Turkey’s Call to Act and Israel’s Red Line: Ankara’s Role in Gaza

The fragile ceasefire in Gaza presents a critical opening for international stabilisation and reconstruction efforts, yet a key component of US President Trump’s 20-point plan – the deployment of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) – remains unmet, lacking both a clear international or UN mandate and defined rules of engagement. Among the constellation of regional actors who may commit troops to Gaza, as a NATO power, Turkey stands out as the most politically consequential and operationally capable actor. Turkey’s potential to assume a stabilisation role in Gaza merits close attention, both for its implications on the ground and for its broader impact on regional relations, including between Turkey and Israel, and transatlantic relations.

Ankara has signalled its readiness to ;deploy military, civilian and logistical assets to Gaza, but the main stumbling block remains Israel’s categorical opposition to any Turkish military presence. The interplay between Turkey’s operational capabilities, the fast-evolving security vacuum in Gaza, Washington’s drive for regional burden-sharing, and Israel’s security red lines has produced a complex strategic calculus that will shape the coming months.

During the NATO defence ministers' meeting in Brussels on 15 October Turkish Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler said that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) are ready to take part in a multinational task force to be established in Gaza. According to reports, the US is keen to see Turkey involved in the next phase of Gaza stabilisation, along with Qatar and Egypt, believing these actors best placed to persuade Hamas ‘to agree and to behave,’ as one American official put it. ‘The Turks were very helpful in getting the Gaza deal, and Netanyahu’s bashing Turkey has been very counterproductive,’ the official added, noting that Washington was ‘aware of the Israeli concerns’ and working to find ‘something that can achieve stability and that both sides can find acceptable.’ Vice President Vance said any foreign troops stationed in Gaza will require Israel’s explicit consent, while noting Turkey’s ‘very constructive’ role in facilitating the ceasefire.

Turkey’s Strategic Fit

Turkey’s qualifications for such a role are clear. As a NATO member with significant experience in expeditionary logistics and NATO operations and peacekeeping missions across the Middle East, Balkans and Africa, it possesses a military apparatus with the command, control and reconstruction capabilities that post-conflict Gaza will urgently need. Its armed forces and aid agencies, such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), have long operated in fragile and conflict-prone contexts, often combining humanitarian delivery with infrastructure development. Turkey has also demonstrated an ability to blend military stabilisation with civilian engagement, which makes it attractive to international partners seeking a pragmatic alternative to direct Western intervention.

Ankara’s regional legitimacy strengthens its case. Its pro-Palestinian stance resonates across the Arab and Muslim world, while its channels to multiple Muslim-majority governments and to Palestinian factions allow it to mediate with actors who would otherwise oppose external involvement. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has repeatedly emphasised that Turkey ‘will actively support efforts to rebuild Gaza,’ underscoring that reconstruction and stabilisation must proceed together. Turkey's principled support for the two-state solution to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict are aligned with those of NATO.

For the US, which seeks to avoid a long-term ground presence but recognises the need for credible regional ownership, Turkey’s participation would help fill a legitimacy gap. Proposals for an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza have circulated for months. While countries such as Azerbaijan and Indonesia have been mentioned as possible contributors, some interlocutors, including Qatar, have expressed reservations that these states lack understanding of the Palestinian issue. In contrast, Turkey’s history of involvement in Gaza and its wider Middle East footprint offer both familiarity and operational depth. When it comes to force generation for the ISF, the issue is not simply which states are willing to contribute troops, but which can provide the right kind of troops. This means those with the capability, legitimacy and restraint suited to Gaza’s volatile environment.

However, Ankara remains deeply concerned that the fragile ceasefire could unravel, prompting Israel to resume military operations in Gaza. This would not only endanger the safety of Turkish personnel, but also erode the credibility of the ISF, and strain the Turkey-US relationship. Past experiences in Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Balkans offer a cautionary reminder of how a fragile ceasefire can rapidly collapse, turning a stabilisation mission into an exposed and unsustainable combat environment. The perception that President Trump has made it clear he will not permit Israel to violate or undermine the ceasefire may prove short-lived. The durability of the ceasefire also hinges on Hamas’s own actions and compliance and the growing risk of intra-Palestinian factional violence in Gaza.

Israel’s Deep-Seated Objections

For Israel, however, Turkey’s inclusion apparently crosses a red line. The Israeli government has publicly ruled out any Turkish military role in Gaza. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar declared that ‘Turkey . . . led a hostile approach against Israel . . . so it is not reasonable for us to let their armed forces enter the Gaza Strip, and we will not agree to that . . . we said it to our American friends.’ The statement leaves little ambiguity. Israel sees Turkish participation as incompatible with its post-war doctrine, which asserts that any foreign deployment must be vetted and approved by Israel on the grounds of its own security.

This opposition reflects long-standing mistrust. Relations between Israel and Turkey have been fraught since the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid, which resulted in the deaths of Turkish activists and the freezing of diplomatic ties for years. More recently, Israel has accused Ankara of maintaining channels to Hamas, and by extension the Muslim Brotherhood, which Israel considers disqualifying for any neutral peacekeeping role. Turkish rhetoric following Israel’s military campaign has reinforced this perception. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called on the US and others ‘to press Israel to abide by the ceasefire.’

Underlying this tension is a broader strategic anxiety. Israel sees Turkey as the spearhead of an emerging Sunni axis, partnered with Qatar and increasingly reconciled with Egypt, that could encircle Israel’s southern and northern peripheries. The recent rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt has made Israel cautious. Ankara’s expanding influence in Syria and its deepening defence ties with NATO allies are all viewed through this lens of potential encirclement. For Israeli policymakers, allowing Turkish troops into Gaza, even under a multilateral banner, would symbolically, and perhaps operationally, erode Israel’s deterrence.

Between Inclusion and Containment

Despite this impasse, there may be space for compromise. Ankara’s participation in Gaza’s stabilisation may not need to take the form of armed deployment. A more acceptable configuration could see Turkey leading on reconstruction, training and civilian administration support, while security and border control remain under the purview of Egypt and a narrower set of partners acceptable to Israel. This division of labour would allow Turkey to contribute materially without challenging Israel’s security prerogatives.

Turkey’s reconstruction capacity is substantial. Its state agencies and private contractors have a long record of post-conflict engagement – from northern Syria to Somalia – and could quickly mobilise to support infrastructure recovery, electricity and water restoration and rubble clearance. A Turkish presence in these domains would complement US, EU and Gulf efforts, while signalling to Palestinians that a regional actor is visibly committed to their welfare.

However, Turkish military involvement in Gaza could represent a pivotal factor in advancing stabilization efforts within the enclave. Beyond the immediate operational dimension, Ankara’s engagement in Gaza may, over the medium to long term, create conditions conducive to de-escalation and a gradual recalibration of Turkish Israeli relations. While such an outcome may appear improbable under current circumstances, shared security interests and regional interdependencies could, over time, transform this engagement into a platform for limited strategic accommodation between the two states. Moreover, such a role would likely strengthen Ankara’s standing within NATO and contribute to an improvement in its bilateral relations with Washington, reinforcing Turkey’s image as a constructive regional actor aligned with broader Western stabilization objectives.

Ankara’s broader diplomatic momentum also strengthens the logic for inclusion. The recent Typhoon fighter-plane deal between the UK and Turkey marks a deepening of defence cooperation and highlights Turkey’s continued anchoring in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture despite persistent political frictions. Days after the signing, Germany’s chancellor Friedrich Merz visited Ankara, reaffirming the European view that Turkey remains an indispensable security partner. This convergence offers diplomatic leverage. It is also true that the United States views Turkey through a NATO lens, recognising its record of participation in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Risks of Overreach

Yet the obstacles remain formidable. The first is the trust deficit. Israel’s perception that Turkey maintains political and ideological proximity to Hamas will not be easily dispelled. Unless Ankara can visibly decouple its humanitarian and political engagements, any Turkish presence in Gaza risks being cast as partisan. Even civilian or unarmed roles could become contentious if Turkey’s personnel are perceived as advancing political objectives rather than neutral stabilisation. Despite the Israeli government’s objections to Turkish involvement, the reality is that meaningful progress will depend on reciprocal restraint and enforcement. If Ankara can use its leverage to ensure Hamas’s compliance with the ceasefire framework, and if the Trump administration can in turn hold Israel to its own commitments, then the prospects for stabilisation may begin to take tangible form.

The optics are delicate. Israel fears that a Turkish role could fuel a narrative of Ankara as Gaza’s ‘protector.’ Equally, Turkey’s economic and political ambitions in Gaza, meaning its construction firms, logistics operators and charities, could blur the line between altruistic engagement and strategic influence. Meanwhile, Ankara faces domestic constraints. An overstretched military engaged in multiple theatres, and an economy that may struggle to sustain large-scale commitments abroad.

A European Balancing Act

For the UK and its European partners, Turkey’s potential participation in Gaza stabilisation represents both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity lies in ambidextrously leveraging Turkey’s combination of military capability and regional status as a middle power to advance a genuinely multilateral approach to Gaza’s recovery. The challenge is to ensure that this participation reinforces, rather than complicates, the fragile consensus between Israel and its Western partners.

London and European capitals can play a useful mediating role. By emphasising Turkey’s civilian and reconstruction capabilities – rather than its military footprint – they can present Ankara’s involvement as complementary rather than competitive with Israeli objectives.

Diplomatically, the UK and EU should promote a phased approach: security and monitoring functions initially led by Egypt and selected partners, followed by a reconstruction and governance phase where Turkey, the EU and UN agencies play leading roles. This sequencing would respect Israel’s immediate security imperatives while still drawing on Turkey’s comparative strengths.

At the same time, UK and European diplomats could quietly work to broker liaison mechanisms and confidence-building measures. The message to both sides should be that stabilisation in Gaza is not a zero-sum theatre of influence, but a shared interest in preventing relapse into conflict.

What Next?

Turkey’s prospective role in Gaza stabilisation encapsulates the contradictions of the current regional order. On the one hand, Ankara’s military competence, reconstruction capacity and political standing make it an indispensable partner for any serious post-conflict framework. On the other, its ideological positioning and tense relationship with Israel render its participation deeply contentious.

For Washington, London and Brussels, the task is to strike a pragmatic balance. This requires harnessing Turkey’s assets while containing its potential to politicise the process. This means privileging Turkish engagement in governance and reconstruction, embedding it within a multilateral framework and ensuring that any role remains transparent, civilian and accountable.

Underlying all of this is the reality that President Trump remains the pivotal actor in determining the ceasefire’s trajectory and will ultimately shape whether, and when, the deal advances into its next phase. The current Israeli government under Prime Minister Netanyahu is in a position of having to defer to Washington for major decisions in Gaza, particularly after its diplomatic and operational overstretch following its attacks in Doha. While the US has no appetite for a renewed military confrontation in Gaza, it is equally unwilling to permit a scenario in which Hamas manoeuvres to reassert its monopoly on violence in the Strip. In a notable and encouraging development, Ankara alongside Arab and Muslim partners has formally endorsed President Trump’s 20-point plan, which unequivocally calls for Hamas’s disarmament and the full demilitarisation of Gaza.

If handled deftly, Turkey could yet emerge as a constructive stabilising actor – one that reinforces regional ownership and reduces the burden on Western powers. If mishandled, the debate over Turkish involvement could deepen rifts between Israel and its allies, delaying the very stabilisation that all sides profess to support.

Either way, Gaza has become the latest arena in which Turkey’s ambitions, Israel’s security concerns and Western diplomacy intersect. How this triangle is managed will reveal much about whether the post-war order in Gaza becomes a platform for renewed regional cooperation or a precursor for the next phase of hostilities.

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