Ramifications of the China-Cook Islands’ Partnership

The Cook Islands, an archipelago with a modest landmass but an extensive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), has emerged as a focal point for China’s broader Pacific strategy. The recent signing of the Action Plan for a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) (2025-2030) between the two countries has triggered geopolitical tensions across the Pacific.

As the US-China rivalry escalates – pitting the US and its Indo-Pacific partners on one side and China on the other – Beijing’s deepening strategic engagement with the Pacific, as signalled by the agreement, causes strategic uncertainties in a region historically perceived as peripheral to great-power politics.

Geopolitics Enters the Pacific Island Region

Traditionally, the Pacific's geopolitical centre stage has revolved around the Melanesian region, home to the majority of Pacific Islanders. While the Micronesian region largely remains under US influence through the Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreements in 1965, the Polynesian area, including the Cook Islands, has been considered geopolitically marginal due to its remote location and quiet role in intra-regional politics.

However, China’s deepening ties with the Cook Islands, a self-governing state existing in ‘free association’ with New Zealand, has posed a new set of challenges to this assumption. It demonstrates how vulnerable smaller Polynesian island nations are in the game of superpower politics and how their strategic utility can suddenly take a quantum leap with heightened regional competition.

The people of the Cook Islands are historically and culturally aligned with New Zealand and possess New Zealand's passport. The CSP with China instigated resentment across the island, with hundreds of people protesting against the deal, fearing a compromise on their traditional ties with New Zealand and a probable dent to their credibility as a country as a consequence of the secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding the deal. The CSP with China encompasses deep-sea mining, hydrography, disaster management and cultural ties.

Domestically, the Cook Islands’ vast EEZ, spanning nearly 2 million km2, presents both opportunities and challenges. While rich in marine resources and critical minerals such as manganese, cobalt, and polymetallic nodules, its vast maritime domain is difficult to manage effectively, making it susceptible to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and exploitation of marine and mineral resources, waste dumping, and a range of potential non-traditional security risks.

By securing strategic partnerships in such areas, China not only gains economic leverage but also expands its influence in the Pacific's maritime domain, posing a challenge to the existing security equilibrium established by the US and France, and complemented by Australia and New Zealand.

China’s Expanding Influence: Economic Leverage or Strategic Inroads?

China's engagement with Pacific Island Countries (PICs) follows a consistent pattern: economic assistance, grants, and loans without due diligence, untenable infrastructure investments, and diplomatic recognition manoeuvres. Through a clever mix of ‘cheque-book diplomacy’ and ‘no-strings-attached’ aid policy, China has cultivated strong ties with several Pacific Island countries, including Tonga, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. While Chinese aid remains smaller in absolute terms compared to Australian assistance, its strategic impact is more profound due to its focus on critical infrastructure, military training, and economic dependencies.

China’s CSP with the Cook Islands builds upon its previous agreement with the Solomon Islands in 2023, signaling a broader regional strategy that transcends the objective of shrinking Taiwan's diplomatic space. Taiwan is the main contention for China, which enjoys diplomatic support from many Pacific islands.

China has been using manipulative tactics to make these islands agree to the ‘One China Policy’. While Kiribati, Solomon Islands, and Nauru withdrew their diplomatic support to Taiwan, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Palau still support Taiwan amidst much arm-twisting by China. Moreover, Chinese port calls and naval manoeuvres have increased, directly challenging the long-standing strategic denial policies of Australia and the US.

Incidents such as the presence of Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea and drone sightings in Papua New Guinea underscore China's growing strategic footprint in the region. Simultaneously, China's economic activities, particularly in resource extraction, have led to concerns over environmental and sovereignty issues for smaller Pacific Island nations.

The US: Navigating Strategic Ambiguity

The US has long maintained strategic interests in the Pacific, primarily through COFA agreements with Micronesian states and its military bases in Guam and Hawaii. However, its engagement with smaller Pacific Island nations has often been narrow in scope with a self-oriented security-centric approach, creating opportunities for China to expand its influence.

While the Biden administration attempted to reassert the US leadership in the region through increased diplomatic visits and security agreements, Pacific nations remain wary of Washington’s long-term commitment, particularly given the changed political landscape with the arrival of Trump 2.0.

While the Pacific component of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy aims to counter China's growing footprint in the region, there has been a shortfall in delivery, especially in the economic realm. The Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Papua New Guinea and expanded military collaborations with Australia signal a renewed focus on strategic denial, yet direct engagement with Polynesian nations like the Cook Islands has been minimal. The uncertainties created by Trump 2.0 in withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and the closing down of USAID have severe implications for the Island Countries, and the Biden government's Pacific Pledge 2020 of $200 million for the Pacific is on hold. This strategic gap has allowed China to present itself as a partner offering immediate economic and infrastructure benefits without the political conditionalities often attached to Western aid.

Australia: A Regional Security Guarantor or the Deputy Sheriff?

Australia has historically viewed the Pacific as its strategic backyard, playing a dominant role in regional security and economic development. Through initiatives such as the Pacific Step-Up, Canberra has sought to reinforce its presence, providing increased financial aid, infrastructure projects, and diplomatic engagement. However, Australia's approach has been criticised for being paternalistic, leading to strained relations with some Pacific nations.

The increasing presence of Chinese naval vessels near Australian maritime borders, coupled with China’s direct engagement in economic projects like seabed mining, underscores the need for a recalibrated Australian strategy.

While Canberra has ramped up defence agreements and intelligence-sharing initiatives with the US and its regional allies, its ability to counter China’s economic influence remains a significant challenge. Australia’s recent push to enhance maritime security cooperation with Pacific nations, including additional funding for patrol boats and intelligence-sharing mechanisms, reflects its efforts to maintain strategic denial against China’s encroachment.

New Zealand: Blending Soft Power with Diplomacy

New Zealand has traditionally adopted a more nuanced and less interventionist approach toward the Pacific, leveraging its Polynesian identity and historical ties with freely associated states like the Cook Islands and Niue. Unlike Australia, which often takes a heavy-handed approach to security, New Zealand has focused on economic cooperation, climate change advocacy, and cultural diplomacy.

However, China’s CSP with the Cook Islands has exposed vulnerabilities in Wellington’s regional engagement. The diplomatic spat between New Zealand and the Cook Islands before the agreement’s signing highlighted New Zealand’s diminishing influence.

Under the terms of the free association arrangement in 1965, New Zealand and the Cook Islands are expected to consult each other on external affairs and defence matters, New Zealand has a constitutional responsibility to assist on issues of foreign, defence and disaster relief when requested. New Zealand was not kept in the loop before signing such a big deal with China, which raised concerns both within the island and with the regional stakeholders like New Zealand and Australia.

Despite its Pacific Reset initiative, aimed at countering China's growing presence through increased aid and infrastructure projects, New Zealand has struggled to offer an economic alternative compelling enough to dissuade PICs from aligning with China. Moving forward, Wellington may need to adopt a more assertive foreign policy, emphasising strategic partnerships and sustainable economic initiatives to reinforce its role in the region.

US-China Competition: The Pacific as a Strategic Battleground

Unlike the Indian Ocean, where large economies and military powers dominate, the Pacific consists of smaller, scattered island nations. This fragmentation presents both opportunities and challenges for external powers.

The international attention given to Palau during the inauguration ceremony of the President and Vice President on 16 January 2025 speaks volumes about how the region has become a strategic theatre of geopolitical competition. The ;countries that attended the ceremony ranged from Australia, Austria, Chile, Germany, India, Japan, Korea, Kosovo, New Zealand, Norway, Malaysia, Morocco, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam sent a strategic signal, especially because Palau is one of the very few countries that recognises Taiwan as a sovereign nation.

China's engagement with the Cook Islands exemplifies its broader Pacific strategy – leveraging economic incentives to gain geopolitical footholds while expanding its military presence. As the US-China rivalry intensifies, the Pacific islands are seemingly trapped in a web of strategic competition.

For regional actors – Australia, New Zealand, the US, Japan, and India – the challenge lies in formulating a cohesive and sustainable strategy that addresses both security concerns and economic dependencies. Regional security initiatives such as the Quad must prioritise climate resilience and sustainable development to counterbalance China's growing influence. Ultimately, the Cook Islands' decision underscores a fundamental shift in Pacific geopolitics – one where no nation, regardless of size, remains geopolitically insignificant.

© Shubhamitra Das and Rahul Mishra, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the authors.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the authors', and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

For terms of use, see Website Terms and Conditions of Use.

Have an idea for a Commentary you'd like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we'll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. View full guidelines for contributors.