far for the prospects of completing the railway project. Currently, the railway has been built up to Robat Paryan station in Herat province and construction is underway on the remaining railroad that runs up to Herat International Airport.

The fourth and final stage of the Khaf-Herat railway is being built by Afghan conglomerate Gamma Group with the support of Russian Railways subsidiary RZD International. The project is expected to be completed in two years at a cost of around $54.6 million. The project is being financed domestically by the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, which in January 2025 granted Gamma Group’s mining business, Gamma Eagle, rights to extract lead and zinc at Sarsarkhak in Yakawlang district in the north-western part of Bamyan Province in return for commitments including constructing Stage 4 Phase 2 of the Khaf-Herat railway and building a hospital in Wardak.

This development comes a few weeks after the first freight train carrying Iranian-exported diesel arrived at Roznak station in Herat province via the Khaf-Herat railway line. Specifically, on 10 October, a private consignment operated by a private Iranian company, Avant Rail owned by DotOne holding company, reportedly transported diesel via tankers along the Khaf-Herat railway into Afghanistan. This was the first diesel fuel shipment to be transported on the Khaf-Herat railway line via the Shamtig border crossing. According to the social media channel of DotOne, the holding company which owns Avant Rail, in the future, this railway line plans to link further with China and seeks to boost Iranian trade relations with Beijing. The reported owner of DotOne is a controversial Iranian businessman called Babak Zanjani.

However, there have not been any photos published of this particular recent Russian diesel shipment in tankers carried by Iranian railways and the Khaf-Herat rail line. Also, Russian Railways and Russian oil and gas companies have not commented on this diesel shipment to Afghanistan via Iran.

What are the Challenges?

Logistically speaking, this Khaf-Herat railway corridor largely relies on Iran’s creaky railway network and Afghanistan’s unconnected and short railroads. Which is problematic, to say the least. In early November 2025, Noorullah Beiranvand, Deputy Director of Capital Financing and Transportation Economics of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways, said that Iran needs $17 billion to modernise its railways. Speaking to sources operating in Iran’s railway and transport industry, the state’s goal to increase the share of rail trade to 30% and increase rail imports and exports to 180 million tonnes by the end of 2028 is ambitious and this objective was unrealised in Tehran’s previous Five-Year Plan. According to customs data, last year, around 12% of transit through Iran was carried by rail and the country's total rail imports and exports were only 5 million tonnes. Despite Iran’s railroads totalling 16,000 km, over 25% of Iranian railroads are not in use, there are only 500-600 active locomotives and traction power is far below the international standard.

Compounding the logistical stressors is the current state of Afghan politics. The Taliban is not a single actor and treating it as such obfuscates more than it clarifies. It is more accurate to think of it in terms of three camps: the Kandahar camp led by the leader of the Taliban regime, Hibatullah Akhundzada, the more hard-line wing of the Taliban, which dominates strategic and senior positions, ethnically Pashtun and whose stronghold exists in Southern Afghanistan. Their outlook is more traditional are often reported to be leaning towards Russia, Iran and China.

The Kabul camp is considered in Afghanistan as the relatively moderate wing of the Taliban, led by Siruddin Haqqani, the Afghan Minister of Interior Affairs. This camp includes the wider Haqqani clan, who hail from the Ghilzai tribe, one of the largest Pashtun groups whose stronghold remains in the Eastern region of Afghanistan. The Kabul camp is considered more pragmatic in its approach to diplomacy. The reason behind this is often explained by the Haqqani network’s long history of having connections and channels of communication with external groups and foreign actors, particularly with the US – back in the 1980s, during the CIA-backed anti-Soviet operation in Afghanistan and Pakistan – as well as close ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

And the third is the ‘side-lined’ camp, which includes Taliban elements of ethnic Uzbek, Hazara, Tajik and Arabic groups in Afghanistan. This camp is now largely invisible within the Taliban senior leadership structures, reflecting the leadership’s distance and lack of trust in other ethnic groups. For example, the case of the ethnic Uzbek Taliban commander and Governor of Logar province, Qari Salahuddin Ayubi.

Relations between the Taliban leadership and Iran are complex and unequal. The reason being is threefold: Tehran still hasn’t formally recognised the Taliban government, but has an ambassador in Kabul; the deportation of Afghan refugees and migrants earlier in the year had caused a political stir from both ends; and since the capture of Afghanistan by the Taliban in 2021, exiled senior anti-Taliban military commanders from Herat set up an office in Mashhad with a group of other former Afghan military commanders, called the ‘Council of Jihadi Commanders of Western Afghanistan,’ which remains a low-profile yet active group. Against this backdrop, Iran is simultaneously building the Khaf-Herat railroad in Afghanistan and is Afghanistan’s top trading partner.

Why Does It Matter Geopolitically to All Three Countries?

For the Taliban, supply routes via Iran have now gained even more significance amid the breakdown of relations with Pakistan, which has put the other Uzbekistan-backed Trans-Afghan railway project on hold, for now. For instance, on 10 November 2025, the Taliban announced that they would prioritise transport routes that bypass Pakistan (aka the Iran route). This comes amid the collapse of the third round of peace talks between the Taliban and Pakistan. On the same day, the Taliban ambassador to Iran met with Mohammad Saeid Arbabi, Chairman of the Chahbahar Freezone and discussed plans to simplify visas for Afghan businessmen, the opening of a representative office of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce of Afghanistan in Chahbahar Port and the establishment of a joint bank between Afghanistan and Iran to facilitate financial transfers. The winners emerging from this current state of affairs are not only Russia and Iran, but also India, a key investor in the Chabahar port. The Chabahar port is considered a rival to the China-backed Gwadar port in Pakistan. On 30 October India received a 6-month sanctions waiver from US President Donald Trump to operate the Chabahar port.

For Iran, rail transport is given high priority in the government’s policy. Railways acquired increased importance in 2012 when Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, called for developing what he termed an Iranian ‘Economy of Resistance.’ The country’s railroads and its regional land connections to Central Asia, as well as the Caspian Sea connection to Russia, and trade with China, became even more important in early 2014, when Iran turned the Economy of Resistance idea into state policy. In the face of increasing Western economic sanctions, the Iranian leadership aimed to prioritise the production of non-oil commodities as a source of revenue for the economy, whose main pillar, oil exports, was hard hit by international sanctions. Iran’s oil exports in the meantime were sold to Russia, China, India, Afghanistan and Middle Eastern markets.

While the strategic significance of rail transport in Iran dates back to 2012, the most recent reiteration of the government’s commitment was highlighted in the 2023 7th Five-Year Development Plan, a strategic government document which is used to guide the annual budgets and development policies in Iran from 2024 through to 2028. The government strategy prioritises rail transport by putting an emphasis on energy consumption, aligning the infrastructure with demand, as well as the railroads’ importance concerning defence and national security considerations.

For Russia, cooperation within the International North-South Multimodal corridor is becoming an important format of network cooperation between Russia, Iran, Afghanistan and the wider Central Asia region. They are becoming the basis of Russia’s networked foreign policy and foreign economic strategy. The countries to the East serve as the crux of the Kremlin’s strategy for building new global supply chains within the framework of the North-South corridor. This was highlighted back in April 2022, when Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Novak pointed out that in the context of the rupture of trade and economic ties with the West, it is the North-South project that is intended to become the new basis for global supply chains for Russia. Back in January 2025, the Kremlin and the Taliban were in talks to increase Russian diesel and gasoline exports to Afghanistan, although the route this would take was not disclosed. Russia already exports small volumes of diesel and gasoline to Afghanistan via Central Asia. However, this was the first time the Kremlin chose to bypass Central Asia and go through Iran by the Caspian seaport and then by rail.

The growing nexus between Moscow, Tehran and Kabul is gradually shaping a new level of risk for Western policy in the Middle East. Perhaps most important in the immediate future, is to keep watch on several stressors that impact the Khaf-Herat railroad, and its broader implications: this includes the Chinese demand for Iranian oil; how soon Iran could fulfil its policy goals of shifting cargo from sea to rail routes as it seeks to restructure its global supply chains; the appetite of Russian investors in Afghanistan and whether the Kremlin manages to secure more energy contracts as well as mining deals with Kabul to justify further rail trade and Russian business; the outcome of the Taliban’s quiet internal power struggle and its relations with Pakistan. It is a tense time in this corner of the world, with railways being at the centre of this wider effort by Iran, Russia and China to restructure global supply chains.

© Sophia Burmaa, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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