An Integrated Air and Missile Defence Architecture for the UK

The prominence of long-range strike capabilities in recent conflicts, most notably in Ukraine, has driven a newfound interest in integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) for the UK. Until recently, this was an area that had received limited interest, given that much British military planning had an expeditionary focus and there were limited threats to the homeland. The size of Russia’s arsenal of long-range strike capabilities – and the demonstrated Russian ability to employ conventional precision strike in both a counterforce and a countervalue role – makes discussions on the risk to the UK germane. The threat spectrum will evolve to become multi-vector, encompassing a combination of air-breathing, ballistic and hypersonic threats. However, any effort to buttress the air and missile defence system protecting the UK homeland will take place at a time when multiple parts of the Joint Force will require recapitalisation of both platforms and stockpiles, after decades of downsizing. It is therefore vital that an IAMD system be developed in a way that does not render it an opportunity cost to the UK’s ability to project power. Instead, it must add to the UK’s credibility. The paper seeks to describe how an IAMD capability to achieve this might be developed in the coming decades.

Key Findings

• Different components of the Russian threat are likely to become acute at different periods during the next two decades. This allows the UK to sequence its commitments.
   
• In the next five years, cruise missiles will probably be the primary Russian threat at depth. This is due to the limited production rates for systems such as the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile and the allocation of produced hypersonic glide vehicles to the Russian Strategic Missile Forces for deterrence against the US. Beyond the mid-2030s, however, it is likely that the threat spectrum will broaden.
   
• The employment of missiles against the UK would currently involve risks to scarce and expensive Russian launch platforms, such as bombers and guided-missile submarines. Russia has not generally faced such risks in the war in Ukraine. Moscow will thus need to be more judicious in target selection to maximise impact in order to justify this risk.
   
• Of the Russian concepts for the employment of long-range strike capabilities – the strategic operation for repelling an aerospace attack (offensive counterair against submarine bases, airbases and cruise-missile-carrying platforms) and SODCIT (the destruction of critical infrastructure) – Moscow is likely to give precedence to repelling aerospace attacks from the UK. Military targets will probably be priorities early in a conflict, when the UK’s vulnerabilities are likely to be most acute.
   
• Until 2030, improving UK national defences against subsonic cruise missiles should take precedence. The availability of elevated L-band sensors and longer-ranged surface-to-air missile systems will be particularly important.
   
• Additionally, there is room to build on capabilities such as Guardian and Nexus to leverage currently unused, but IAMD-relevant, data from across the Joint Force.
   
• In the mid-2030s to the early 2040s, a degree of homeland ballistic missile defence will probably be important. Fielding a number of the Royal Navy’s MK 41 vertical launch system-equipped platforms during this period can provide some opportunities in this regard as the MK 41 is compatible with several BMD-capable exo-atmospheric interceptors. Opportunities to iterate on work being conducted for programmes such as the Royal Navy’s Future Air Dominance System can be exploited.
   
• Beyond 2040, defences against targets such as hypersonic glide vehicles will also become a higher priority.
   
• A carefully sequenced approach to generating a national IAMD capability – that matches investments to the evolution of the threat and leverages existing multipurpose systems as well as more bespoke capabilities – can mitigate risks to the homeland in a way in a way that supports other joint force priorities.