How Does it End? The Iranian Regime

As I write, it seems probable that the brutal suppression of protests in Iran has, as in the past, achieved its immediate goal. Sadly, this was always the most likely outcome. It took extraordinary courage for Iranians to risk their lives and liberty while in the absence of a credible, organised opposition in Iran and therefore the lack of a foreseeable trajectory from demonstrations to regime change. But even courage has limits. In the end, the regime’s near monopoly of violence is likely to have won out, as it did in 2009, 2018 and 2022.

It is tempting, nevertheless, to think that the regime’s days are numbered. It has no answers on the economy, corruption, government incompetence, drought, Iran’s creaking energy infrastructure or even national defence. The latest protests unified people who can no longer afford rocketing food prices with those who have a more political or social agenda. The Iranian people have had enough – surely something has to give?

That could be right. But over the last twenty years I have heard so many forecasts of regime change in Iran (and, indeed, of the death of the Supreme Leader) that I have learned to be cautious. The day could come when the Iranian security forces are no longer willing to fire on their own people. And perhaps fault lines within and around the regime will widen to a point where there is a viable alternative.

But neither of those eventualities looks imminent. Some members of the security forces did resign rather than join the crack-down. But not, so far as we know, in significant numbers. And there are divided opinions within the regime, not least between the circle around President Pezeshkian and the Supreme Leader and security chiefs. But the differences are about futile ways to make a broken system work better, not how to replace it.

What Does this Mean for the Future?

First, the most likely future is one in which the regime remains in power for some years to come. Like a clown car at a circus, the regime will go around in circles, belching smoke, with bits falling off – but still going; the Supreme Leader, in time, replaced by another elderly cleric; President Pezeshkian, scapegoated for the miserable state of the economy, replaced by a more conservative figure in the 2028 elections; Iran fails to do a deal with the US because, ridiculously, the enrichment of uranium has become totemic for the regime; the economy continues to deteriorate; periodic demonstrations against the regime are crushed. Poor Iranians.

There are other, less likely but still plausible scenarios. For example:

• Falling oil revenues and sanctions drive still higher inflation and economic misery. Even the 13 million people who voted for a hard-line candidate in the 2024 elections are alienated from the regime. Protests become more frequent. Crucially, even members of the security forces see their own families struggling to make ends meet and they become unwilling to crush dissent. Eventually the regime loses control.

  This scenario could end in different ways. One, benign, variant would see the emergence of political leaders who could lead Iran onto a democratic path. The difficulties would be many in a country that has no political infrastructure outside the Islamic regime. But there could be a path to a better Iran. A second variant would see a grab for power by the security forces, perhaps leading to extensive bloodshed.

• The hopelessness of the regime’s current policy trajectory becomes clearer to a wider cross-section of the leadership. This creates an understanding that, to paraphrase The Leopard, in order to stay the same it has to change. Some understand this already. Former President Rouhani is reported to have told fellow clerics in the holy city of Qom that Iran’s Islamic governance will be under threat without reform – including mending Iran’s relations with the US. Rouhani is isolated and reviled by hard-liners. But if Iran’s most senior clergy concluded that reform was an existential necessity, even the security forces would pause for thought.

  This scenario is still a long shot. But when the Supreme Leader dies there just might be a critical choice to be made. The body that appoints the next Supreme Leader – the Assembly of Experts – consists of carefully-vetted clerics chosen to large degree for their conservative views. But if a number of Iran’s most senior clerics – the Grand Ayatollahs or Marja-i Taqlids – concluded that only a Supreme Leader who was open to reform could ensure the survival of a cleric-led Islamic Republic, their influence just might be decisive.

• A third scenario could be that external military intervention decapitates the regime to an extent that those inside Iran who oppose the regime find that it is incapable of their suppression. The conflicting signals coming from Washington in the last few weeks suggest that this will almost certainly have been one of the options for military action explored by the US Administration. But there would be multiple difficulties. It is uncertain whether even an extended strike campaign could achieve the decapitation needed to reach the goal. In June 2025, when Israeli strikes killed several of Iran’s top military commanders, new appointments were quickly made without much evidence of dislocation. The regime is resilient. Furthermore, it is impossible to know what would emerge from the chaos. A military take-over would be at least as likely as a pluralistic political system. And, of course, other countries in the region are desperate to avoid the sort of turbulence that large-scale attacks would bring.

  We must expect some level of military action against Iran in 2026. Even if the US does not act, it is unlikely that Israel will stand by as Iran replenishes its inventory of ballistic missiles – still less if it resumes its nuclear programme. But this will almost certainly aim to degrade Iran’s military capability rather than achieve regime change.

These scenarios do not give much cause for optimism. The regime has no answers to Iran’s mounting problems. I hope those who believe this cannot last much longer are right. But in the last thirty years we have seen a number of countries in failing positions where the strong do what they will, and the poor suffer what they must. Let us hope Iran is different.

© RUSI, 2026.

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