Israel-Iran War: Regional Reactions

The Middle East is bracing for further escalation, with continuing uncertainty as Iran weighs retaliation options following US Operation Midnight Hammer. So far, the responses among Gulf States have oscillated along a spectrum of severity in their condemnation of the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The consensus is the region may be on the brink of an escalation of an unprecedented scale unless Iran is persuaded to proceed with restraint. There are justified concerns about the endgame for Israeli operations, and condemnation from regional states against further Israeli strikes is expected to grow harsher as the conflict evolves into its next phase.

Until now, Iran’s retaliation had been noted for remaining below the historic pain threshold to threaten Israel. While comprehensive bomb damage assessments remain outstanding, the myth of the invincibility of the Iranian nuclear programme has been shattered. To recover the psychological impact of its threats, Tehran will be compelled to take kinetic retaliatory action. This is not only to inflict damage on Israel, but to telegraph its resilience to a range of audiences in the region: GCC states; Turkey; Iran-linked paramilitary groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; paramilitary groups in Iraq like Kataib Hezbollah; and others.

Gulf states have expressed formal statements of concern in the wake of the US operation. Concerns have centred on violations of the UN Charter, the weakening of the principle of territorial sovereignty, and the precedent such operations might set. All GCC states are clear that they do not condone US military strikes – despite the history of fraught relations between Iran and its Arab Gulf neighbours – while trying to balance this with the reality of their reliance on US security guarantees.

Preexisting tensions with Iran should not be interpreted as the Gulf condoning Israeli attacks on Iranian territory, which are seen, rather, as unprovoked acts of aggression that derailed the Oman-facilitated nuclear talks between the US and Iran. There are signs that Gulf states, which had invested in the possibility of a diplomatic solution, are frustrated with Israel’s unilateral military activities. Israel has placed immense pressure on the Gulf – militarily, politically, and economically – while strategically marginalising key Gulf mediators, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, from shaping the path of de-escalation.

Iran’s initial response to the US strikes on its nuclear sites was to focus its retaliatory campaign on Israel, with some speculation that it may seek to stretch this into a war of attrition to erode Israel’s public morale. Yet, now exposed to the possible aftershocks of the US operation, GCC states are concerned about a protracted action-reaction dynamic with a small margin of error. Missteps resulting from Israeli or Iranian military activity could jeopardise regional energy installations, port infrastructure, and commercial investments that threaten to undermine Gulf stability.

Iran’s renewed threat to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, while not a novel threat, have put Gulf states in a precarious position. Lacking full naval deterrence capabilities to unilaterally keep the strait open, Gulf leaders are weary that Iranian asymmetric naval capabilities could disrupt shipping temporarily, likely inviting a US military response that would put the Gulf directly in the line of attack. Recent reports suggesting that the US did not engage its Gulf-based assets in the execution of the recent operation imply it plans to deflect Iranian retaliation away from Gulf territory. Yet this calibrated distancing offers only partial reassurance.

Turkey and the Consequences

Turkey shares the concerns of regional neighbours but also faces a distinct set of challenges. At the 51st Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on 21 June, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for stronger solidarity among Islamic nations to counter Israeli actions in the Middle East. As a NATO member, Ankara has called for de-escalation, warning that US strike on Iran's nuclear facilities could transform the conflict from a regional to a global one.

Last week, Turkish officials reportedly visited the border crossing areas with Iran, and confirmed that security precautions were in place. Turkey shares a 560-km (350-mile) border with Iran and is alert to the possibility of an influx of refugees from Iran should the security situation erode further. Reports suggest that several hundred Iranians may have crossed into Turkey on 23 June. A massive influx would pose potentially calamitous consequences domestically for the Turkish government, with flashbacks to the refugee influx experienced during the Syrian war.

The ongoing war will inevitably reshape the historic Iran-Turkey regional rivalry. While Turkey has sought to position itself as a mediator – quietly pursuing backchannel diplomacy to broker a ceasefire – these efforts have, so far, yielded little. A militarily and politically weakened Iran could create security vacuums, particularly in Iraq and within cross-border Kurdish groups – spaces where Turkey’s regional interests are acutely engaged.

There are broader concerns that the war will have spill-over effects on Turkey, with Turkish nationalist political leader and government ally, Devlet Bahceli, cautioning against Turkey becoming the next target of Israel’s expanding and unchecked ambitions in the region.

Beyond the flurry of diplomatic and principled statements for de-escalation, Iran lacks major state allies signalling overt military or logistical support for its self-defence or offensive capabilities. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the IRGC cultivated technical expertise for its domestic arms production from Syria and Libya, particularly for its missile programme. Precedent of external military assistance to patch up gaps in its indigenous defence sector has raised questions about what options may be available to Tehran now, as it seeks to compensate for its conventional military shortcomings.

© RUSI, 2025.

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