History is a Strategic Necessity for Negotiations with Russia
Peace negotiations with Russia require more than a contemporary understanding of events, and diplomats would do well to recognise the patterns Russia’s past teach us.
Russia is reportedly mobilising 160,000 new troops, ramping up its war efforts in Ukraine. Meanwhile, President Trump is eager to broker a peace deal, despite remaining obstacles and with limited US support for Ukraine. The burden of leadership is increasingly on the Coalition of the Willing – led by the UK and France and composed of states committed to supporting Ukraine.
Regardless of whether current diplomacy succeeds, Russia will pose the central threat to European security. This requires a strong, coherent long-term strategy. Such a strategy must incorporate historical ‘tools’ alongside other approaches. While policymakers in the field of international relations do recognise the importance of historical knowledge and skills, it is often lacking a structural integration in the onboarding processes for new diplomats and policymakers.
Tool 1: Understanding Russia’s Historical Narrative
It is important to gain a deep understanding of the Russian historical narrative. This narrative became more assertive from 2007/2008 onwards and centred, on the idea of reunifying different Slavic peoples within one holy Russian nation and protecting (ethnic) Russians (abroad). It reflects the Kremlin’s motivations on the international stage.
One cannot assess the value of a concession without a clear grasp of what drives Russia’s leadership. In parts of the West, the (naïve) belief persists that Russia's imperial ambitions are limited to Ukraine. Yet Russia’s historical narrative is not rhetorical. It is used for political purposes and weaponised to justify the ongoing war. Russia’s historically informed agenda leaves no doubt about its ambitions on the international stage and the threat it poses to European security. Effectively communicating these insights to the public is important for sustaining public support for Ukraine and for broader investments in European security, particularly as these investments will compete with other spending priorities.
A key reference point is the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine relinquished its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. The lesson Ukraine has drawn from this experience is that written agreements offer limited protection
Russia’s historical narrative must also be considered in the negotiations over a peace deal. Even if a deal is reached, the Russian perception of Ukraine as a hostile Nazi state is unlikely to disappear. This narrative – propagated through state media, the education system, and even a military-theme park near Moscow – remains deeply embedded. The Coalition of the Willing must reckon with this factor when shaping its longer-term strategy towards Russia.
Tool 2: Learning from Analogies and Precedents
The second historical tool is the analysis of analogies and precedents. In the context of the ongoing negotiations over a peace deal, it is relevant to examine how Russia has approached diplomacy in past conflicts.
For instance, during the wars in /span>Chechnya (1994-1996, 1999-2009), Russia used the interwar period to reorganise, and ultimately launch a renewed offensive. A comparable pattern played out in Syria, where Russia’s intervention from 2015 onwards was marked by strategic use of ceasefires, not as pathways to peace, but as opportunities to regroup before resuming military operations.
In March 2016, Russia announced a withdrawal of its forces from Syria. In reality, this was a rotation of troops in preparation for a large-scale offensive. These examples are a recurring strategy: using diplomacy as a tactical opportunity rather than as a step towards lasting peace. The Minsk Agreements (2014-2015), which sought to halt fighting in the Donbas, similarly failed to produce durable peace and ultimately preceded Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
Beyond the battlefield, Russia pursues a long-term objective to disrupt the European security order that has existed since the 1990s. While the US has repeatedly reaffirmed its continued support for NATO, growing indications suggest European reliance on American security can no longer be taken for granted. Telling signals include US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth’s statement that the US is no longer ‘the primary guarantor of security in Europe,’ as well as President Trump’s remarks on potentially using military force to acquire Greenland from NATO ally Denmark.
In this context, Europe must accelerate efforts to develop greater autonomy. Over the longer term, this calls for institutionalising the Coalition of the Willing into a more permanent European security structure. The EU, in its current configuration, is unlikely to serve as such a structure, given internal divisions and the problematic role of member states like Hungary. A new model is required. Historical precedents, including the Western Union (1948), the European Defence Community (proposed 1952), and the Western European Union (1954-2011), offer useful points of reference. The point is not to replicate these past models, but rather to examine what once existed, understand what worked and what did not, and draw relevant lessons for the future.
Ultimately, analysing analogies and precedents offers no certainty about what lies ahead. Events may unfold differently. However, history helps to identify which factors must be taken into account. By understanding the past, policymakers are better equipped to anticipate developments, and in some cases, even prevent certain scenarios from materialising.
Tool 3: Contextualising the War
The third historical tool is contextualisation. Contextualisation aids in elucidating Ukraine’s position regarding potential peace negotiations. A key reference point is the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine relinquished its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. The lesson Ukraine has drawn from this experience is that written agreements offer limited protection. This insight helps explain President Zelensky’s reluctance to engage in negotiations and his persistent insistence on obtaining firm security guarantees.
Historical Tools at the Strategic Level
Historians, especially those working on international relations, typically emphasize history for policy: providing insights based on their scholarly research. Yet what is increasingly needed is a shift toward history in policy: the structural integration of historical thinking into the policymaking process itself. Where and how can historical tools be embedded? And what knowledge and skills do policymakers – particularly those within the Coalition of the Willing – need to meaningfully incorporate historical perspectives into their work?
Our research shows that many diplomats and policymakers already apply (some of) the historical tools we have mentioned, sometimes consciously, often intuitively. The real question thus is whether political leaders are willing and able to act on the insights history provides.
© Harm Kaal and Floris van Berkel Smit, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the authors.
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WRITTEN BY
Harm Kaal
Guest Contributor
Floris van Berckel Smit
Guest Contributor
- Jim McLeanMedia Relations Manager+44 (0)7917 373 069JimMc@rusi.org