Co-Creating the New Europe: The Road, Not the Destination in EU–UK Talks

Ursula von der Leyen announcing the €35 billion loan from the EU to Ukraine, secured by future profits from frozen Russian assets.

European safety: Ursula von der Leyen announcing the €35 billion loan from the EU to Ukraine, secured by future profits from frozen Russian assets. Image: Sipa US / Alamy Stock


As leaders meet in Brussels on 20 November, a more useful question than re-joining the EU is what the UK will help to build next.

When Prime Minister Andy Burnham meets António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels on 20 November, the discussion in Westminster will already have a frame. Politicians and officials ask how, or whether, the UK could rejoin. This commentary argues against that frame in four steps. The EU that Britain left no longer exists, and the Europe of 2028 or 2030 will differ again from today's, which makes the task one of joint construction. The effort to anchor Ukraine in Europe and preserve peace on the continent is pushing the EU to invent new formats of association, and that widens the options open to the UK. Britain's weight in Ukraine's security places it inside this work, with the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) as its core. And the summit will absorb much of its energy in money and procedure, so both sides need to protect the strategic track that runs alongside.

A Destination That Keeps Moving

Talk of ‘rejoining’ assumes a fixed address to which one returns, but the EU has moved. It has opened accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. It has put together a €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan and a €150 billion defence lending instrument (Security Action for Europe, or SAFE). NATO's July report puts the defence spending of European Allies and Canada at about $634 billion for 2026 at constant 2021 prices, a real increase of nearly 11% in a year, and Germany now spends more than the UK in absolute terms after radically changing its doctrine. An organisation that is adding members, creating categories and financing defence at this scale will look different as soon as one or two years from now. Focusing on the end risks distracting from the importance of the road that needs to be travelled. The question of return has no stable reference point; what London and Brussels can do on 20 November is take part in drawing the next one.

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Kyiv is unlikely to sign a settlement that leaves it outside European structures in practice, so integration has to become tangible well before accession is complete

Ukraine as the Organising Question

European capitals share the view that a lasting peace needs Ukraine anchored in the continent, in security terms and well beyond them. The negotiations bring the point home. Whatever settlement is finally reached, it falls on Europe to provide the conditions to make it stick and avoid a toxic peace that could further undermine everyone’s security. Russian officials want a broad agreement on Europe's security architecture, and US negotiator Jared Kushner said in Moscow on 12 November that he had begun discussing it with European partners. On the same day, 40 European countries meeting in Dublin signed a declaration that matters affecting European security should be decided with Europeans involved (the European Political Community itself stands testament to this drive towards bringing like-minded nations together), and EU leaders said the next day that the architecture should stay off the table in the Ukraine talks.

Closing ranks in this way gives added weight to the UK. Ukraine will not be fast-tracked into the Union. Kyiv has asked for an entry date as early as 2027 and calls membership an essential pillar of its security, while accession moves cluster by cluster and requires unanimity. Yet Kyiv is unlikely to sign a settlement that leaves it outside European structures in practice, so integration has to become tangible well before accession is complete: shared financing, joint procurement, market access, a political seat. Each of these can be shaped to include countries that are not members.

The Canada episode showcases the momentum, but also how hard that shaping is. On 16 September, von der Leyen proposed making Canada the Union's first associate member. After objections from some member states, the label was left out of the joint statement issued in Montreal on 30 October, and the two sides committed to define an ‘ever-closer association’ short of full membership by the 2027 summit. But the wish to bring like-minded partners closer remains a natural and inevitable consequence of having to stand up against Russian aggression, while compensating for the diminishing US role in Europe and transatlantic convergence of interests.

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The E3 and E5 (France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK) are emerging as the core of this work. France, Germany and the UK have co-chaired the leaders' meetings of the Coalition of the Willing. While European institutions are present at Ukraine negotiations to ensure inclusive representation, leadership remains with the five largest defence spenders.

Why the UK is Central

Britain's place follows from Ukraine's and Europe’s security. London has committed £3 billion a year in military assistance until at least 2030–31 and counts £35 billion in total support since 2022, of which £16 billion is military. With France it leads the planning for a reassurance force, and Exercise Koalicja, running from 9 to 22 November, is the first outing of the Multinational Force Ukraine, with 2,800 personnel from 11 nations. Britain and France are Europe's only nuclear-armed Allies. Any security guarantee for Ukraine assumes contributions of this kind.

Money Talks and the Strategic Track

It will be hard to stop the EU–UK ‘rapprochement’ process from getting bogged down in money and procedure. The EU wants to conclude agri-food standards, linkage of carbon markets and a youth experience scheme as one package. On the youth scheme, London wants a cap on numbers; Brussels wants EU students to pay home fees at UK universities, and the two disagree on whether young Britons could move between member states. Reports suggest it may slip by six months. Access to the EU electricity market comes with a request for a sizeable contribution to cohesion funding, and the food deal turns on how far the UK aligns dynamically with EU rules. On defence, the UK is outside the current round of SAFE after talks failed over terms.

These are real questions and negotiators must work through them. The difficulty is that budget lines and strategic choices run on different clocks. The strategic clock is the one now being set by the Ukraine negotiations, and it does not wait for the youth scheme.

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Three Recommendations for 20 November

Give the strategic track its own standing mechanism. The EU institutions, the UK and the other E5 governments should agree to consult regularly on the Ukraine settlement and on the European architecture responses to questions arriving from Moscow and Washington. The mechanism would thus remain separate from the EU–UK negotiations, so that a dispute over student fees cannot hold strategic integration hostage.

Define the format of association before the label. The Canada outcome shows what happens when a name is announced ahead of its content. Brussels should set out a modular menu of association for close partners: consultation, participation in defence instruments and missions, economic and political cooperation, etc. Canada, the UK and eventually Ukraine would draw on one framework to determine their respective forms of association – and they should also participate in defining it.

Agree the criteria for SAFE before the numbers. Talks on UK participation failed over price in late 2025, and Defence Secretary Wes Streeting says a SAFE 2 will be judged on its terms. Both sides should settle the principles now: participation measured by capability delivered for Ukraine and by new industrial capacity, entry terms set by a formula known in advance, and an immediate step on UK participation in EU civilian and military missions. Streeting's own point is that industry, not money, is the constraint. The arithmetic should follow that purpose.

The language of rejoining belongs to a Europe that has changed and will change again. Ukraine's integration is leading the EU to create new formats of association, which gives the UK more routes into the construction than the debate at home allows. The UK's role in securing Ukraine and Europe puts it at the centre of that work. The money talks will take their share of attention on 20 November, but the three steps above are meant to keep the strategic track moving while they do.

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WRITTEN BY

Oana Popescu-Zamfir

Senior Research Fellow - European Security

International Security

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