Russia’s Enduring Grip on Syria

In a historic visit to Washington, transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa became the first Syrian leader to visit the White House. The trip is meant to symbolise a turning point in Syria’s relations with the United States, as Damascus prepares to join the US-led coalition against ISIS. Yet rather than signalling a major geopolitical realignment, it reflects Sharaa’s broader strategy of maintaining ‘zero external enemies’, underscored by his visit to the Kremlin one month earlier. This approach has secured him growing international legitimacy but also rests on a fragile balance of power that will be increasingly difficult to sustain amid diverging foreign interests.

Sharaa’s overture to Moscow marked the culmination of months of growing diplomatic engagement, during which Russia resumed shipments of wheat and oil to Syria and agreed to print new Syrian banknotes through Goznak, the same provider used under Assad. The rapprochement has been facilitated by Sharaa’s brother Maher, a gynaecologist who lived and worked in Russia for over two decades and now serves as Syria’s de facto second-in-command.

Although the visit has been framed as a reset in relations, Sharaa pledged to honour all past agreements and signalled intent to deepen bilateral ties. These include Russia’s military bases at Hmeimim and Tartus, as well as the continuation of energy and reconstruction contracts awarded under Assad’s regime, many underpinned by Syria’s coercive debt obligations to Moscow. The emerging alignment points to a restoration of the structural dependencies that defined the Assad era, and with them, the return of Russian influence.

A Legacy of Influence

With the Middle East emerging as a key battleground in the Cold War, the Soviet Union sought to expand influence in Syria by supporting leftist and pan-Arab movements, most notably the Ba’athists after their ascent to power in 1963. Syria’s strategic value to the Soviet Union grew significantly in the 1970s, particularly after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and Egypt’s subsequent pivot toward the United States. With the loss of access to Egyptian ports, the Soviet Union increasingly relied on Syria’s Tartus port, positioning Damascus as its principal Arab client.

Moscow deepened military cooperation by replenishing Syria’s battlefield losses, supplying advanced weapons, expanding training programmes and providing sustained technical and logistical support. This assistance enabled Hafez al-Assad to consolidate control over the armed forces, a critical step in securing his rule given Syria’s history of military coups. It also bound Syria’s defence architecture to Soviet systems and left Damascus with $13.4 billion in debt. Moscow later wrote off much of this debt in 2005 in exchange for preferential access to energy and infrastructure contracts.

These longstanding ties shaped Russia’s early support for the Assad regime after the 2011 uprising and set the stage for its military intervention in 2015. Launched less than a year after annexing Crimea, Russia’s Syria campaign aimed to preserve its strategic foothold in the region and demonstrate its resurgence as a global power. In 2017, it secured cost-free operational control over the Hmeimim airbase and Tartus naval base for 49 years, gaining a platform for power projection in the Eastern Mediterranean and logistical support for operations in Africa.

Meanwhile, Syria accrued significant external debt to Russia, which has been leveraged to obtain dominant stakes and long-term concessions in key strategic sectors. One of the most prominent Russian companies operating in Syria is Stroytransgaz, a subsidiary owned by Gennady Timchenko, a Russian oligarch and close friend of Vladimir Putin. Its agreements include the management of the Port of Tartous, investment in oil fields, operation of fertiliser plants and a 50-year contract for Syria’s largest phosphate mines. While the terms of these deals remain opaque, it was revealed that 70% of revenue from phosphate production goes to the Russian firm, with only 30% allocated to the Syrian state-owned Gecopham – raising concerns that other agreements are structured on similarly exploitative terms.

Former Enemies, Converging Interests

Russia’s immediate priority is to maintain its military bases in Syria, as fully replacing them in the short term remains unfeasible. Attempts to establish alternative naval access in Libya and Port Sudan have stalled amid political instability, legal uncertainties and logistical hurdles. Moscow’s presence in Tartus dates back to 1971; even under favourable conditions, developing the infrastructure and operational capacity to match it elsewhere would take years. The Kremlin also seeks to contain the threat posed by battle-hardened Chechen and other North Caucasian fighters remaining in Syria through surveillance and discreet intelligence cooperation with Damascus. Their potential return risks destabilising the North Caucasus, a concern compounded by persistent reports of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s deteriorating health. Beyond these imperatives, Moscow has cultivated extensive ties with Syria for over six decades across the diplomatic, military and economic spheres, making it unlikely to relinquish its position voluntarily. The loss of Syria would also signal a broader erosion of Russia’s global influence, particularly at a time of mounting resource constraints from the war in Ukraine and intensifying confrontation with the West.

Sharaa’s turn to Moscow reflects a broader strategy to rebuild Syria’s military and state institutions and project external legitimacy amid ongoing domestic fragility. Lacking a monopoly on force and full territorial control, he seeks to consolidate power through military strength rather than political compromise. Although Turkey already plays a central security role, its involvement is shaped by its own strategic priorities and it lacks the institutional and material capacity to undertake a comprehensive rebuilding of Syria’s armed forces. Moscow represents one of the few viable alternative security partners capable of mitigating overreliance on Ankara, owing to its longstanding military ties with Damascus. Unlike Western powers, it is also not constrained by legal frameworks or reputational concerns associated with supporting a coercive regime. More importantly, alienating Moscow could pose a serious threat, as several senior former regime officials – particularly from the Alawite community – remain in exile there. The Kremlin could offer financial, military or intelligence support to factions opposed to Sharaa, especially in the coastal region where Alawites have faced mounting marginalisation and heavy-handed repression.

Furthermore, Syria continues to face chronic electricity shortages due to the destruction of its energy infrastructure, and is experiencing one of its worst droughts in decades – driving food insecurity and the collapse of its agricultural sector. Recent shipments of oil and gas condensates and wheat from Russia underscore Moscow’s role as an essential economic lifeline. This helps explain why Russia has retained control over key contracts, with the exception of the civilian port in Tartus, awarded to the UAE’s DP World. The status quo inherited from the final years of Assad remains in place – for now. Commodity flows continue, and the opaque nature of existing agreements enables corruption and patronage networks that help reinforce Sharaa’s internal authority, while Russia retains key military bases, strategic contracts and Syria’s outstanding debt. Yet despite a convergence of interests, the relationship remains marked by mutual mistrust and uncertainty, which may deepen or rupture depending on Syria’s political trajectory.

Mediation and Leverage in a Fragmented State

Throughout the war, Russia cultivated ties with a wide range of actors beyond the regime and engaged in mediating regional tensions, particularly in the south and northeast. This has allowed it to remain engaged across Syria’s fragmented post-Assad landscape and to embed itself in key arenas of influence. This approach is designed to give Moscow the flexibility to navigate shifting dynamics and safeguard its interests, regardless of who holds power in Damascus.

In recent months, Moscow has reinforced its military presence at Qamishli airport, located in Syria’s northeast under the control of the Kurdish-led SDF. This has occurred amid the partial withdrawal of US forces, stalled negotiations between the SDF and Damascus over political and military integration and persistent Turkish threats against Kurdish forces. This positioning gives Russia space to mediate between Damascus, Ankara and the SDF, while also enabling it to strengthen ties with Kurdish forces should its influence come under threat.

Sharaa, for his part, has expressed interest in the redeployment of Russian military police to southern Syria to help manage tensions with Israel. This recalls Moscow’s earlier role under Assad, when Russian troops stationed in the south were meant to serve as a buffer between Iran and Israel. Although it did little to deter Israeli strikes, the deployment contributed to limited deconfliction and crisis management. This development comes amid an impasse in US-sponsored talks between Syria and Israel, with Washington either unable or unwilling to restrain Israeli operations. Over the past year, Israel has significantly degraded Syria’s military infrastructure through sustained airstrikes, carried out incursions along the southern border and expanded its support for the Druze community in Suweida.

If the redeployment is realised, Russia would hold a military presence in Syria’s south, northeast and coastal region. These are three strategically vulnerable areas where Damascus lacks full authority or faces ongoing challenges in asserting control. The south is particularly sensitive, as it opens the road to Damascus. In this context, Russian forces could act either as a stabilising buffer or, if relations deteriorate, as a latent pressure point. This configuration would reinforce an asymmetric balance of power in which Sharaa’s authority would be contingent on Moscow.

© Kelly Kassis, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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