The War on American Intelligence

The US Intelligence Community is under attack. That in itself is not news – its officers wage a daily, usually unseen struggle with adversary services from countries like Russia, China and Iran. What is new is that this adversary now sits in Washington DC: the current US administration. It knows precisely where US intelligence is vulnerable and how to wound it.

The Call is Coming from Inside the House

Clashes between intelligence professionals and political leaders are not unusual. After events like the Iraq War, or Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, politicians have often demanded reforms or new leadership. But the scale and intensity of the current upheaval is almost unprecedented, and probably not matched by anything seen in more than a generation

Within seven months of President Donald Trump's inauguration, the heads of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) have been forced out, along with the NSA's deputy, the acting Chair of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and other intelligence officials. FBI officials linked to investigations of 6 January or Trump’s earlier conduct have been sidelined. Serving intelligence staff have seen their security clearances stripped: a career-ending punishment. Units dealing with election interference and foreign influence had their mandates curtailed or disbanded. In effect, Washington has launched a purge of its own intelligence apparatus.

It is the 'Russia, Russia, Russia Hoax'

The rationale is no secret. Senior officials, most notably Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, CIA Director John Ratcliffe and FBI Director Kash Patel, say they are cleansing the community of 'politicisation' and 'abuse' supposedly committed under Democratic administrations. The core of their case is that US intelligence abetted what Trump calls the 'Russia collusion hoax' or in Gabbard’s phrase a 'years-long coup against the president'.

The allegation is grave, but the evidence is thin. Declassified material has not disproved the 2016 Intelligence Community Assessment on Russian interference. Instead, it shows the assessment was produced under pressure and at speed – uncomfortable but familiar conditions for analysts facing urgent, high-profile questions. Journalistic reviews have found the administration's claims conflate different issues, confusing Russian influence operations with hacking attempts. The charge of a grand conspiracy remains unsubstantiated.

Nor do the leading accusers carry much credibility. Gabbard has often been criticised for minimising Russian and Syrian behaviour in the Middle East. Ratcliffe, initially rejected in the previous Trump Administration as too inexperienced for the DNI post, later moved away from his stated intention to be 'apolitical'. Patel clashed with other officials in the first Trump administration's national security team as he bounced from role to role and was later described as 'untrustworthy, cancerous with staff'. Their crusade reads less like reform and more like retaliation against unwelcome analysis.

Consequences for US Intelligence Partners

US intelligence is an enormous source of shared intelligence for partners globally, particularly for the so-called 'Five Eyes': Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the US. This is an intelligence partnership which is formally based around signals intelligence (sigint) but which influences sharing in all other intelligence collection disciplines, as well as in assessment (the judgements made about what intelligence reports collected mean). If the actions taken by US political leaders result in the loss of expertise then the output of US intelligence will be diminished, affecting everyone who relies upon it. The recent security clearance action reportedly included Russia specialists and a scientist working at the NSA on artificial intelligence, both high priority areas where self-harm would be massively counter-productive.

Political pressure to alter intelligence assessments is a known challenge within the professional intelligence community, and one familiar from the debacle over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But the second Trump administration seems more willing to retaliate over assessments which do not meet its stated preferences, such as in the case of analysis of Venezuelan criminal gangs; in spite of requests for a rewrite, the final product still contradicted the public position, leading to accusations of 'political' assessment, and the removal of several officials from the NIC. Trump's scepticism over assessments of Russian activity are well known, and it is reasonable to ask at what point they will begin to have an outsize influence on both collection priorities and the assessment which reaches him. Indeed, if disinformation and election interference are joined by counter-intelligence as another area de-prioritised, then the US will be wilfully stripping itself of protection against threats to its democratic system, which will extend to partners having a reduced understanding of the overall threat.

There could also be an increased risk of compromises of material from within the US national security system, as competing groups seek to use the media to advance their arguments. The US is already surprisingly leaky at times, with intelligence that would never see the light of day in the UK frequently splashed across the pages of major US newspapers. But the leak of a DIA assessment on Iran’s nuclear programme in the aftermath of the recent US and Israeli strikes is a worrying sign that there might be those inside the US prepared to risk compromising information to make a point (even if in that case it was a very early and low-confidence assessment). Such activity plays into Trump’s hands by appearing to validate the existence of a 'resistance' to his leadership, in turn reinforcing efforts to root out 'traitors'.

Meanwhile, Trump and his administration have a dubious record on handling sensitive material (although he personally has a great deal of latitude as president to declassify it). From briefing the Russians on intelligence reportedly provided by another country, to tweeting unaltered US imagery, or leaking UK counter-terrorism investigations, recent administrations have been remarkably lax about protecting both their own and others' secrets. Moreso than before, there are no guarantees that information passed over will not be caught up in the internal political battle and leaked or abused.

Judging the 'value' of intelligence is a difficult business, and not something to be done on volume alone: many countries provide a small amount of highly-impactful intelligence because they have priorities which even the vast US machinery cannot cover in detail. But having already demonstrated a highly-transactional approach to national security, the US might begin to restrict or reduce intelligence being shared with international partners. Some reporting suggests that the US has already begun to restrict intelligence on Russia negotiations, although it is important not to exaggerate this: all countries have their version of US NOFORN (not for foreign release) reports, which they control tightly to protect sourcing. Nonetheless, it is not hard to imagine that an administration obsessed with ‘fairness’ in trade and defence will start to look for quid pro quos in intelligence, to the detriment of partners: the recent (temporary) pause of vital intelligence-sharing with Ukraine is a prime example of using such partnerships as a tool of coercion.

The UK-US Intelligence Relationship is Both a Strength and a Vulnerability

International partners, including the UK, therefore face standard intelligence and international relations frictions, mixed into a cocktail that also involves a mercurial President and a troubled US political environment. The bad news is that the UK is probably uniquely vulnerable and has few options to change the mood: the best it can do is insulate itself from the worst of the fallout. It is uniquely vulnerable because of years of close work with US intelligence which have created dependencies and efficiencies which have – until now – been largely beneficial. The UK has generally not operated any surveillance satellites of its own, because it has excellent access, through its analytical capabilities and burden-sharing arrangements, to US space-based sensors. The same is true of access to geospatial information (necessary for targeting). And while the UK has excellent signals and human intelligence capabilities, all have been augmented by pooling – to different degrees – intelligence with the US.

Disengaging from this relationship would not only be difficult – with intelligence-sharing mechanisms well-established and a network of liaison officers and embeds in place across both systems – but also unwise. It would risk diminishing the UK's global understanding at a time when state-based threats are worsening, as even a diminished US intelligence community still has enormous value. Publicly arguing with the US on analytical judgements would probably not provide much leverage and is in any case against the UK’s instincts on being more circumspect than the US in talking about intelligence. But if reports of unease in the UK are accurate, some painful or costly steps may be necessary. The UK should probably reconsider intelligence-sharing arrangements on some sensitive issues, where there is little chance of influencing the US position, but considerable risks of exposure of sourcing. Any suggestions that UK intelligence might be shared at the working level but not passed upwards are probably unworkable: they would put US counterparts in a difficult position and risk validating US political complaints about ‘the blob’. This means that genuine restrictions on some reporting will be necessary. The UK could continue to use assessments, which usually obscure sourcing, as a means of sharing overall positions with the US system, as long as it was prepared to accept the risk that these might be subject to leaks where they prove controversial in the US. Finally, the UK will need to continue investing in its own capabilities along with its relationships elsewhere. In that regard, the increase in the budget for the Intelligence Agencies announced earlier in 2025, as well as the start of the UK launching its own surveillance constellation will help soften the blow of any reduced cooperation with the US.

Riding out the Storm

None of these even approach the status of a 'solution'. The reality is that what is happening in the US will affect its reliability as an intelligence partner, but there is little that can be done externally. If US political leaders are prepared to take risks with US security and interests, then it is unlikely that the interests of international partners will be afforded much greater priority. The best that partners can do is ensure that they understand where they can take risks and mitigate them accordingly, battening down the hatches until international priorities align again. The Five Eyes community, and especially the UK-US intelligence relationship, has survived other scandals and crises, from the Soviets penetrating the Manhattan Project via Klaus Fuchs, the Cambridge Spies crippling UK counter-intelligence, and the fallout over the hunt for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, to US contractor Edward Snowden compromising GCHQ’s capabilities. The relationship may prove resilient once again, given its deep roots in both countries. But for now, the UK must recognise that the rules of the game are being played differently in Washington, DC, and adapt accordingly. To do otherwise would be to make hope a course of action.

© RUSI, 2025.

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