Norway's Purchase of Type 26 Frigates

31 August 2025 saw the announcement that the UK’s Type 26/Global Combat Ship had been selected by Norway for their future Anti-Submarine Warfare platform; a deal reportedly worth £10 billion to UK’s defence industry. Under current plans, this will translate to a total of 13 Frigates being built by BAE systems, with 5 earmarked for the Royal Norwegian Navy, creating thousands of jobs and benefitting hundreds of related companies in the UK.

It is notable that statements accompanying the announcement underscore that this decision reflects much more than a selection of a ship. It spoke to a ‘long-term strategic relationship’ and to the importance of standardised platforms with ‘at least one ally’.

On a technical level a key consideration would have been the balance of the AAW (Anti-Air Warfare) and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) and strike capabilities. While the primary threat consideration is the growing Russian submarine threats, the ability to survive in an A2AD (anti-access/area denial) environment with a sophisticated air threat, and to support wider NATO functions might also be seen as requirements. An additional consideration is the potential versatility of a ship likely to operate with and around uncrewed and autonomous capabilities. Finally, more prosaically, the crewing and sustainment requirements were likely a factor in determining the choice.

On an operational level there is a balance between the primary role, the expected groupings/task groups to which the vessel will contribute, and the degree to which the ship will perform subsidiary roles and sovereign tasking. Lastly, there are strategic and alliance level questions to be considered in a NATO context as well as bilateral and regional relations.

In summary, collaborative procurement projects necessarily balance considerations beyond the technical. The Norwegian decision, arguably represents an example of a nation opting to align its procurement explicitly with NATO’s threat based planning approach and accepting the trade-offs this entails. This alignment and the prioritization inherent to it is arguably as important as the specific benefits the decision provides to both Norway and the UK.

The Critics and the Technical Comparison

Much of the reasoning and data behind the choice will likely remain unpublicised. However, whilst a cause for celebration from the UK and British industry, the decision has not been without its critics. A number of commentators have expressed reservations over the choice. One particular concern cited, is the relative weakness of the Type 26 compared to the other contenders in terms of air defence, particularly the French FDI (Defence and Intervention) Frigate and German F127. The US Constellation Class Frigate was also a contender.

The Constellation is expected to boast 32 Mk 41 Vertical Launch System cells (the configuration of missiles would be confirmed in slower time), and its Aegis radar system give it an anti-ballistic missile capability. However, it is designated an FFG, a Guided Missile Frigate, and lacks an ultra-quiet running capability (a key feature in an ASW). Furthermore, it has faced significant delays in manufacturing with talk of possibly changing the specifications further (increasing its missile capability) raising questions about production capacity and suitability as a primarily ASW platform.

The FDI bills itself as a multi-purpose frigate, complete with the CAPTAS ASW system, MM40 anti-ship missiles and MU 90 torpedoes. The vessel is equipped with a Sea Fire AESA radar and up to 32 VLS cells. It is, in theory, capable of air defence beyond 100km if carrying the Aster 30 and the flat panel AESA radar likely provides range and coverage that is considerably in excess of the Type 26 Artisan radar.

The F127, is also an Air Defence Frigate, with a capacity to support ballistic missile defence that the Type 26 lacks, with 64 Mk 41 VLS bays and the US AN/SPY-6 radar. However, it is not optimised for ASW either in terms of its quieting or its sensor suite (the vessel lacks a hull mounted sonar, for example). Furthermore at 10,000 tonnes would likely require a crew of around 220 personnel which is a significant consideration for a smaller navy, as the RN has also experienced over the last few decades. This is a reasonable capability for the Baltic Sea with a dense missile threat from vectors like Kaliningrad and where Russia fields a single Kilo class submarine. However, its utility in the Norwegian environs where the SSNs of the Northern Fleet represent the primary threat is more questionable.

By contrast to the other contenders, the Type 26’s 48 Sea Ceptor (CAMM) offer very limited air defence beyond point defence. Without a longer-range air defence radar, even though it carries 24 Mk 41 VLS cells, these may well be better optimised to carrying tomahawk, and contributing to a wider strike capability.

Why Prioritise for ASW?

Although the critique that the Type 26’s air defences are less capable than its competitors has merit, several factors bear considering. First, optimisation for ASW also largely mitigates the air and missile threat facing Norway. In the environment where the Norwegian Navy will operate, the missile threat and the submarine threat overlap considerably. The majority of the Russian launch capacity for cruise missiles in the north is held on its nuclear submarines. Secondly, in the most testing scenarios (article 5 conflict) Norway will be operating alongside allies including the US Navy, Royal Navy and RNLN all of which field air defence destroyers. The added value of additional air defence capacity is marginal relative to the utility of capable ASW frigates, of which there is a paucity. Thirdly, given the scale of the Russian missile threat at sea and it’s growing complexity, a small fleet of air defence assets adds very limited sovereign air defence capability. A single Oscar II SSGN, for example, carries a loadout of 72 cruise missiles which would likely penetrate even the better air defence systems of the FDI and F127 unless operating in an allied formation. In other words, additional maritime air defence would have represented a rather illusory sovereign air defence capacity and only a marginal addition to allied AAW.

By contrast ASW represents an area where the Alliance faces pressing capability gaps in the face of a Russian Northern Fleet that is both growing larger and which fields increasingly quiet submarines. As an ASW platform the Type 26’s ASW credentials, from a CODLOG propulsion to its 2087 towed array and torpedo defences, are not in question. With a crew of around 157 it demonstrates good return on capability to manpower ratios. The possession of a shared platform by the UK and Norway can usefully mitigate challenges beyond available hardware. NATO ASW is hampered not only by platform availability but by the comparatively federated ASW picture at the Alliance level (national caveats being especially stringent in this area). In addition, virtually every European navy likely to contribute significantly to containing Russia’s Northern Fleet suffers personnel shortfalls and this includes specialists such as sonar controllers and operators. The fielding of a shared vessel type by nations that regularly share data and conduct ASW together, is particularly valuable. Additionally, this commonality and cooperative tasking may allow for pooling of specialist personnel in a way that mitigates potential shortfalls for both navies.

Commitment to NATO and Threat Based Planning

Arguably the choice is a vote of confidence both for NATO and for threat-based planning. There is an implicit acceptance that, in high intensity conflict, units will not be able to operate effectively other than in a task group or in company with other vessels. No NATO nation, except perhaps the US, should be expecting to operate in isolation. While this is superficially understood, planners often pursue the flexibility associated with capability-based planning rather than optimising for specific functions on the understanding that Allies will provide other capabilities such as anti-air warfare (in the context of Norway’s situation for example). NATO defence operations are to be ‘integrated and mutually reinforcing to establish a single strategic-scale defence’ and integration implies specialization. A Norwegian capability that focuses first and foremost on ASW is the contribution that will likely have the greatest deterrent effect. The reality is that this likely comes with a loss of warfighting versatility.

The NATO Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) framework channels national forces into three regional plans. Both the Royal Navy and Royal Norwegian Navy will likely find themselves operating as part of regional plan northwest where containing Russian submarines will be one of several core imperatives. The employment of a shared platform by two nations operating alongside each other within the same regional plan is highly reasonable and will allow for mini-lateral standardisation that may not perfectly be achieved across a wider spectrum of NATO allies.

This choice by Norway is a vindication of the SDR’s directive to prioritise the UK – Norway bilateral relationship but it has implications beyond this. As a national decision to align procurement with NATO’s DDA model, the choice arguably represents a model for national procurement within the Alliance more broadly.

Towards an Atlantic Bastion

While the expansion of Type 26 usage beyond the UK and Norway may be limited, one of the features of the vessel is ‘flexible mission spaces’. This brings a particular level of versatility to the platform, arguably somewhat future proofing the ship as modularity is increasingly a feature of capability development. This is particularly noteworthy when it is considered that, as part of the Royal Navy’s Atlantic Bastion concept and NATO’s emerging approach to ASW, much of the mission will be supported by uncrewed and autonomous systems.

If ongoing discussions between the UK and Denmark for the purchase of the Type 31 – which is also equipped with a mission bay – bear fruit, there is an opportunity for a family of users who operate vessels with the same or similar mission bays to generate economies of scale in the development and deployment of uncrewed systems. Ongoing discussions regarding collaboration on the Swedish Lulea class frigate would, if this vessel is mission bay equipped, expand this family of users further.

Many of the companies which produce capabilities which might be employed in a mission bay are SMEs which often succumb in the ‘valley of death’ a period when there is insufficient demand for a capability which has been proven on an experimental basis to be scaled in a way that makes it commercially viable. While the requirements of individual nations for uncrewed systems will likely often differ, a larger pool of nations which might operate any given capability from a frigate’s mission bay represents a market which can provide greater opportunities to cross the valley of death. The speed at which capabilities could reach markets could also be increased in other ways, for example if uncrewed systems certified by one country could be accepted by any member of this potential family of users. This can provide the commercial foundations for the vision of a NATO ASW barrier in which many uncrewed systems complement more expensive crewed assets.

Strategic Criticisms and Considerations

In addition to doubts around AAW capability, there was also some criticism that Norway should be prioritising a relationship with the EU and its members, rather than the UK. The commentators highlight that the UK is isolated from many of benefits of EU industrial base, which itself is gaining a significant boost in the current geopolitical climate.

Although not an EU member, Norway is politically more closely aligned with the EU than is the UK. Norway has signed a EU defence partnership, giving it access to the European Defence Fund and include being part of the EU Common Procurement Act amongst other strategic advantages. In light of this some have questioned whether a closer alignment with Denmark and Sweden and optimising opportunities from the EU Defence Partnership may not have been a better strategic decision.

However, it should be noted that the UK is in dialogue with both Sweden and Denmark for the purchase of the Type 31 and work on the Lulea Class, somewhat weakening the argument that alignment with the EU and UK should be viewed in zero-sum terms. Additionally, the Type 26 deal has still been celebrated for support, maintenance and system development opportunities that it is expected to bring to Norway. Furthermore, cooperation in the maritime does not negate the potential for closer cooperation with the EU in the land and air domain, where there is a different threat calculus from the maritime.

Finally, political considerations of BREXIT aside, on defence, from its role in the Joint Expeditionary Force to helping coalesce a unified European front on Ukraine, the UK continues to play a leading role in Europe.

Conclusion

There is much to celebrate about the Norwegian decision within the UK and in part it vindicates the SDR’s directive to prioritise the UK–Norway bilateral relationship –However, the wider ramifications of the decision are of greater significance. The potential for aligning national capabilities with the DDA framework is arguably it’s most important near term consequence. In the medium term, a family of nations which operate frigates with the same mission bay-equipped Frigates can also provide a market large enough to enable the transformation in how the Alliance prosecutes ASW which many view as necessary.

© RUSI, 2025.

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