Challenges and Opportunities of the Transition to War

It remains an unfortunate reality that democratic nations are seldom prepared to fight a war with well positioned and fully equipped armed forces. Financial constraints, and competition for resources with other vital sectors such as healthcare, education and social welfare, often add a level of challenge for new acquisitions, long-term investment in defence and the relationship with industry. The military are then inevitably driven to resort to sticking plasters and ‘quick fixes’ to deep rooted problems.

Furthermore, conventional wisdom often regards unused, large stockpiles of equipment as wasteful in terms of Treasury accounting. Despite the recent increase in defence spending, the challenges currently being wrestled within the MOD are unlikely to become less onerous in the short and medium term. With the limited funds immediately available, exacerbated by the purportedly hollowed-out military, both the MOD and industry have resorted to offering ‘jam tomorrow’ in the context in of the prioritisation of funds and letting-contracts, or the increase of production runs. This is promised with the expectation of a suitable warning of escalation, a timely easing of contracting rules and routes, and the appropriate release of money for conflict. That said, industry and the authority may not be in unchartered territory if we recall history. If the closest comparison is 1938 during the period of the Munich Agreement, then geopolitical challenges could intensify quite quickly.

Challenges

The potential of a prolonged conflict and resource depletion, poses unique challenges that necessitate comprehensive preparedness strategies. Indeed, focusing on tactical capabilities will not be enough to offer the resilience needed if NATO is deployed at scale. It is thus suggested that without better alignment of the military-industrial complex we are gambling with extremely high stakes. Building on a recently published RUSI Whitehall Paper, Introduction: The Strategic Logic of Dissimilar Rearmament, the defence ecosystem needs to develop the understanding of how industry can better support the armed forces. Specifically, the transition to war and war itself, what barriers can be easily dealt with, and how to gain the initiative over potential adversaries.

Currently, there is no clear plan on how industry will be called upon in these two phases of conflict. When one considers the lessons that have emerged from Ukraine, we see that capability requirements appear to have been shifting in response to the changing nature of contemporary warfare. The dynamics of the combat power and the elements of manoeuvre, command & control, fires and protection, have followed different and possibly unexpected pathways. This is likely to raise more questions than answers. However, it is clear that high-tech, nuanced, or exquisite capability in a multi-national supply construct, requires an equally bespoke industrial support network and supply chain, which will unavoidably be burdensome in an Article 5 level war and take time to reconstitute. Any delay in mobilising industry may see significant attrition of military capability until full support capacity is reached.

Whilst technology certainly expands and magnifies lethality, as we have seen in Ukraine, uplifted numbers of people and bayonets are still vital to create the need for mass. Yet people are a scarce resource, and those who want to serve and lead are getting scarcer.

More than ever, the upcoming generations are looking to different goals in a career, with significant numbers turning away from key public sector roles. Indeed, in recent research carried out by Prograd, it was suggested that many of Generation Z would rather work as a Barista in a coffee shop, than be in the uniform of our armed services. In the UK, there are more people leaving the military than are joining it. There is no reason to think that the situation differs wildly in any other nation. Indeed, NATO Allies unavoidably find themselves in the position of having the smallest military in modern times, with the most diverse tasks in the largest geographical areas of responsibility that they have ever seen.

The ratio of combat troops (or tooth) to those force elements whose primary role is to support the deployment, such as logistical element, supply trains and maintenance workshops (or tail) has been debated for generations. However, whatever the correct Tooth To Tail Ratio is needed, it is a fair assumption based on cultural changes, that there is not enough ‘tooth or tail’ wearing uniform. There is, however, an opportunity to learn and emulate history, as seen in the United Kingdom and the United States, in the late 1930’s and early 1940’s.

Opportunities

During this time industrial leadership worked ‘hand in glove’ with the Government and National authorities to deliver an impactful effect on the mobilisation of the industrial base, to compliment the military, and position each nation on a warfighting posture. It is here that outsourcing to industry can literally be the force multiplier needed for military readiness. There is an apparent will to evolve and develop, demonstrated by the promised increase in defence spending, and the Front Line Commands recognise the need of a transition plan. So, with the MOD’s requirement to fight the next war – ‘A War’ – rather than the last – ‘The War’ – doctrine should not only be questioning if the balance is right between high and low technology, but also the relationship with industry, and how to transition the defence ecosystem swiftly to a posture for war.

The defence ecosystem needs to prepare and plan for the transition to a war footing. A strategy of Total Defence would offer the UK the ability to return to a position where it could rapidly pivot to a whole-of-society approach to national security, involving the government, military, industry, and civilians in preparing for and responding to existential threats.

In the much-quoted Rules of the Game by Andrew Gordon, there are references to Regulators and Ratcatchers. Ratcatchers have an instinct for war, whereas Regulators are driven by process, tabulation, and regulation. It is the view of Gordon that the delta between the triumph of Trafalgar and the less than successful Jutland was driven by the dominance of Regulators over Ratcatchers due to protracted peace. In the wake of a long period of little or no threat in Europe, the armed forces and industry must pivot and return our collective psyche to one of the Ratcatcher.

As such, we need to regard the rearmament of the military as a transformation or change programme, approached from both sides of the defence-industrial construct, not a series of statements from Whitehall. In the forward of the MOD publication, The Orchestration of Military Strategic Effects dated January 2021, Major General (now Lieutenant General) Charles Stickland RM said, ‘changes to our behaviour and culture that will be necessary to achieve this better orchestration will be hard. This process of improvement will be a journey, there is no finite end. There will always be more we can do to integrate better with our partners and allies, but by striving for this integration we can maintain a position of advantage against our competitors.’

The change must be done collaboratively with industry, using ISO44001, which the MOD has already embraced. The partnership that develops shouldn’t be limited to the UK but rather seen as an exemplar and a stepping stone to align and work closer with NATO and the JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force) through a similar collaborative, interoperable and transparent framework. Both organisations require high levels of cooperation and coordination across multiple nations and sectors. This is where the UK's defence industry, already closely connected internationally, plays a crucial role.

The UK should strengthen its integration between defence and industry. If we are in a 1938 moment, it is imperative that industry dovetail with military as the partners, to support the understanding of the ‘art of the possible’ and thus help develop a change strategy based on accurate operational effectiveness, even in the case of legacy platforms and systems. The ability to rapidly mobilise industry is critical, but contractual arrangements are needed to be prepared far in advance of any conflict. Jam tomorrow will not do, we must remember that Prior Planning and Preparation, Prevents Poor Performance!

© RUSI, 2025.

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