The Emerging US Influence Threat to British Democracy

The Trump administration has openly stated its intention to intervene in the UK and Europe’s domestic politics, supposedly for the purposes of preserving free speech and preventing political oppression. These ideological aims are closely linked to the commercial interests of powerful US technology firms, who have framed UK and European online regulation as censorship.

What has emerged from this change in US foreign policy, combined with rising digital platform power, is a serious threat of foreign interference by a traditional ally, one which has the potential to eclipse the Russian threat in scale and effectiveness. With a Bill intended to futureproof democracy currently before Parliament, the UK should act now to strengthen its defences.

Redrawing the Boundaries of Foreign Interference

The United States’ 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) signals a stark departure from traditional transatlantic diplomacy. Under the heading ‘Promoting European Greatness’, it warns of ‘civilizational erasure’ across Europe, attributing this in part to the censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition. Unironically, it states that the US intends to ‘stand up for genuine democracy [and] freedom of expression’ by ‘cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory’.

It appears that part of this strategy involves the US government financing policy discourse to promote ‘American values’ abroad. According to the Financial Times, the US State Department intends to fund ‘MAGA-aligned think tanks’ across Europe and the UK. The US Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, Sarah Rogers, travelled to London and several European capitals in December 2025 on what was described as a ‘freedom of speech tour’, meeting right-wing think tanks and key figures within Reform UK. Rogers again made similar trips in February 2026. POLITICO has also reported on meetings between US government officials and ‘a burgeoning ecosystem’ of ideologically-aligned think tanks and political groups interested in receiving financial support ‘to export MAGA ideology to Europe’.

US government support for think tanks is not unlawful nor is it unprecedented. Since the post-war period, the US has funded a vast array of projects and institutions to promote democratic ideals around the world. Indeed, it is that exact ‘soft power’ playbook that is now being repurposed in a different ideological direction, one that aligns with the values of the current US government and the commercial interests of technology platforms. The issue is not with states or companies promoting their interests abroad, as they are entitled to do, but foreign funding should not enter domestic political ecosystems without disclosure or regulatory oversight.

A key example of the synergy between the Trump administration and its powerful tech oligarch supporters is their shared opposition to regulation designed to make online platforms more accountable for illegal content, disinformation and child protection. The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) has been one such target, with the US State Department imposing a visa ban in December 2025 on five Europeans it claimed ‘have led organized efforts to coerce American platforms to censor, demonetize, and suppress American viewpoints they oppose’. One of those banned was ex-European Commissioner Theirry Breton, described by Rogers as the ‘mastermind’ behind the DSA.

The UK’s Online Safety Act (OSA) has also been a flashpoint, with the legislation being cited as a key obstacle in the UK’s trade talks with the US. The situation has recently escalated, with Reuters revealing that the US State Department is developing a ‘freedom’ website to allow British and European users to see content banned by their governments. This reflects the convergence of state and commercial interests inside the Trump administration, with significant implications for how influence operations can be conducted on privately-owned and state-backed digital infrastructure.

When Platform Power Meets Foreign Policy

Tech oligarchs have demonstrated their willingness to donate funds towards US-state objectives. By the end of 2025, Trump and his allies had amassed a record $429 million in super-PAC donations for the November 2026 mid-term elections from crypto, AI and other tech donors. Closer to home, Elon Musk, a tech oligarch and ex-head of the defunct Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), has demonstrated an interest in UK politics. In late 2024, reports emerged that Musk would donate $100 million to Reform UK following a meeting between Musk, Nigel Farage and Nick Candy, respectively Reform’s leader and treasurer, at Donald Trump’s house in Florida.

While these rumours were subsequently denied, Musk’s willingness to engage in British political discourse has continued. In September 2025 he appeared by video link at an anti-immigration rally in London, telling the crowd that the UK needed ‘revolutionary government change’. The rally was organised by the far-right agitator ‘Tommy Robinson’, who had been banned from Twitter in 2018 for promoting hate speech, only to have his account reinstated by Musk after the businessman bought and rebranded the platform as X.

This ideological interest from Musk clearly dovetails with his commercial interests. The conflation of ‘free speech’ with ‘market access’ that Musk and other tech oligarchs espouse is already creating friction with UK regulatory frameworks, and the rollout of competing AI rules will undoubtedly create further pressure points. Another emerging source of tension concerns technological sovereignty. As US rhetoric towards Europe sharpens, policymakers in London and European capitals may reconsider their dependence on embedded US technology in government, defence and financial systems. This threatens to initiate a feedback loop where greater regulatory scrutiny and diversification efforts in Europe could prompt pushback from US-based commercial platforms and their political allies. This in turn will create further incentives for tech oligarchs to fund political figures aligned with their interests.

The door was opened for tech companies and their CEOs to pour billions of dollars into US election campaigns by the controversial 2010 Citizens United case, in which the US Supreme Court held that financial donations are a form of free speech and therefore protected under the Constitution. By removing campaign finance restrictions on corporations, the case has resulted in the ballooning of political spending by firms in the subsequent decade and the ability of ultra-wealthy donors to wield significant political influence.

While UK political finance rules are more restrictive than those in the US, we are starting to see a similar emergence of ‘mega-donors’. For example, in the lead-up to the 2024 UK general election, £56.5 million or 66% of all political donations from private sources came from just 19 donors. The UK government has recently proposed legislation that strengthens the controls on corporate donations, but it does not include an annual donations cap that would prevent the distorting influence of the mega wealthy. Meanwhile, the opaque funding of some British think tanks not just by US donors, but also by UK political parties, remains a clear vulnerability in UK undue influence protections.

From Alarm to Action

It is entirely possible that the US state funded interventions described above will not fully materialise. They may even prove counter-productive, as any overt association between a British political party or think tank and the MAGA movement is likely to prove unpopular with the public at large. Polling in early 2026 indicated that 81% of the British population held unfavourable view of Donald Trump, while in January 2025 – when Musk made inflammatory statements about British politics – 71% of people viewed him unfavourably.

However, it would be unwise to rely on the electorate to be the sole firewall against influence tactics, particularly if the funding for think tanks is not subject to clear disclosure requirements. It is important to be proactive, rather than reactive, because questions of foreign interference can quickly become politically charged, particularly when they intersect with arguments about free speech or longstanding diplomatic relationships. Furthermore, given current global instability, the UK may be hesitant to confront Washington directly on the issue of US-state funded think tanks, especially as the funding is part of the 250th anniversary celebrations of US independence.

The UK therefore has a narrowing window of opportunity to strengthen its defences against this threat to its sovereignty and stability, before tensions escalate. With a Bill to futureproof democracy moving through Parliament and an independent review into foreign financial interference underway, the time to act is now.

First, political finance rules should ensure that only sovereign, tax-paying voters are eligible to donate to UK political parties. Furthermore, a ceiling should be imposed on how much individuals and corporations can donate to political causes each year, regardless of whether it is an election period. Even a generous annual cap of £1 million per donor would be effective in reducing undue influence and political capture. This would also help restore public trust, with a recent survey finding strong support for abolishing unlimited donations.

Second, the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), analogous to the US Foreign Agents Registration Act, should be properly maintained and enforced so that the public can understand who is directing lobbyists, consultants and think tanks. This may require clarifying the scope of the legislation and strengthening the capacity to enforce it. Moreover, clear guidance should be provided on when think tank activities meet the registration threshold, building on the recently published guidance for the Higher Education Sector.

Third, mandatory funding disclosure standards should apply to think tanks and any organisations that seeks to impact political decision-making. Transparency around the source of significant donations would reduce opportunities for undue influence. To complement these regulations, security briefings, similar to the ones recently held for UK universities and political parties, should be offered to think tanks to increase awareness of how foreign interference can manifest.

Fourth, the UK government should invest in research institutes and civil society organisations dedicated to democratic resilience. These organisations can assist the government design robust safeguards, counter disinformation narratives, improve the public’s media literacy, and preserve democratic accountability.

Finally, the UK should continue to demand reciprocity – it does not interfere in the domestic policies of the US, and it expects the same in return. The emerging US influence threat will gain traction where rules are ambiguous, enforcement is hesitant, and public trust in political finance is weak. The task now is to strengthen our democratic guardrails – calmly, transparently and proportionately – before those boundaries are redrawn by others.

© RUSI, 2026.

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