Drones Drive Battlefield Motorcycle Tactical Shift

Motorcycles have long had a presence in irregular and guerrilla warfare, particularly among non-state actors in regions such as Africa. However, their use by modern, professional state militaries has traditionally been limited – typically confined to reconnaissance or light logistics roles. This changed dramatically in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), especially first-person view (FPV) drones, has reshaped battlefield tactics.

A recent study by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimated that drones were responsible for 60–70% of damaged or destroyed Russian military systems. In this environment, traditional armoured vehicles – once central to manoeuvre warfare – have become highly vulnerable. This has led both Russian and Ukrainian forces to adapt, increasingly turning to motorcycles and All-Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) for their mobility, speed and expendability. These vehicles are now being used not just for assault but also for logistics, medical evacuation, reconnaissance and electronic warfare support, particularly in terrain where heavy armour is ineffective or too easily targeted.

Mechanised Warfare Adapting to Drone Dominance

This shift represents a tactical evolution – an adaptation to drone-dominated terrain that blurs the line between infantry and cavalry. As one Ukrainian soldier from the 3rd Assault Brigade put it in an interview with El País, such units resemble a form of ‘rapid assault cavalry.’ He described a successful Russian penetration of Ukrainian lines near Pokrovsk in April 2024 using ATVs. This was no isolated incident: Russian motorcycle and ATV units were being formally integrated into operations by mid-2024, with the Ministry of Defence publicly acknowledging their role in offensive efforts and frontline supply operations.

The Ukrainian military, too, has embraced the concept. The 425th Separate Assault Regiment announced its first motorcycle assault unit in May 2024 after ‘hundreds of hours’ of training, reporting its first successful mission – a night-time incursion into the Kursk region – later that month. These developments reflect not a desperate improvisation by either side but rather a deliberate response to the rapidly evolving threat environment on the modern battlefield.

What makes these tactics so effective is the unique combination of speed and decentralisation. Unlike heavily armoured vehicles, which carry large numbers of troops and are high-value targets for drones, motorcycles offer a dispersed, fast-moving alternative. Small assault groups – often numbering between a dozen and a hundred riders – can move quickly over rough terrain, giving drone operators and artillery spotters little time to intercept. Furthermore, neutralising a single motorcycle typically requires the same resources as stopping a larger-capacity armoured vehicle, making them far more cost-effective and tactically elusive.

Motorcycles and ATVs as Adaptive Mobile Platforms

Motorcycle units have also begun adapting in their own right. Reports from Ukrainian sources indicate that Russian assault motorcycles are being outfitted with iron cages to defend against drone strikes and, in some cases, with portable electronic warfare (EW) equipment designed to jam incoming UAVs. These units are not just agile; they are increasingly networked and self-protected – illustrating a clear move towards integrated, flexible force structures.

The conflict in Ukraine has rendered a wider array of lightweight, off-road platforms operationally relevant. While motorcycles are effective for fast, agile troop movements, ATVs offer distinct advantages in payload capacity, stability, and off-road capability – filling a critical niche in the current conflict. Their ability to transport troops, ammunition, equipment, and evacuate wounded personnel across rugged terrain addresses urgent operational needs. By late 2024, reports indicated that Russian forces were formally training troops in ATV operation, signalling their growing tactical importance. Unlike motorcycles, which excel in speed and dispersion for rapid assaults, ATVs provide greater versatility, supporting a wide range of roles from direct assault to frontline resupply. Their heavier payload capacity and terrain-handling capabilities make them especially valuable as a logistical backbone in operations conducted under persistent threat from UAVs and artillery.

However, while motorcycles and ATVs excel as mobility platforms, they remain ineffectual as combat platforms compared to traditional armour – rather than acting like traditional cavalry, effective units operate more along the lines of mounted infantry. Tanks and armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) still provide unmatched protection, firepower, and survivability in high-intensity combat. The challenge is not replacing armour but rebalancing its role within a broader combined arms approach. Motorcycles may allow troops to traverse contested terrain or avoid detection, but they cannot substitute for the brute force and staying power of well-supported mechanised formations.

This new mobility-focused doctrine does not render armour obsolete. Instead, it signifies a rebalancing of combined arms tactics. The most effective operations now tend to combine drones, artillery, and mobile infantry in tightly coordinated strikes. As the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted, the Russian military is ‘systematically integrating’ motorcycles into its planned 2025 offensives as part of a broader shift in tactical thinking – a shift from massed mechanised formations to modular, flexible strike teams that can survive and operate under persistent UAV surveillance and attack.

Military Motorcycles Beyond Ukraine 

This evolution holds important lessons for NATO and other Western militaries. The Turkish Operation Spring Shield in 2020 should have offered an early warning – not least to Russia – when coordinated Turkish UAV and artillery strikes decimated Syrian armoured formations with devastating efficiency and resulted in at least 197 casualties. As military analysts Reynolds and Watling warned in a 2020 article ominously titled 'Your Tanks Cannot Hide', survivability in the modern battlespace requires layered defensive capabilities – including electronic warfare, radar warning, and short-range air defences (SHORAD).

Despite these early signals, Western doctrine has been slow to adapt. While the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) acknowledges the need for new anti-UAS tactics and improved electronic countermeasures, it remains vague on how infantry and mechanised units should operate in a drone-saturated environment. One notable trial – by the Parachute Regiment with the Sur-Ron Firefly electric motorcycle – predates the SDR and is conspicuously absent from its recommendations. Yet electric motorcycles like the Firefly, already widely used in Ukraine, offer compelling advantages in drone warfare: they are quieter and have smaller heat signatures making them harder to detect.

What is emerging is a new light cavalry paradigm – faster, quieter, more modular and adapted to high-tempo, electronically contested environments. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are experimenting with and institutionalising these innovations, suggesting that the future of ground warfare may belong not just to armoured formations or infantry alone, but to hybrid, networked forces capable of manoeuvring intelligently under constant aerial threat. Striking the right balance – leveraging the speed and dispersion of light vehicles while retaining the firepower and protection of armour – will be key to surviving and prevailing on tomorrow’s battlefield.

For NATO, the implications are clear. The experience of Ukrainian forces, now operating in perhaps the most technologically dense battlefield in modern history, should serve as a source of urgent tactical insight. Updating doctrine and training to reflect this shift will be essential if European forces are to remain operationally effective in future conflicts.

© Darragh McGovern, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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