US Troop Cuts On NATO’s Eastern Flank

US and Romanian officials announced on October 29 that soldiers with the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, will not be replaced when they return home from Europe.

No Surprise

In a press release remarkably devoid of details, US Army Europe and Africa described the move as part of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s ‘deliberate process to ensure a balanced US military force posture.’ It stressed that ‘this is not an American withdrawal from Europe or a signal of lessened commitment to NATO,’ but rather a sign that Europeans ‘are meeting President Trump’s call to take primary responsibility for the conventional defence of Europe.’

The Romanian defence minister Ionuț Moșteanu said in a hastily arranged press conference that Romania and its allies had been ‘informed’ of the adjustment of American troops deployed on the eastern flank. He also pointed out that that this was not a withdrawal, but rather the suspension of the rotation of a brigade that had elements in several NATO countries, including Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia.

Importantly, he noted that around 1,000 US troops would stay in Romania and cooperation with the US, which is Romania’s main supplier of military equipment, remained strong. Before the announcement, the number of US troops in Romania was estimated at around 1,700.

“No Big Deal”

It has been widely expected that the Trump administration’s Global Posture Review, due later this year, will focus on the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific region, leading to a reduction of US troop levels in Europe, especially the rotating forces deployed by the previous administration in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since then, US force levels in Europe have fluctuated between 75,000 and 105,000 troops, according to the US European Command.

A NATO official said that ‘even with this adjustment, the US force posture in Europe remains larger than it has been for many years, with many more US forces on the continent than before 2022.’

President Donald Trump was asked on Air Force One, as he flew back from Asia, about the thinking behind reducing troops in Romania. ‘It’s not very significant, it’s not a, not a big deal,’ he said.

Wrong Time, Wrong Place

The rotating American troops were a supplement to security on NATO’s eastern flank, rather than central to it, and the withdrawal of key US enablers, such as intelligence or air and missile defence, which Europeans lack, would be much more detrimental. Yet while the plan may not substantially alter security in Europe, it does send the wrong signal at the wrong time in the wrong place.

At the wrong time, because it coincides with the Trump administration’s attempts to pressurise President Putin to end his brutal war in Ukraine. It is hard to see how cutting US troops in Eastern Europe can send a signal of deterrence. On the contrary, it may send the wrong message to Putin and fuel European anxiety that Trump is using troops on NATO territory as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with the Kremlin.

In the wrong place, because of Romania’s strategic position in the Black Sea region. The country has the longest border with Ukraine of any NATO ally and hosts a major training hub for Ukrainian pilots. The deployment of the 101st Airborne Division to the Mihail Kogǎlniceanu (MK) base in southeast Romania was not just the first time this storied unit had returned to Europe since World War Two. It also brought them closer to the war in Ukraine than most other U.S Army units. Not far is Russian-occupied Crimea, one of the most heavily militarised parts of Europe.

Another of the three US bases in Romania is Deveselu. It hosts NATO’s missile defence system, which matters to the whole alliance and has been the target of repeated Russian threats.

Allies Step In

Tensions have been mounting since September, when Russian drones and planes violated the airspace of Romania, Poland and Estonia. It led NATO to set up a new mission, Eastern Sentry, meant to enhance vigilance along the alliance’s entire eastern flank. This gives NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich, more flexibility to deploy forces and capabilities wherever needed, including to Romania.

Other European allies are present in Romania: Germany leads an air policing unit until March; France stations around 1,300 troops as part of the NATO multinational battlegroup it leads there since 2022. The battlegroup, which includes Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, is currently conducting its biggest exercise this year, Dacian Fall, to scale up to brigade level. Visiting the exercise on October 31, defence minister Catherine Vautrin said France would maintain the number of troops present in Romania but did not suggest any major future increase.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is also expected in Romania on November 5-6 when the country hosts the alliance’s Industry Forum. He will want to send a reassuring message to Romanians that they are safe in NATO.

Rare Rebuke

The troop cut announcement has led to criticism of the Romanian government’s management of its strategic partnership with Washington from both the ultra-nationalist opposition and the social democrats, who are part of the ruling coalition. It should spur Romania to further strengthen its armed forces, speed up its defence industry production and step up military and industrial ties with other European allies. Defence minister Moșteanu rightly stressed that ultimately, Romania’s strongest security guarantee lies in its own armed forces.

But there was also a rare rebuke from two top Republican lawmakers, the chairs of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, who made clear they strongly oppose scaling back US presence in Romania. ‘Unfortunately, the Pentagon’s decision appears uncoordinated and directly at odds with the President’s strategy,’ wrote Senator Roger Wicker and Representative Mike Rogers, stressing that ‘it is concerning that Congress was not consulted in advance.’ Republican Representative Mike Turner, who chairs the US delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, also expressed his concern, recalling that “Congress has been clear that US force posture across Europe must remain robust and resolute” in view of Russia’s continued aggressive actions.

It is unclear if Congress can reverse the decision. It is equally unclear if this is the only shift in US military presence in Europe or just the opening salvo of more cuts to come in the Global Posture Review. There are indications that the Romanian cuts may just be phase one, with further reductions in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia expected as soon as mid-December.

Notably, the first report of the force adjustment came not from Romania, but in a Kyiv Post story from Washington, DC. It quoted US and European officials saying that ‘internal discussions initially considered reductions in both Romania and Poland, but the final decision targeted Romania alone.’ There is no public explanation for why that may have happened. In Poland, where some 10,000 US troops are currently stationed, the country’s defence minister said he had not received warning of any withdrawal or reduction. His Estonian counterpart said the US had made a “significant decision” to maintain its 700 troops in the country.

Until now, NATO’s approach to the Global Posture Review has been to call on the US to ensure there was “no gap and no surprise.” Further significant US adjustments at a rapid pace would risk leaving gaps in NATO’s defence plans and invite further Russian aggression. So concerns will continue that decisions are made in Washington without full coordination with NATO allies and without enough regard for Europe’s security or the bigger strategic picture.

© RUSI, 2025.

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