Trump Peace Plan for Ukraine will Consign Europe to Peril and Contempt

Rarely has there been so little substance to a peace plan. The sheer absurdity of the 28-point plan which the Americans claimed to be their own creation defied serious analysis. Marco Rubio’s subsequent meetings in Geneva restored a measure of balance but the despatch of Steve Witkoff to Russia will see it swing almost drunkenly nearer to its original conception, one that clearly had its origins in Moscow.

It was a sucker punch by Washington (or Mar-e-Lago) to President Zelensky, conscious that the Ukrainian President’s fortunes are at a low ebb. Not only has Pokrovsk nearly fallen to the persistent (and sanguinary) Russian advance but his own credibility has taken a substantial hit by the allegations of corruption amongst some of his advisors possibly including his Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak. Under pressure it seems that Zelensky was even prepared to discuss ceding some Donbas territory on a de facto basis so long as it is not de jure. This too makes no sense when one of the provisions of the 28-point plan banned Ukraine from ever trying to recover its lost territories.

Europe, of course, had to pretend to take the negotiations seriously. Not to have done so would have enraged Trump and risked retaliatory action which might have included the immediate withdrawal of the intelligence feed to Kyiv and even tariffs imposed on European countries. By appeasing the US President since January 2025 the Europeans have become his prisoners.

Europe has only itself to blame. The impending betrayal of Ukraine has been there for all to see. Europe has been guilty of wishful thinking. Ever since the start of his first term Trump’s admiration for Vladimir Putin has been evident. Leaders in London, Paris and Berlin should have re-read John Bolton’s book The Room where it Happened which laid bare Trump’s foreign relations proclivities (to an extent which has landed the Bush-era hawk in serious trouble).

European leaders should have gone to Washington shortly after 20 January 2025 with the following brief. Europe would take the Ukraine issue off Washington’s plate. The survival of a sovereign Ukraine within its original borders is a fundamental matter for European security. It is regrettable that Washington has had to finance so much of the conflict. In return for taking over responsibility for supporting Ukraine Europe requests three things: that the US continues to provide intelligence support to Ukraine; that it permits Europe to buy US weapons for shipment to Ukraine; and that the US continues to provide some niche capabilities (such as heavy lift aviation) pending Europe acquiring the required equipment and training.

This conversation need not have sought Trump’s commitment to NATO. Bolton makes clear that this is not particularly firm; but it would have been much firmer after Europe had succeeded stabilising Ukraine at its own cost. There would have had to have been a much later discussion on future Ukrainian membership of NATO but, again, that debate would have been far easier if Europe’s efforts had prevailed.

Instead we know what happened. Europe thought it could change Trump’s mind by a mixture of flattery and offering the US President incentives such as a state visit hosted by King Charles. At the same time Britain compromised its own foreign relations by offering insufficient moral support when Canada came under verbal assault from Washington, and failing to exert sufficient pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu to stop the excessive suffering in Gaza which followed the appalling terrorist massacre of 7 October 2023.

The ‘Coalition of the Willing’ began by giving the impression that it would provide the required military and hardware support to Ukraine. But its mission gradually morphed into planning a future assurance package to underpin a negotiated agreement. Even by undertaking this planning (much of which was wholly unrealistic, given that Putin is unlikely to agree to NATO boots on Ukrainian soil and because no European army, apart from the Ukrainians themselves, has the capability to stop a major Russian breach of the terms) Europe has been putting subliminal pressure on Kyiv to consider concessions. No similar pressure has been imposed on Moscow apart from ineffective sanctions. In October and November, for example, India has allegedly increased its purchases of Russian oil.

An even more graphic example of a lack of European resolve has been the continued failure to seize Russia’s frozen assets.

Not all Europeans have been so feeble. The Scandinavians, the Baltics, the Poles and the Finns have been staunch but they have noticed how Britain, the nominal leader of the Joint Expeditionary Force, has gradually demonstrated reduced commitment. This has been confirmed to this author by a senior Estonian official in recent weeks and is entirely evident in Britain’s own desperately weak defences. In spite of an apparently upbeat Strategic Defence Review in 2025 it is clear, not least from the Budget on 26 November, that the Starmer government has prioritised ‘welfare over warfare’.

A poor deal for Ukraine will be bad for Europe in three ways. Firstly there is every chance that Russia, after, say, three or four years of recovery, will come back for more of Ukraine. It will also nibble away at Georgia and Moldova and even at the Russian-speaking fringes of the Baltic States using its various grey-zone techniques. So, a bad deal will considerably increase the chances that Europe will, one day, have to fight (or, more likely, succumb to) Russia. Secondly, in three of four years’ time Marine Le Pen could be in power in Paris and Nigel Farage in London both of whom Moscow might expect to be even more accommodating. And thirdly, China and the United States will not take Europe seriously as a global power bloc. Indeed they will show the same contempt for Europe that J.D. Vance evinced during his February speech to the Munich Security Conference.

If Europe ascribes any credence to an American guarantee to provide a kinetic backstop to any agreement then the cycle of self-delusion will be complete. And yet agreement will be taken as a signal to reduce actual defence readiness – beyond a performative percentage figure designed only to appease Trump.

© RUSI, 2025.

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