Poland, Ukraine, and Russia’s War on History

Poland is one of Ukraine’s most important allies. It has become a hub for the EU and NATO responses to Russia’s war. Over 90% of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine passes through Rzeszow airport in southern Poland. Yet the relationship between Poland and Ukraine is complex, largely for historical reasons.

As Ukraine’s battlefield situation deteriorates – with key strategic cities such as Pokrovsk under threat – Poland’s role becomes even more crucial. The bilateral relationship is essential not only for supporting Ukraine against Russia’s aggression but also for consolidating Ukraine’s position within Europe and, ultimately, for maintaining European security. That makes history urgent.

History in Polish Diplomacy

History is not an abstract subject in Poland. It is an integral part of national culture and an organising principle of politics and diplomacy. Poland’s leadership is steeped in historical thinking: both the president and the prime minister are trained historians, and recently the president’s former PhD supervisor was appointed ambassador serving as special representative of the president for historical diplomacy.

The institutionalisation of history extends into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Every new Polish diplomat receives training in diplomatic history – particularly of the 20th century – at the MFA’s Diplomatic Academy. Historical reflection is not only a ceremonial exercise, but a means of avoiding past mistakes and legitimising current choices.

Polish-Ukrainian Historical Issues and Russia’s Disinformation Offensive

Russia’s disinformation campaigns in Poland are not designed to promote pro-Russian sentiment. That would fail in a country shaped by the memory of Soviet domination. Instead, the Kremlin seeks to exploit historical wounds, most notably the Volhynia massacres of 1943-45, in which an estimated 100,000 Poles were killed by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

In Poland, these events are recognised as genocide. In Ukraine, however, some honour the UPA as anti-Soviet resistance fighters. In Lviv, for instance (part of Poland before the Second World War), a statue of UPA leader Stepan Bandera symbolises this contested legacy. Bandera’s reputation has changed dramatically. While only 22% of Ukrainians viewed him positively in 2012, by 2022 this had risen to 74%. Russia’s demonisation of Bandera may have reinforced his standing as a symbol of resistance to Moscow.

The Volhynia issue, and the related debate over exhumations of massacre victims, remains an open wound with geopolitical implications. In 2024, for instance, deputy prime minister and defence minister, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, declared that Ukraine could not be admitted to the EU until the Volhynia question was resolved. During Poland’s presidential elections in May 2025, the winning candidate, Karol Nawrocki of the opposition PiS party, went further, suggesting he would block Ukraine’s NATO membership until the issue was settled.

Since 2017, the Volhynia massacres have been a recurring source of tension in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Following the destruction of several Ukrainian monuments in Poland commemorating UPA soldiers, Kyiv imposed a ban on Polish exhumations of massacre victims in Ukraine. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue stalled for years. A diplomatic breakthrough came after the appointment of Ukraine’s new foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, in September 2024. In early 2025, a Joint Ukrainian-Polish Working Group on Historical Issues was established, leading to Kyiv’s decision to allow the resumption of Polish exhumations of massacre victims, as well as reciprocal permission for Ukrainian exhumations on Polish soil. The agreement marked an improvement in relations after years of tension.

Still, the issue remains delicate. Russian strategic planners understand that history can divide allies. Poland’s critical role within NATO and as Ukraine’s main logistical corridor makes it an ideal target for manipulation. Kremlin propaganda has portrayed Poland’s interest in exhumations as a pretext for territorial revisionism – a supposed attempt to reclaim the Volhynia region. Some Ukrainian commentators, influenced by Soviet-era narratives, continue to suspect Polish expansionism. These misunderstandings feed mistrust and risk undermining allied cohesion.

Another recent example of such manipulation was a video circulated online that claimed Polish soldiers had been beaten by Ukrainian ‘Banderites’ at the Polish-Ukrainian border. Poland’s Ministry of National Defence later confirmed that the incident was ‘a complete fake’. Yet the video had already gone viral, demonstrating the speed with which historical and emotional triggers can be weaponised to erode public confidence across the alliance.

Historians in Strategic Communication

A feature of Poland’s response to Russia’s disinformation challenge is the active involvement of historians. The MFA previously tasked professional historians with identifying elements of Polish history that Moscow could exploit – and how to pre-empt that. These experts analysed sensitive episodes such as antisemitic violence in interwar Poland, the Polish seizure of Vilnius in the early 1920s and the 1938 ultimatum to Czechoslovakia over the Teschen region.

The latter, for example, is used in Russian narratives to claim that Poland collaborated with Nazi Germany in dismantling Czechoslovakia, thereby shifting responsibility for the Second World War to Poland and away from the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

The MFA’s relatively large strategic communications (StratCom) department, established last year, also works with external experts to prepare campaigns designed to counter Russian disinformation around major commemorations, such as Russia’s National Unity Day (4 November), which celebrates the expulsion of Polish-Lithuanian forces from Moscow in 1612. It also monitors and responds to Kremlin narratives targeting sensitive historical episodes more broadly. In the run-up to such events or narratives, Polish StratCom teams coordinate social media content that presents an alternative narrative, aiming to stay ahead of Russian propaganda.

In this way, experts – not only historians but also specialists from other fields – have become part of Poland’s strategic communications infrastructure, producing knowledge not just for scholarship but also for national resilience.

Historical Analogies in Polish International Relations

The importance of history in Poland’s security and foreign policy extends well beyond strategic communication. In Warsaw, policy choices and diplomatic persuasion often rely on historical analogy. Poland’s early warnings about a large-scale Russian invasion following the 2014 annexation of Crimea were grounded in historical insight. Warsaw sees Russia’s imperial behaviour as a pattern, marked by recurring rhetoric about ‘protecting minorities’. During the Second World War, for example, the Soviet Union justified its invasion of Poland as an act of protection for Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities.

Historical reasoning also shapes Polish arguments within the transatlantic alliance. When debating the delivery of Javelin missiles to Ukraine, Polish politicians invoked the precedent of US Stinger missiles in Afghanistan, which forced Soviet aircraft to fly higher and altered the course of that war. The analogy was straightforward: modern weapons, in the right hands, can again shift the balance.

Another frequently cited analogy is that of appeasement. For Warsaw, British and French concessions to Nazi Germany in the 1930s serve as a lasting warning against hesitation. The message is: the response to Russian aggression must be resolute. Appeasing president Putin, many Polish policymakers argue, would only worsen the situation.

Finally, Poland’s global outreach reflects similar historical framing. In its dialogue with African partners, Polish diplomats have described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in terms of a ‘colonial war’. The idea is that this framing resonates with postcolonial audiences and underscores Poland’s distinctive position as a state without an overseas colonial past.

History as a Security Frontier

Poland’s proximity, its role as the logistical hub of Western support and its deep historical ties with Ukraine make it indispensable to Europe’s security architecture. In Central and Eastern Europe, history is not merely background, it is a security frontier.

For NATO and EU partners, the Polish-Ukrainian case offers two key lessons. First, supporting Ukraine’s future also means supporting efforts to reconcile its past with that of its neighbours, especially Poland, but also others, where unresolved historical disputes continue to influence current policy. Historical reconciliation is not a moral luxury; it is a strategic imperative for sustaining European security.

Second, Poland demonstrates how history can be used constructively: as a diplomatic tool, a means of persuasion and a source of resilience against disinformation. For those seeking to understand the interplay between history and security, Poland’s approach provides valuable insights.

© Floris van Berckel Smit, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

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