Unnatural Disasters: The Next Front in Russia’s Hybrid War

Once confined to science fiction, solar geoengineering is now moving into real-world experimentation, raising the risk of misuse by hostile actors. Also known as solar radiation management, this set of novel technologies – such as stratospheric aerosol injection and marine cloud brightening – aims to artificially slow the rise in global temperatures by reducing the amount of sunlight absorbed by the Earth’s surface. To date, their primary purpose has been to tackle the symptoms of accelerating climate change. However, these technologies also pose dual-use risks: alongside unintended environmental consequences, they could be exploited by powers seeking to tilt the geopolitical balance to cause climate-related disruption.

As the UK government prioritises investment in solar geoengineering research and development, it has a crucial window to help shape international norms. Without adequate safeguards, these technologies could become tools of geopolitical coercion in the years ahead.

Russia's Campaign of Hybrid Warfare in Europe is Expanding

The UK's new national security strategy, released on 24 June, highlights a rise in hostile activity on British soil from countries like Russia and Iran. This includes acts of sabotage, cyber attacks and other forms of democratic interference, which often exploit legal loopholes and are difficult for the authorities to attribute. The strategy warns that such hybrid threats not only endanger the British people but also threaten the UK’s critical national infrastructure and prosperity. This trend, the authors suggest, will continue over the coming years as states pursue their interests more assertively.

A growing consensus among European governments and their intelligence communities indicates that Russia, in particular, is escalating its clandestine activities across the region, necessitating increased governmental preparedness and response. In November 2024, MI6 Chief Sir Richard Moore publicly revealed that the UK’s intelligence services had uncovered a ‘staggeringly reckless campaign’ of Russian sabotage in Europe. Similarly, Norway's national security strategy, released in May, identified Russian sabotage as a major concern, emphasising the need to anticipate more aggressive and widespread hostile actions.

A report on Russian targeting patterns and tactics, published in February (which this author contributed to), shows that Russia’s campaign of hybrid activities in Europe has expanded significantly since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began over three years ago. It documents over 200 incidents of suspected Russian hybrid warfare in Europe between 2014 and 2024, including acts of sabotage, disinformation and electromagnetic attacks like GPS jamming. Most incidents (86%) have taken place since early 2022, with events recorded in 2024 rising sixfold compared to the previous year.

Russia’s choice of targets has also evolved. In addition to arson attacks on ammunition depots, Moscow has increasingly targeted the energy and aviation sectors, severing undersea power cables and planting incendiary devices on air freight. The number of European countries targeted by Russian hybrid warfare has also surged. This same report shows that an average of 20 countries were targeted annually in 2022-24, up from just three per year in the prior three years.

The Baltic states, Finland, Germany, Norway, Poland and the UK have remained the primary targets so far this year, probably due to their continued support for Kyiv. In the first half of 2025, suspected Russian operations have included conducting undersea infrastructure surveillance off the British coast, distributing fake military draft letters to Ukrainians living in Poland, and damaging a water supply system on Sweden’s Gotland Island.

Some of these actions appear designed to test European defences and probe for weaknesses. But others seem more random, suggesting that Moscow's goal is not only to prepare for a possible future involving a direct military confrontation with NATO, but to create a sense of confusion and chaos. By wreaking havoc across Europe, the Kremlin likely aims to force European states to focus their attention inwards, divert European resources from Ukraine and show that sanctions enforcement carries political and economic costs.

In response, European states are stepping up efforts to deter hybrid threats. This has included criminal proceedings, diplomatic expulsions and strengthening cyber defences. NATO’s Baltic Sentry mission, launched earlier this year, also aims to increase surveillance of critical undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and shows promise in preventing future incidents.

Yet as measures to counter Russian sabotage mature, the Kremlin may further diversify its tactics. Although unlikely in the short term, an expanded hybrid warfare campaign could involve even more elaborate approaches. At the more imaginative end of the spectrum, this may include causing an environmental disaster, like an oil spill in a busy maritime shipping lane. Alternatively, Moscow could seek to induce climate extremes, such as drought or flooding, by deploying solar geoengineering technologies against an adversary, disrupting agricultural production and the operation of critical infrastructure.

Solar Geoengineering Research Sees Renewed Support

International intrigue in climate cooling technologies is growing. The UK government’s Advanced Research and Invention Agency, for example, announced in May plans to invest £57 million across 21 geoengineering projects. This includes funds for stratospheric aerosol injection research and efforts to refreeze Arctic Sea ice, which is now shrinking at a rate of 12.2% per decade due to global warming, compared to its average extent during the period from 1981 to 2010.

These investments make the UK one of the largest funders of geoengineering research globally. But it is not the only state interested in assessing the feasibility of these emerging technologies.

Several others, including Australia, China, India, Russia, the US, and several EU members, are also exploring geoengineering techniques. This is according to the US intelligence community's national intelligence estimate on the geopolitical implications of climate change through 2040. This report, published in 2021 during the Biden administration, warned that large-scale unilateral solar geoengineering deployment by a major power to counter the intensifying effects of climate change, should other warming-limitation efforts be deemed insufficient, would carry major risks for geopolitical stability.

Russian scientists have long been strong proponents of solar geoengineering for managing climate change impacts. According to one recent academic study, this interest stretches back to the mid-Soviet period. Notably, Moscow had remained an important voice in this scientific debate until its isolation from the international science scene following its invasion of Ukraine.

Security Concerns Around Solar Geoengineering Abound

Climate scientists have long held diverging views on whether more research funding should be channelled into solar geoengineering. This is partly because research and deployment of these technologies are not currently covered by existing international law, despite their potential for harmful cross-border impacts. While some states have agreed to a de facto moratorium on large-scale solar geoengineering use under the Convention on Biological Diversity, a UN treaty focused on protecting biodiversity, this agreement is not legally binding.

With relatively few field experiments having been carried out, solar geoengineering technologies remain largely unproven. Meanwhile, the interconnected nature of the global climate system makes unintended consequences resulting from their use highly likely. The UN and various research institutes have in recent years highlighted the risk of potential side-effects, including unpredictable and extreme changes in rainfall patterns, which could undermine food and water security within affected areas.

A key concern is how any cascading effects would manifest. As previous analysis on this issue has suggested, increased rainfall that is beneficial to one country might cause major downstream flooding in a neighbouring state. While any sudden termination of these technologies would risk triggering severe shocks, including abrupt warming and ecosystem disruption.

Solar Geoengineering as an Instrument of Hybrid Warfare

Concerns around solar geoengineering deployment – such as those identified by the US intelligence community – have typically centred on these technologies being used as extreme responses to mounting climate pressures. Yet more recently, some experts have raised the alarm about how they might be leveraged by hostile actors to further their interests.

There currently appears to be no publicly available evidence suggesting the Kremlin is planning on weaponising solar geoengineering technologies, or that it has even considered this. However, their relative ease of deployment, legal ambiguities surrounding their use, and the potential for plausible deniability could make them an attractive tool in an era of intensifying hybrid warfare where there are fewer guardrails to restrain state behaviour.

Moreover, the controversial nature of these technologies means they could be used to cause widespread disruption, even without enabling negative climate impacts, due to high levels of anxiety surrounding their development. Given this possibility, Russia’s scientific credentials in this field and Russian military intelligence’s history of allegedly using novel methods to inflict harm on adversaries, it seems plausible that Moscow may experiment with weaponising solar geoengineering in the coming decade, even though this scenario may have seemed outlandish just a few years ago.

Key Challenges and Recommendations for Policymakers

Unlike most acts of sabotage or cyberattacks, it would probably be difficult for most European intelligence agencies to detect, attribute or prevent the use of solar geoengineering as a weapon given current capabilities and priorities. Any early warning would therefore be limited, raising the risk of strategic surprise. This challenge is likely to be compounded by uncertainty over where responsibility for solar geoengineering governance should lie. There is currently no international consensus on which forum, if any, is best positioned to lead on this issue.

Meanwhile, several states and multinational organisations appear to be scaling back efforts to examine issues like this that sit at the intersection of climate change and national security. This de-prioritisation risks eroding institutional awareness of the security implications of solar geoengineering technologies among defence, security and intelligence communities despite their potential to be used coercively.

As the UK increases investment in solar geoengineering research, a narrow but critical window exists to shape international norms and safeguards and establish red lines. The UK, given its growing role in this area, has an opportunity to lead efforts to embed prohibitions against the offensive or coercive use of solar geoengineering into international agreements and research protocols. It can also champion the creation of a dedicated intergovernmental task force – under the UN, NATO, or an alternative body – to monitor militarisation risks, enhance transparency and establish response mechanisms.

Finally, risks linked to solar geoengineering should be integrated into national and allied security strategies and planning frameworks. This would help to build understanding and cultivate resilience against any potential future hybrid threats involving climate manipulation. The UK intelligence community, meanwhile, should treat these technologies as it would other emerging hybrid threats – investing in detection and attribution capabilities, and coordinating across government agencies to spot and track early signs of misuse.

© RUSI, 2025.

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