Not Business as Usual: Why Trump’s War Department Rhetoric Matters

When news emerged last week that the newly-styled US ‘Secretary of War’ Pete Hegseth had ordered a gathering in the US of almost all general officers and senior non-commissioned officers from across the US military, speculation quickly mounted on the reasons for the rare – if not unprecedented – gathering, especially when it emerged that President Donald Trump was also going to be speaking. Guesses ranged from a public humiliation and potential firings of officers out of favour, to a discussion on the draft National Defense Strategy (NDS) which has reportedly been the subject of unfavourable feedback from many in uniform. In the end, neither materialised, and instead briefs that this was going to be about the ‘ethos’ of the Department of Defense – now unofficially the Department of War – were most accurate.

It would be easy to dismiss the near two-hours of speeches as a combination of US political theatre and macho posturing, especially given President Trump’s diversions into criticising his predecessor Joe Biden, renaming the Gulf of Mexico and musing on the aesthetics of modern warships. This Administration is hardly the first to be muscular in its language when talking about US military power, and many might point back to language from the Bush Administrations of the early 2000s. But several prominent messages stood out in terms of emphasising the military priorities of the second Trump Administration and possibly hinting at the future of the NDS.

The Department of War is the Continuation of Politics by Other Means

Most obviously, Hegseth says he wants his department ruthlessly focussed on preparing for war and is wholly uninterested in anything which he does not believe advances that goal. Of course, previous Secretaries of Defense would almost certainly argue they had also prioritised readiness and combat capability, but in Hegseth’s analysis this justifies eliminating anything regarded as ‘woke’, be that medical exemptions for beards, ‘diversity’ policies, or different fitness standards across the militaries. Quite what famous ‘beardo’ Ulysses S. Grant would make of the argument that facial hair undermines professional performance is unclear, but none of this is a surprise based on the communications from the Department since Hegseth took over. Neither is it obvious why this required assembling all general officers in command positions in person to hear a re-statement of a position that Hegseth has adopted from the start, unless there was some desire to re-assert the Secretary’s authority.

A demand for high standards of physical fitness for personnel in the military should not be controversial, and the US has hardly been alone in grappling with the issue of women in close combat. Merit-based promotion is clearly a highly-desirable approach when it comes to preparing for conflict. But the way in which both Hegseth and Trump phrased their speeches make clear that they see the US military as being part of the political and cultural war in which they are involved – ironic, given the Secretary’s stated desire for the US military to be ‘apolitical’. Indeed, Hegseth was explicit that he held officers he fired responsible for enacting the policies of the previous administration, creating the potential for military officers to be increasingly treated like senior political appointees and thus more likely to change over between administrations.

War, what is it Good for?

The focus on combat, preparing for war, and the creation of hard military power is a natural continuation of the Trump Administration’s mantra of ‘peace through strength’. The utility of force and the role of the military – perhaps some signs of preparing for the NDS – were made clear in Hegseth’s statement focussing on the M in the DIME mnemonic for the aspects of state power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic). More specifically, he extolled the virtues of the Gulf War as ‘a limited mission with overwhelming force and a clear end state’. Notwithstanding differing interpretations of the aftermath of the war, it is not hard to contrast it with more recent operations with ‘nebulous end states’, such as Afghanistan, and to see examples of the Trump preference for short, sharp applications of force in the operation to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities (Midnight Hammer). The stated preference for a large military that deters war, backed up by an expanded nuclear arsenal or more assertive signalling to deter both Russia and China, is something that Trump himself later reinforced with his exhortation to win wars quickly and decisively (as if any president would prefer to wage war slowly and indecisively). The challenge will be when Trump discovers – as many before him – that war has the proverbial life of its own, and rapid knockout blows, from the Schlieffen Plan to the assault towards Kyiv, have a patchy record of succeeding.

The Enemy Within

Where the speeches might cause most concern is with the combination of domestic politics and the contempt expressed for norms, checks and balances. Trump’s looseness with language is well-known, but his casual reference to using Americans’ own cities as ‘training grounds’ combined with his description of ‘the enemy from within’ and his desire to use the military to ‘straighten out’ cities run by Democrats will hardly reassure those who already think he wants to use the institutions of the state to settle political scores. In addition, Hegseth was contemptuous of ‘politically correct and overbearing rules of engagement, which he regarded as tying the hands of the military. Debate over rules of engagement is common across administrations, and on its own part of healthy discussion: the policy of ‘courageous restraint’ in Afghanistan encouraged by Stan McChrystal was much-criticised and later revised when David Petraeus took over. But this was largely a disagreement over policy. The framing by Hegseth, on the heels of his removal of a number of military lawyers, and voiced by a Secretary of War that had lobbied on behalf of war criminals while working as a television commentator, poses more questions about his attitude towards the application of law and the use of force. When combined with Trump’s own behaviour on the question of legal barriers and the powers of his office, it is no surprise if domestic political opponents might start feeling nervous.

Saying the Quiet Part Out Loud

Allies and partners of the US could be forgiven for treating the whole spectacle as a domestic political concern, and little to do with them. To a degree they would be correct; the audience for both speeches was either in the room, or watching at home, listening while the government approached a shutdown where the political consequences and blame with be hotly contested. But much of the event revealed the preferences of this administration on the role of the military, with consequences for how others act.

First, if any more proof were needed, it should be shared interests and not ‘values’ that form the arguments of politicians when dealing with the US. There could hardly be a starker contrast between Hegseth’s contempt for ‘diversity as a strength’ and the language that forms part of the promotional case that the UK’s Armed Forces present. While the UK military might hope to insulate their relationships from such political debate, their US counterparts are going to be scrutinised like never before on their views and utterances, and should be expected to avoid any hint of endorsement of such positions, or discussion of nebulous concepts like values. The UK also has a habit of egregiously copying US language in the mistaken belief it confers familiarity and influence. UK officials talking of ‘warfighting’ and ‘warfighters’ should probably reflect whether they actually share the views and analysis seen this week and stop mindlessly aping their US counterparts.

Second, even when looking at shared interests, partners will need to understand that Trump is likely to interpret US interests very differently, with a premium on reducing protracted ‘entanglements’. The fact that this will be hard to achieve is secondary; while it may seem contradictory that someone who consistently mentions his interest in a Nobel Peace Prize has been willing to repeatedly authorise military strikes, his clearly stated preference is for short action, even if the results are fleeting. This potentially gives weight to the analysis that the new NDS will finally make good on repeated warnings of a reduced US military presence in Europe. And it also seems increasingly unlikely there will be much of a role for humanitarian activity or what might previously have been called stabilisation. Partners, particularly in Europe, will need to bring material military capability to the table if they want influence with the administration, and have to accept that some arguments will fall on deaf ears.

Finally, partners will need to be prepared for the use of US military power in a way that is deeply uncomfortable. US strikes on alleged Venezuelan drug smugglers have had their legality challenged, and follow significant disruption within the US Intelligence Community, where the question of ‘loyalty’ to the Administration has been a theme. The messages coming loud and clear from the Administration are that they are far more relaxed than recent predecessors on the domestic role of the US military, and have a blasé approach to the presentational and legal aspects. It is possible that approach could be extended to international action in a way which more directly poses difficult questions to international partners. In any case, an expansion of US military activity at home seems possible, as the Administration seeks to reset or test its limits.

If nothing else, the scenes in Quantico are a reminder that in spite of many shared experiences with the UK and other Europeans, the US political and cultural environment is currently very different to that experienced in the professional lifetimes of most serving NATO personnel. The old habits are losing their relevance. The US Administration is saying loud and clear that it represents a repudiation of previous policies, and that the current incarnation of the US military will be different to its predecessors, as will US defence strategy. Even if we factor in the mercurial nature of Trump, it is time that Europeans and others started listening.

© RUSI, 2025.

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