Iraq Elections Return Incumbents, Testing US and Iranian Influence

Iraq’s November national elections positioned incumbent Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC) as the leading party in federal Iraq, and provided more seats for coalitions and parties within the Shia Coordination Framework, the alliance that backs Sudani’s government.

The pre-election period was marked by extensive vote-buying and the use of sectarian fearmongering, both of which shaped campaign tactics across several constituencies, amid historically-low levels of political violence.

The Shia political actors in the Framework have vast influence in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the country’s state-sanctioned Iran-backed paramilitary umbrella. Those winning political entities include ex-PM and Dawa Party leader Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SoL), Qais al-Khazali’s Sadiqon-AAH paramilitary, Hadi Al-Ameri’s Badr Organisation paramilitary and Ammar Al-Hakim’s State Forces Alliance, among others. While Sudani is member of the RDC, there are roughly even chances that he will part paths with it, depending on his negotiations with other Framework member parties.

Voter participation defied prevailing expectations, with a reported turnout of 56% in 2025 marking an advance on 2021’s election turnout of 43%.

The heightened participation rate was achieved despite the continued boycott of the widely popular National Shia Current led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr withdrew from the electoral process, yet as his voting base compliantly updated their biometric voting cards in the months prior to polling day, this update contributed to the elevated voter turnout.

In the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) performed strongly against rivals, while the Taqaddum gained the highest votes in Baghdad and Sunni parts of Iraq.

Coalition Building

The electoral configuration dividing the Framework might set the stage for a demanding coalition-building process, if Sudani challenges his peer Framework members. With the Framework declaring itself the largest parliamentary bloc, the requirement for a grouping to be constitutionally empowered to nominate the next prime minister, member Shia parties are commencing their deliberations over picking the next prime ministerial candidate.

During Sudani’s premiership, the Coordination Framework – with several parties possessing armed wings – have further cultivated their influence within ministries, state institutions and furthered their cordial networks in the judicial system.

However, in an election where liberal and secular parties in Shia-majority provinces achieved only marginal gains and parties aligned with Iran-backed armed groups and linked to the PMF secured notable advances, there are signals of deep political fragmentation within Shia coalitions.

Despite the RDC’s strong performance, Prime Minister Sudani’s prospects for a second term are uncertain.

On 18 November, Sudani declared his coalition as part of the Framework, however, there are signs he might still part paths as there have been tensions between him and other members. Sudani routinely attends the Framework’s meetings, as a member, he was notably absent from at least the last two sessions, held on 3 and 10 November, a development that indicated a widening internal rift. And, prior to the elections, the Coordination Framework’s dominant figure, Nouri al-Maliki, signalled opposition to Sudani’s continuation, viewing the latter as abusing state resources for electoral purposes, inter alia.

Sequencing Change

From the moment election results are announced, the process of appointing a prime minister in Iraq follows a protracted eight-phase timeline. This sequence begins with the submission of appeals to the electoral commission and concludes with a prime minister-designate forming a government within 30 days. In between those phases, parliament must elect a speaker and a president.

Federal Supreme Court President Faiq Zaidan has recently explained that four months is the ideal interval before a new prime minister to take office. In practice, however, the process can extend much longer: the 2021 elections demonstrated that it may take up to a year before a government is finally formed – in what could be considered a worst-case scenario.

The lengthy timeline for appointing a prime minister typically creates space for extensive manoeuvring among parties and coalitions.

For example, Mohammad al-Halbusi, leader of the foremost Sunni party, Taqadum, recently signalled his interest in seeking the presidency, a role traditionally allocated to Kurdish parties under Iraq’s power-sharing conventions.

Furthermore, the likely-protracted bargaining and political friction between Sudani and elements of the Coordination Framework could further complicate matters. If, for example, Maliki and his partners work on fragmenting Sudani’s coalition and activate eavesdropping lawsuits against him, it could sabotage his chances of keeping the premiership.

Taken together, and in conjunction with foreign interference in the choice of a national leader, the dynamics are an obstacle to appointing a new prime minister in any timely manner.

Tehran’s Influence is Weakening But Still Crucial

Iraq’s elections come at a time when Iran’s Islamic Republic faces great international pressure and a contraction of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ and of Iran’s regional influence – a geopolitically challenging moment.

With several of Iran’s allies weakened or removed from the battlefield, neighbouring Iraq is the most valuable remaining arena for the Iran-led alliance. Baghdad represents not only a critical economic lifeline for Iran, but its allied militias have remained largely intact following the 7 October 2023 attack on Israel and the conflicts that ensued over the region in the next two years.

In the aftermath of the election, Tehran confronts a fragmented Shia political landscape, divided mainly among Coordination Framework actors, Sudani’s coalition and the Sadrists. Iran’s preferred outcome is a reasonably inclusive arrangement that brings at least two of these three camps into a working partnership. Since 2004, Tehran has consistently sought to maintain a cohesive and unified Shia political sphere in Iraq, with divide-and-rule caveats. In the current context, it is most likely to prioritise bringing the Framework parties and Sudani into alignment.

The Sadrists, long critical of Iran and of Iran-backed armed groups, remain difficult both to co-opt and to sideline. While Tehran may not be able to integrate Muqtada al-Sadr into a governing formula, it will seek to ensure that Muqtada al-Sadr does not exercise a veto over the next prime minister. In the meantime, understanding Iran’s weakening influence, Sadr may deliberately work on sabotaging the process via various means, including mass protests.

In parallel, Iran retains significant coercive and deterrent leverage in Iraq, principally through Kata’ib Hezbollah and other groups, should it wish to pressure domestic actors. However, the more Tehran relies on this form of coercive capital, the more likely Washington is to adopt a harder line on armed groups in Iraq, raising the political and security costs of such intervention.

Iran’s foremost priority is that the next prime minister either neutralises Washington’s demand to disarm Iran-backed groups, including dismantling the PMF, or, if hard-pressed, dilutes the scope and pace of any such measures. For this reason, Tehran would favour a collaborative prime minister whose authority is balanced and effectively constrained, by its allies within the Coordination Framework.

Prime Minister Sudani has repeatedly stated that he would move to address the issue of militias, commonly described in Iraq as ‘uncontrolled weapons,’ if the US-led International Coalition were to withdraw completely from Iraq. However, he has not clarified how such disarmament would be enforced. Tehran may calculate that this ambiguity serves its interests, allowing space to manage US pressure while preserving the autonomy and influence of its allied armed groups in Iraq.

If Maliki’s veto on Sudani persists, and Sudani’s coalition is marginalised or fractured, multiple prime ministerial candidates may emerge to satisfy both the Coordination Framework, Iran, and possibly the US. One potential contender is Hamid al-Shatri, the current head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). Shatri’s trajectory echoes, in part, the diplomatic ambitions once held by former prime minister and former INIS chief Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Soon after the fall of the Assad regime, Shatri worked to repair Iraq’s relationship with Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, showing no concern for media scrutiny or for the negative perceptions many of Iraq’s Shia citizens hold of Sharaa.

With a Dawa Party background, Shatri has served across almost all major security institutions, from the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Service to the PMF. This gives him a broad institutional footprint and a profile that may appeal to key Shia actors seeking an alternative consensus candidate who does not possess a political party and who does not show eagerness for political dominance. Several other candidates, whether politicians or senior security figures, are also favourable to Tehran.

Regardless of its preferred candidate, the Islamic Republic is racing to consolidate Iraq’s political trajectory on terms favourable to its interests, even as it confronts the risk of regional escalation with Israel and increasingly fragile ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon. Yemen’s Ansarullah, more commonly known as the Houthis, has begun to scale back its confrontations with Israel, a development that may additionally indicate Tehran’s preference for de-escalation at the regional level while it focuses on reinforcing its allies in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.

Washington Has Yet to Prove its Threat Credibility

Following the elections, while Washington and Tehran are both seeking to keep the status quo in Iraq, Washington wants to remove the entrenched presence of the Iran-backed militia groups – the jewel in Tehran’s crown. The statement congratulating Iraq for holding its national elections, issued by the US Presidential Envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, manifested this when it reiterated his country’s commitment to tackling ‘foreign interference and armed militias’ in Iraq.

President Donald Trump’s engagement in Iraq has pursued two primary objectives: weakening Tehran by dismantling its allies while advancing his Middle East peace agenda, and ensuring that American companies retain significant access to the Iraqi economy, particularly the oil sector. Yet it remains unclear how Washington intends to translate these aims into concrete outcomes, or whether it is prioritising diplomatic and economic coercion, kinetic pressure on militias, or a combination of both. Most recently, the US issued an ultimatum to Baghdad concerning the activities of armed groups.

To dismantle or restructure Iran-backed armed groups effectively, Washington has sought to pressure Iraq’s leadership through a sequence of escalating ultimatums. Without the appointment of a collaborative prime minister who shares elements of Washington’s agenda, any disarmament effort could be diluted or redirected.

The US is therefore likely to consider conditionally supporting Sudani or, alternatively, advocating for a more US-aligned figure such as Adnan al-Zurfi; Ex-PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi, a Washington ally during his tenure, is reportedly actively seeking a political role in Baghdad. Finally, the more a PM is US-accommodative, the more likely this would ease Baghdad-Erbil relations next year as the country is likely to endure economic stress and need Western financial aid.

© RUSI, 2025.

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