After the PKK: Peacebuilding Challenges in Turkey, Syria

This article is part of a policy series for the 'Turkey’s Peacebuilding in a Disordered Middle East' project of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) network.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey. 

On 12 May 2025, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) announced its decision to dissolve and end its armed struggle against the Turkish state. The announcement followed the PKK's 12th Congress, held from May 5 to 7 in northern Iraq, and came after a February call from the group's imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who urged the organization to lay down arms. This followed an unexpected call by right-wing nationalist leader and government coalition partner, Devlet Bahceli, who in October last year suggested that Öcalan could be granted parole if he renounced violence and disbanded the organisation.

According to the group’s statement, the PKK’s struggle ‘brought the Kurdish issue to the point of resolution through democratic politics . . . As a result, activities carried out under the name “PKK” were formally terminated.’

Ending the four decades-long armed conflict, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process now expected to take place in the coming months is conceptually straightforward, yet translating this into practice in post-conflict settings is fraught with complexities. Recent trends in comparative counterinsurgency and DDR studies offer some insight into the challenges and strategic opportunities that may lie head for Turkey but will also serve as an important case study to inform future counterterrorism efforts and wider US and UK interests in the region. Comparative cases demonstrate that success can vary significantly based on local conditions and levels of political will across stakeholders. The interplay between DDR and peacebuilding processes with longer political horizons is also a factor, when it promotes legal reforms that can address the root causes behind the conflict and avoid a relapse into violence.

The 12 May announcement does not explicitly outline a roadmap for the laying down of weapons, rather, it references disbandment, and the end of armed struggle in favour of the beginning of a new phase of democratic political struggle.

Turkish media reported that the PKK has around 3,500 members in northern Iraq. Fighters are expected to hand over their weapons to designated verification centres as Ankara works with Baghdad and Erbil to oversee the process. It is expected that this will also include a phased withdrawal of the PKK from its controlled areas in Iraq, such as Qandil, Gara, Sinjar, and Makmur, in a process coordinated by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and Armed Forces. Media reports suggest that around 100 senior leaders may be sent to third countries, while around 2,000 members without active arrest warrants or egregious criminal records are expected to return to Turkey, where they will be subject to prosecution under counterterrorism laws.

The Kurdish conflict presents a complex case for the effective prosecution of DDR. An examination of other international conflict resolution and DDR processes highlight three potentially complicating factors in relation to the PKK, a designated terror organisation by Turkey, the US, UK and European Union.

First, the PKK has overseen a transnational conflict involving national and subnational dynamics in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. This distinguishes it from most other post-conflict DDR processes since the late 1980s, such as those in Mozambique (1992), Liberia (2003) Nepal (2006), and Colombia (2016), which came in the aftermath of mainly internal conflicts. The protracted civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) stands out as having transnational dimensions with DDR processes explicitly dealing with regional fighters. The Sierra Leone-Liberia DDR efforts were also deeply intertwined regionally, given the cross-border flows of combatants. Conflicts with transnational dimensions are more complex and harder to resolve than purely internal or bilateral conflicts. However, the number of fighters to be demobilised is relatively small compared with other cases, rendering a successful outcome more likely. By comparison, around 70,000 fighters from different rebel factions were demobilised by the international community in Sierra Leone.

Second, the PKK’s origins and evolution as mainly an armed self-determination actor will influence the trajectory of its political transition. The organisation’s stated ideology has undergone significant pragmatic shifts – from its roots as a separatist movement in the late 1970s, to seeking autonomy in the 1990s and 2000s, and now, in its current phase, advocating for democratization within the state’s existing borders. Post-conflict-transitions involving actors with some form of self-determination-claims have shown the need to address wider demands for political reform beyond DDR to achieve stability and avoid recidivism. A Marxist-Leninist organisation at its inception, the PKK’s ranks are filled with fighters that undergo strict ideological training, practice martyrdom culture, and valorise a cult of personality around Ocalan. The concept of ‘devoted actors’ within armed-conflict- and rebel-group-studies suggest that fighters motivated by deeply held, non-negotiable commitments to the organisation’s cause may either resist demobilisation or struggle with reintegration processes unless there are targeted policies to ‘flip’ allegiance or facilitate a transition to non-violent forms of political contestation.

Third, relevant conflict resolution and terrorism scholarship argues that the way in which conflict comes to an end can influence the sustainability of the transition and stabilisation phase. In the modern era, terrorist groups have typically ended through hybrid policy instruments, including military force, reduced public support, disruption of illicit financing, and diplomatic pressure on external sponsors.

Terrorism Termination and Democratisation

Ankara views the dissolution of the PKK as the outcome of the state’s military victory in line with its security doctrine, intelligence gathering and counterterrorism strategy, which meant the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) narrowed the PKK’s area of action and operational capabilities in the Qandil mountain range and territory in northern Iraq. However, some within the PKK movement, including Murat Karayilan, a co-founder and a top commander, have interpreted the decision differently. He recently claimed that the PKK had not been defeated militarily, that the PKK had new war tactics and had developed its technological capabilities. While denouncing armed struggle, Karayilan said laying down weapons was contingent on the Turkish state codifying legal guarantees. Should this narrative gain traction among the PKK’s rank and supporters, it may undermine the level of commitment to disarmament protocols.

One of the explanations cited for the decline or termination of terrorist groups is the achievement of the group’s aims. However, following the collapse of the two-year ceasefire in mid-2015 and the return to armed violence in Turkey’s southeast, the PKK failed to achieve its aim after taking a maximalist posture and unilaterally declaring autonomy across several towns and villages. Turkish special police and gendarmerie forces carried out a counter-insurgency operation. The PKK intensified its attacks, and the violence reportedly resulted in more than 3,800 reported fatalities in 2016. Turkey’s security doctrine intensified following this phase in the conflict with increased cross-border air operations inside northern Iraq – codenamed Claw (2019), Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt (2021), and Claw-Lock (2022) – that systematically targeted PKK infrastructure. Turkey also conducted military operations since 2016 inside northern Syria.

Ultimately, the PKK’s armed insurgency aimed at establishing autonomous areas inside Turkey failed operationally, the group lost public legitimacy, and it retreated geographically from Turkey into areas of control in northern Iraq, where it became vulnerable to Turkish airpower campaigns and drone strikes. While there is scepticism among some in Turkey about the PKK’s long-term intentions, even after disbanding, the organisation’s failure to achieve its core aim – and its shift away from autonomy demands now – combined with the assessment that it is militarily weaker than it has been are factors that may enhance the likelihood of success for the current process.

Nonetheless, there are concerns that the PKK’s self-declared ‘disbandment’ may mean different things to different actors. Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the situation on the ground in Syria has been shifting rapidly. These changes have created opportunities for the PKK’s announced disbandment and for advancing the ‘Terror-Free Türkiye’ process. However, Turkey’s position is that the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, People’s Protection Units (YPG), the armed unit of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), must equally heed Ocalan’s call to disband. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said the declaration should apply to all PKK-affiliated groups: ‘We consider this announcement to encompass all of the organization’s branches, including those in northern Iraq, Syria and Europe.’

In response to the PKK’s formal announcement, the SDF commander Mazloum Abdi welcomed the move as a step towards a 'new political and peaceful process in the region,' Consistent with his long-standing position that the SDF is a distinct entity, his message implied that his forces were not bound by the PKK’s decision. On 19 May, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the Iranian offshoot of the PKK announced that it would not disarm despite the decision of its parent organisation.

This apparent contradiction risks undermining the wider process unless it is resolved through a negotiated settlement. Nonetheless, two cost-benefit calculations enhance Ankara’s commitment to effective implementation of the PKK’s disarmament. First, the dissolution of the PKK marks a historic milestone, bringing an end to an organisation that primarily targeted the Turkish state and the conclusion of a costly four-decade-long counter-terrorism campaign. Second, Ankara anticipates that the YPG-SDF will be incorporated into the Syrian central army and state institutions, with Turkey coordinating this integration with the Ankara-friendly interim government in Damascus. The extent to which the PKK’s disarmament and demobilisation process succeeds in the coming months will likely positively influence the integration of the SDF into the Syrian state-building process as a recognised and legitimate actor.

Unresolved questions over how the PKK’s disbanding will impact the SDF in Syria is fuelling scepticism among some in Turkey that the outlawed militant organisation may gradually evolve under a different banner. Related to this is that PKK-linked splinter groups may operate in north-eastern Syria or Iraq, perhaps under Iranian patronage, particularly if power vacuums or ungovernable spaces emerge. Ankara can be expected to monitor activities in Kurdish-run areas in north-eastern Syria and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and reserve the right to take military action against PKK remnants. This, however, would risk undermining stabilisation efforts in Syria and Iraq, underscoring the importance of a successful and verified disarmament process.

It remains to be seen how the disarmament process will interface with democratisation outcomes in Turkey. What renders this case complex is that the disbandment decision arrived without a negotiated settlement or peace agreement, rather, constitutional reforms in Turkey are expected to be debated in parliament follow disarmament. On 27 May, a team of legal experts was appointed to work on a new constitution. The legal framework for managing the DDR process, along with the anticipated pro-democracy reforms, faces significant challenges as Turkish lawmakers navigate this uncharted territory.

The PKK's announcement of its intention to dissolve marks a pivotal moment in the protracted conflict and will have implications for peacebuilding in Turkey, Iraq and Syria. However, the current moment is a liminal one, throwing up dilemmas from the perspective of post-insurgency politics given uncertainties about how the reintegration phase will be implemented. And this is the part of the DDR process that is being discussed the least. How ex-fighters that may receive amnesty, for example, will integrate and select to pursue political goals will impact Turkey’s wider political system and carry consequences for prospects for democratisation. Conversely, prosecuting those who committed crimes and abuses during the conflict may lend greater legitimacy to the process and promote democratic principles. It is important to support policies that balance various grievances within the broader polity in Turkey and do so under parliamentary oversight, broad based political buy-in, and transparency.

© RUSI, 2025.

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