Violence in Suweida Reveals Syria’s Volatile Transition Challenge

On 16 July, the Israel Defence Forces launched a series of airstrikes on key sites in Damascus, including the Syrian Ministry of Defence, military headquarters, and areas near the presidential palace. Israel framed the strikes as a warning to the Syrian government against further escalation in Suweida in the south, where clashes erupted between a Druze militia and Bedouin groups.

In response to the clashes local to Suweida, the Syrian government had deployed forces to restore order. According to Israeli officials, government forces entered a zone that Israel – currently occupying parts of the area – has designated as demilitarised of heavy weapons. The Israeli Air Force subsequently struck Syrian government targets, framing the strike as enforcement of its red lines and aimed at neutralising militias affiliated with the Syrian government responsible for massacres against the Druze minority in Suweida.

With over 1,200 reported fatalities in a highly volatile escalation, there is a credible risk that such violence could recur. As part of a ceasefire agreement, the Syrian government started evacuating Bedouin families (up to 1,500 persons) trapped inside the city of Suweida. The UN International Organization for Migration reported that close to 130,000 people were displaced in the hostilities. Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa has vowed to protect Syria’s Druze and condemned external intervention aimed at fracturing Syria’s national unity.

The Fragility of the Post-Assad Transition

Although Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) emerged as the dominant force in the fragile new state that replaced the Assad regime, it has yet been unable to sideline other armed, former Jihadist factions with which it had previously collaborated during the anti-regime conflict. The challenges facing the interim Syrian government led by al-Sharaa are formidable: the task of constructing institutional capacity after decades of tyrannical dynastic Assad rule; managing acute financial constraints within a heavily internationally sanctioned economy; and contending with a critical shortage of trained civil administrators and professional security forces. Yet despite these obstacles, the central test confronting Syria’s new governing power has remained constant since December 2024: asserting effective and uncontested political and military authority across the entirety of Syria’s national territory and its borders.

Three key regions of Syria managed to carve out quasi semi-autonomous spheres beyond the reach of centralised authority during the multisided civil war and the tumultuous years before Assad’s fall. These regions include: the northeast, governed by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); Suweida, with its Druze-majority population; and Deraa, which developed a distinct and negotiated relationship with the Assad regime.

The recent deadly violence marks the culmination of months of mounting local grievances compounded by inadequate or poorly conceived policies from the central government to respond to local demands for decentralisation in Druze-dominated areas. Recent violence erupted after a young Druze vendor from Suweida was reported to be forcibly stopped and kidnapped on 11 July at a makeshift Bedouin checkpoint on the highway between the province and Damascus. The Druze contend that the Syrian government has allowed the security situation in Suweida to deteriorate intentionally, as part of a broader strategy to reassert full control over the province. Hikmat al-Hijri, the dominant, yet polarising, leader of Syria's Druze, has been a central figure in the recent violence, accused of endorsing Israel’s intervention on behalf of the Druze.

For Damascus, the loss of authority in one region could set a legitimacy-testing and undermining precedent, encouraging similar challenges elsewhere in the already fragmented state. Its inability to assert control in Suwayda not only undermines its image as a sovereign central power but also risks emboldening restive constituencies in Latakia, Hasakah, and even in Aleppo – turning isolated defiance into a contagion of fragmentation. For al-Sharaa, the stakes are therefore not just local – they are existential.

Not all Druze factions have been irreversibly opposed to the interim government in Damascus, but a sizeable portion have sought accommodation on their own terms. Demands for special arrangements for the region began in January: Druze armed groups formed in Suweida refused to disarm and community elders insisted that government officials in the province were selected from among local residents. They reluctantly accepted the appointment of Mustafa Bakkour as governor, and only under pressure. Bakkour ultimately resigned in May due to sustained unrest. Until the final week of June, administrative oversight of Suweida was temporarily handled by an official from neighbouring Deraa province. Frequent demonstrations have signalled local rejection of government-affiliated security forces operating in the area. In the lead-up to the recent flare-up, tensions remained high – underscoring the persistent fractures between the centre and periphery and exposing the limits of Damascus’s ability to assert a monopoly on the use of force.

The South as Precedent for the Northeast

Israel has consistently emphasised two red lines regarding Syria: preventing the Syrian military from deploying south of Damascus and protecting the Druze population. These priorities have effectively positioned Israel as a central actor in what might otherwise appear to be a localised internal conflict.

Israeli policymakers are well aware that if the al-Sharaa government fails to establish control in Suwayda, it could significantly weaken Damascus’ posture – particularly in relation to the Kurds in the northeast. In that sense, Suwayda is not just a provincial contest; it is a strategic fault line with broader implications for Syria’s internal balance and Israel’s regional deterrence architecture.

The Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is not a monolithic entity; it comprises a patchwork of Arab tribal factions that joined the coalition at different points to fight against Islamic State (Daesh) and, in some cases, to oppose the Assad regime following the outbreak of Syria’s multisided civil war in 2011. However, the Kurdish-Arab tribal consensus has been under strain, especially in non-Kurdish majority areas. Now, government failure in the south risks exposing the hollow core of post-war Assad rule and reinforces the image of a fragmented Syria. This raises the risk that the Syrian Kurdish narrative – namely, that Damascus lacks the capacity to govern the entirety of Syria – may gain further traction. However, to date, the SDF have shown no signs of intent to disrupt the ongoing, historically significant disarmament process involving the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Iraq and Turkey.

Israel-US Tensions

Israel’s strikes in Suweida and Damascus have resuscitated speculation that there is daylight between US President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. Such noise had subsided after what appeared to be a turning point following US strikes against three Iranian nuclear sites in the aftermath of Israel’s operation ‘Rising Lion’. Now, the flareup in Syria seems to have widened the gap between Trump and Israel’s ruling government over both strategy and timing.

Crystalising signs of the divergence, US Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack said, ‘The United States was not asked, nor did they participate in that decision, nor was it the United States responsibility in matters that Israel feels is for its own self-defence.’ He added, Israel's intervention ‘creates another very confusing chapter’ and ‘came at a very bad time.’ In a rare critique of Israeli policy, the news site Axios quoted several US officials as being critical of Netanyahu, with one unnamed White House official as saying, ‘Bibi acted like a madman. He bombs everything all the time . . . This could undermine what Trump is trying to do.’

Israel’s stated rationale for its latest strikes in Syria blends claims of self-defence with a purported commitment to protecting the Druze minority. Israeli officials insist they will not allow hostile actors to establish a foothold along Israel’s northern frontier and have unilaterally demanded the demilitarisation of areas south of Damascus. The effect of this is that the Syrian government must effectively relinquish its sovereign right over its own territory, ceding sovereign rights to its territory and the airspace above it to Israel. This, despite a series of consistent signs from Syrian interim president Al-Sharaa that Damascus is not interested in hostilities with Isreal, even going as far as to indicate the possibility of a non-aggression agreement brokered by the US in recent weeks.

Public criticism by Barrack is likely meant to send a warning to Netanyahu that the White House is growing impatient with military action that runs counter to Trump’s vision for a centralised and ‘back-to-business’ Syria. In recent days, the UK and 27 states jointly issued a statement against ‘drip feeding of aid and the inhumane killing of civilians’ in Gaza. Israel’s actions in Syria have risked alienating Israel further. In a notable show of regional solidarity, Turkey and ten Arab states issued a joint declaration on 17 July condemning the strikes as violations of Syrian sovereignty. They reaffirmed support for Syria’s unity and territorial integrity, rejected foreign interference, and welcomed the ceasefire between the Syrian government and Druze militias in Suweida.

Post-ceasefire realities and constraints

The fragile ceasefire in Suweida is holding, for now. But what will this deadly chapter of the post-Assad transition, the failure of Al-Sharaa’s forces to prevent violence against Druze civilians and the local Sunni Arab population, mean for US support for the man that Trump described as a ‘young, attractive guy. Tough guy. Strong past.’

Three key conclusions can be drawn from the recent conflict. The first is the sheer difficulty Damascus faces in asserting authority across the entirety of Syrian territory. Countering Hikmat al-Hijri and his group – comprising only a few thousand armed fighters – should have been a straightforward task for the al-Sharaa government. Yet, Damascus has demonstrated a weak hand in projecting and sustaining control, particularly when it ignores local power dynamics and communal grievances. The Druze have been a persecuted minority for a long and fraught history. Al-Sharaa inherited this problem; he did not create it. However, his interim government could have done more to foster national consensus around the new governance framework, pairing calls for militia integration with genuine efforts at political inclusion. His forces – already under-resourced and lacking in cohesion – appear to have overreached by attempting to reassert control over Suweida through pro-government tribal militias, without adequately addressing the province’s specific grievances or its expectations from the post-Assad order.

The second, and related, lesson is the risk that violence can erupt elsewhere in Syria should Damascus try to forcefully gain territorial control in fragmented areas by mobilising armed Arab tribal factions in lieu of negotiated agreements with local communities to promote integration with the Syrian state. Should the attempted uprising that occurred between Latakia and Tartus in March be repeated, for example, the Syrian government may face a renewed challenge to its force projection across volatile intra-communal and cross-regional fault lines inside Syria. It is worth bearing in mind that it was not only regime forces that were compelled to withdraw from Suweida: Arab tribal militias – many of whom had deployed thousands of fighters to the area to support the regime or avenge killed kin – were also forced to pull back in the ceasefire agreement.

Despite being at a structural disadvantage, the Druze managed to expel both state forces and their tribal allies from Suweida. This outcome is likely to have been noted by other actors in comparable circumstances and may well influence future challenges to Damascus’ authority. The most consequential issue on the horizon is the question of how, whether and under what terms the SDF will integrate with Syrian Ministry of Defence forces, and how this will impact the balance of power in northeastern Syria.

What is clear is that Damascus needs to urgently build up a professional and centralised security force with a recognisable command and control structure and effective deployment capabilities. The current approach that relies on regional armed group integration is slow and contingent on shifting militia interests and loyalties. Even more concerning than the challenge of security sector reform (SSR) and force institutionalisation is the possible emergence of an alternative armed movement – formed outside the control of the state – consisting of thousands of tribal fighters mobilised under the banner of restoring stability or exacting revenge. ;Moreover, some leaders of Sunni Arab tribal factions have openly declared that the ceasefire applies to the government – not to them – highlighting the fragmented nature of authority on the ground. Complicating matters further, although the tribal council claims to represent southern tribes, there is credible evidence that the clashes have also drawn in tribal fighters from Deir ez-Zor, Hama, Idlib, and Aleppo, as well as a number of foreign-trained militants with a history of involvement in intra-communal conflict.

The third conclusion drawn from this conflict is that should al-Sharaa’s government delay in a process of accountability to deliver justice in the aftermath of the atrocities that were committed in Suweida by all sides. This requires public procedures against those affiliated with Sheik Hijri as well as pro-government militia and rebel factions drawn from ex-Jihadi fighters (including some foreigners) to investigate killings, torture and kidnappings that are reported to have taken place. There needs to be a swift, credible and transparent investigation and the perpetrators held to account.

The brief but deadly bout of fighting resolved none of the underlying triggers that drove the escalation. On the contrary, both Druze forces and Sunni Arab tribal fighters employed severe violence against one another, deepening inter-communal animosity and heightening minority insecurities. With memories of the massacre in Latakia still fresh, the reciprocal abuses reported in Suweida are magnifying fear across communities – and rising fear is delaying disarmament. Taken together, these dynamics suggest that another round of violence in Syria – beginning in Suweida but potentially spreading more widely – may not be far off. It is conceivable that in the coming months we may witness a series of new clashes – possibly extending into Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa.

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