CBRN Supply Chains: The Strategic Enablers Missing from Resilience

A British Senior Non-commissioned Officer, with the Joint European Training Team, spreads CS gas inside the US Army Training Support Center Benelux CBRN facility on Chièvres Air Base, Belgium.

Focusing on dispersal: A British Senior Non-commissioned Officer, with the Joint European Training Team, spreads CS gas inside the US Army Training Support Center Benelux CBRN facility on Chièvres Air Base, Belgium. Image: RP Photo / Alamy Stock


CBRN preparedness depends on dispersed supply chains. Resilience frameworks should recognise them as strategic enablers, even if they are not critical infrastructure.

National resilience strategies place significant emphasis on protecting Critical National Infrastructure, recognising that disruption to essential services can have profound consequences for national security, public safety and economic stability. The UK Government Resilience Framework advocates a whole-of-society approach to resilience and highlights the need to understand systemic interdependencies that could affect national preparedness and response capability.

Recent events, including the Covid-19 pandemic, geopolitical instability and global supply chain disruptions, have demonstrated how rapidly shortages of critical materials, components and specialised products can emerge. The strategic significance of resilience has been reinforced through the Integrated Review Refresh 2023, which emphasises the challenges posed by strategic competition, economic coercion and vulnerabilities associated with globally interconnected systems.

Increasingly, resilience debates are shifting from protecting individual assets towards understanding the interconnected networks that support national capability. Both the EU and NATO have recognised the growing importance of resilience across interconnected sectors, industrial ecosystems and supply networks. The EU's resilience framework specifically acknowledges that increasingly interconnected societies require resilience measures extending beyond the protection of individual infrastructure assets, while NATO emphasises that resilient civil systems are fundamental to both societal and military preparedness.

This challenge is particularly relevant in the CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) domain, where preparedness and response capabilities depend on complex, interconnected and often globally distributed industrial networks. An important policy question therefore emerges: should CBRN supply chains be considered critical infrastructure in their own right, or should they be recognised differently within resilience frameworks?

The answer may lie between these two positions. While CBRN supply chains may not fit traditional critical infrastructure definitions, they should be recognised as strategic enablers whose disruption could significantly degrade national preparedness, emergency response capability and operational resilience.

Invisible Dependencies

CBRN capability is often viewed through the lens of frontline assets, including detection equipment, respiratory protective equipment, medical countermeasures, specialist laboratories and decontamination systems. Yet these capabilities depend upon extensive supply chains that frequently remain outside national resilience discussions.

Modern CBRN systems are rarely manufactured within a single organisation or country. Their production relies upon specialist components, proprietary technologies, precursor chemicals, advanced electronics and niche manufacturing processes distributed across multiple suppliers and jurisdictions. In many cases, these supply chains contain hidden vulnerabilities arising from supplier concentration, limited manufacturing capacity, long lead times and reliance on overseas suppliers.

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Semiconductor shortages may not initially appear to be a CBRN issue, yet they can directly affect the production, maintenance and sustainment of radiation detectors, chemical sensors and biological surveillance systems

These risks are amplified because many CBRN products exist within relatively small and specialised markets. Unlike commercially competitive sectors characterised by significant redundancy, specialist CBRN equipment often depends on a limited number of suppliers possessing unique expertise, manufacturing capability or intellectual property. Should disruption occur, alternative sources may not exist or may require lengthy qualification processes before they become operationally viable.

As a result, vulnerabilities may emerge several tiers below the end user, creating resilience challenges that are difficult to identify through conventional procurement and assurance mechanisms. This concern is consistent with the National Risk Register, which identifies supply chain disruption, pandemics, cyber incidents and geopolitical instability as significant risks capable of affecting critical national functions.

The Semiconductor Example

Semiconductors provide a compelling illustration of this challenge. Many CBRN capabilities depend directly upon advanced electronics, including radiation detectors, chemical identification systems, bio-surveillance platforms, autonomous monitoring technologies and secure communications networks.

However, semiconductor manufacturing relies upon highly complex international supply chains involving rare gases, ultrapure chemicals, specialist manufacturing equipment and globally dispersed production facilities. The OECD has noted that while globalisation has improved efficiency and reduced costs, it has also increased exposure to supplier concentration, systemic shocks and strategic dependencies within critical supply chains.

An October 2026 analysis by the Semiconductor Industry Association highlights that semiconductor production depends upon a highly interconnected, multitiered global supply chain, with many critical vulnerabilities residing deep within upstream suppliers of materials, equipment and subcomponents.

Recognising these dependencies, the US government has explicitly identified semiconductors as essential to national security, defence capability and critical infrastructure resilience. Modern military systems, communications networks, critical infrastructure and advanced security technologies all depend upon assured semiconductor availability.

The broader importance of supply chain security was also recognised in Executive Order 14017: America's Supply Chains, which identified resilient and diversified supply chains as essential for managing biological threats, geopolitical disruption and national security challenges.

For the CBRN community, the implications are significant. Semiconductor shortages may not initially appear to be a CBRN issue, yet they can directly affect the production, maintenance and sustainment of radiation detectors, chemical sensors and biological surveillance systems. The vulnerability therefore exists not solely within the CBRN sector itself, but within the broader industrial ecosystem upon which CBRN capability depends.

The resilience of a radiation detector may ultimately depend less on the detector manufacturer than on a global network of semiconductor fabricators, chemical producers and specialist component suppliers.

Strategic Vulnerabilities in the UK Context

The UK possesses significant expertise across defence, security and emergency preparedness. Nevertheless, many CBRN capabilities rely upon highly specialised industrial partners and international supply networks.

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Detection technologies frequently incorporate globally sourced electronic components and sensors. Pharmaceutical countermeasures depend upon complex supply chains that support active pharmaceutical ingredients, precursor chemicals and specialist manufacturing processes. The UK Biological Security Strategy highlights the importance of maintaining resilient access to diagnostics, surveillance capabilities, medical countermeasures and supporting industrial capacity during emergencies.

Similarly, personal protective equipment (PPE), often considered a relatively straightforward commodity, demonstrated considerable vulnerability during the Covid-19 pandemic. The National Audit Office found that unprecedented global demand, export restrictions and disruption to international supply chains created significant challenges for the procurement and distribution of PPE despite existing stockpiles and contingency arrangements.

These experiences demonstrate that the resilience of national CBRN capability is closely linked to the resilience of underlying industrial systems. National preparedness may therefore depend as much upon the robustness of supply chains as upon the availability of frontline response assets.

Learning from International Practice

International organisations and governments are increasingly recognising the importance of supply chain security and strategic dependency management.

The NATO resilience agenda places growing emphasis on the role of civil preparedness, industrial capacity and interconnected support systems in maintaining operational effectiveness. NATO's resilience framework explicitly recognises that military capability depends upon broader societal and industrial resilience.

Similarly, the EU's Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the Resilience of Critical Entities reflects a shift away from protecting infrastructure assets in isolation towards understanding how interconnected systems support the delivery of essential services. The Directive acknowledges that increasingly interconnected societies require resilience measures extending beyond physical infrastructure protection alone.

Despite these developments, relatively little policy attention has focused specifically on CBRN-enabling supply chains. As a result, critical dependencies may remain poorly understood until they are exposed during periods of crisis.

From Vulnerability to Resilience

Recognising CBRN supply chains as strategic enablers should not necessarily result in their designation as critical infrastructure. Instead, it should encourage a more sophisticated approach to resilience management.

The first requirement is improved supply chain visibility. Many organisations understand their Tier 1 suppliers but possess only limited awareness of dependencies located further upstream. Mapping multitier supply chains would improve identification of chokepoints, concentration risks and strategic dependencies.

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Such an approach aligns with the principles of the UK Government Resilience Framework, which emphasises anticipation, preparedness, adaptation and the management of cross-sector interdependencies.

Second, resilience planning should extend beyond stockpiling finished products. While strategic reserves remain important, governments should also focus on maintaining industrial capacity, preserving critical skills and ensuring continuity of manufacturing during periods of disruption.

Third, procurement frameworks should place greater emphasis on supply chain transparency and resilience. Research by the OECD suggests that improved supply chain visibility, diversification and strategic inventory management are important mechanisms for reducing vulnerability to systemic disruption.

Policy Recommendations

Three practical measures could strengthen national resilience.

First, governments should establish a dedicated CBRN Supply Chain Intelligence Function responsible for dependency mapping, horizon scanning and vulnerability assessment.

Second, resilience frameworks should introduce a formal category of Strategic Enablers to recognise functions that may not constitute critical infrastructure in their own right but which remain essential to preparedness, response and recovery.

Third, procurement and assurance processes should require greater multitier supply chain visibility, enabling hidden dependencies and systemic risks to be identified before they affect operational capability.

Conclusion

The central question is not whether CBRN supply chains should be formally designated as critical infrastructure. Rather, it is whether governments adequately recognise their role as strategic enablers of national resilience.

CBRN capabilities do not exist in isolation. They rely upon complex industrial networks, specialist manufacturers and globally distributed supply chains extending far beyond the traditional boundaries of the sector. This is particularly evident in biological preparedness, where resilience depends not only upon frontline response organisations but also upon robust supply chains supporting diagnostics, surveillance systems and medical countermeasures. As recognised in both the Integrated Review Refresh 2023 and the UK Government Resilience Framework, national resilience increasingly depends upon understanding and managing the complex interdependencies that underpin critical capabilities.

If resilience planning is to keep pace with an increasingly interconnected world, policymakers must look beyond critical infrastructure itself and towards the strategic enablers that support it. Failure to do so risks discovering during a future crisis that the weakest point in national CBRN preparedness was never the frontline capability, but the unseen supply chains upon which it depended.

© RUSI, 2026.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the authors', and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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WRITTEN BY

Professor David Crouch

RUSI Senior Associate Fellow, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy

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Natascha McVeigh

Guest Contributor

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