Burnham’s Makerfield Test: Home Gains or Global Risks?

Britain has a new Prime Minister, and he has a plan. Andy Burnham’s Makerfield Test – reminiscent of both former US President Joe Biden’s foreign policy for the middle class and current US President Donald Trump’s America First doctrine − promises to apply a domestic lens to international affairs and ensure that the UK’s foreign and security policy benefits the average citizen. Under this framing principle, decisions on trade, energy, development aid and defence investment must not only produce the right foreign and security policy outcomes or elevate the UK’s international standing, but also deliver tangible domestic returns.

While Prime Minister Burnham’s first week in office centred on introducing his cabinet and delivering some early wins on his affordability agenda, the world won’t wait. International security issues, from Ukraine and European defence to the widening conflict in the Middle East, demand his attention, with allies and partners eager for UK leadership and support in tackling them. For a middle power like the UK, which is reliant on its global, export-driven economy for prosperity and on collective security guarantees in NATO for its security, successfully navigating these external challenges is critical to security at home.

Early indications are that Burnham appreciates this dynamic. In an opinion piece published shortly before his appointment, he writes that ‘keeping people safe’ is the first responsibility of any government, and ‘ordinary lives and local prosperity are impacted by global events’. From cyberattacks on critical infrastructure to rising energy costs due the war in Ukraine and conflict with Iran, national security challenges affect people’s daily lives. He promises to prioritise stability ‘where it matters most’, namely at home in the UK and in its immediate North Atlantic and European neighbourhoods, and to leverage the UK’s allies and partners around the globe. He suggests that the UK nuclear deterrent, nearly synonymous with UK sovereignty, will be preserved, and the UK’s NATO commitments met.

As the Burnham government begin to apply the Makerfield Test to international security, several relationships will be instrumental.

The ‘Special Relationship’

First and foremost is the so-called special relationship with the US. Despite current tensions in the UK–US relationship, Burnham kept with tradition in making his first call to a foreign leader the US President. He has called the US the UK’s ‘most important security and defence ally’ and will probably seek to maintain current levels of cooperation with the US around nuclear deterrence, intelligence and conventional defence, even as the UK diversifies its security and defence relationships. While Trump may initially have time for Burnham, finding him a welcome change from former Prime Minister Keir Starmer, whose lack of support for Iran strikes angered him, the same sticking points on defence spending, the Middle East and technology regulation remain. The upcoming UK–US Summit and G20 Summit, both scheduled to take place in the UK in November 2026, will be early tests of the direction of the relationship.

A key area of tension in this relationship is, of course, NATO defence spending. Prime Minister Burnham, working closely with now Chancellor and former Minister of Defence John Healey and newly appointed Defence Secretary Wes Streeting, will have to move quickly to demonstrate this government’s commitment to meeting the NATO requirement to spend 3.5% GDP on core defence. While defence shares rallied following Healey’s appointment and statement that, ‘fiscal credibility is the bedrock for economic stability and national security’, Streeting’s subsequent reluctance to publicly commit to reaching 3% by 2030 injected doubt.

A concrete plan to reach 3% by 2030 and 3.5% by 2035, if not sooner, will reassure the US and other NATO allies that the UK has the cash to contribute significantly to deterrence and defence of the North Atlantic and support Ukraine. Increased UK spending would benefit both UK and US defence industries, which partner closely in areas like the nuclear deterrence and combat aviation. Yet should the UK begin to give preference to the national or European industry, to the detriment of the US, Trump might react poorly; he could, for example, eliminate the UK’s tariff exemption for defence articles agreed under the 2025 UK–US Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD), negatively affecting UK business and workers. At a minimum, the US can expect Burnham’s government to negotiate hard on coproduction, codevelopment and offsets, to maximise domestic benefits to the UK.

Disagreements could also surface on the Middle East. The appointment of Ed Miliband as Foreign Secretary suggests Burnham intends to take a non-interventionist approach to the region. As opposition leader in 2013, Miliband whipped the Labour Party to vote against the UK joining planned US-led air strikes on Syria in response to Syria’s chemical weapons use. More recently, as Energy Secretary in the Starmer government, Miliband argued against UK military involvement in Iran, a position which led Trump to threaten to scrap the EPD. With the war now expanding beyond the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea, the US is likely to renew its requests to use UK bases or enlist UK support to strike Iran and its proxies. While Middle East conflicts may seem distant and UK involvement optional, the UK has a vital interest in the region’s stability. Given its export-driven economy, UK economic interests are dependent on free trade and freedom of navigation. The Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) are also central to UK economic security, as evidenced by the UK-GCC free trade agreement (projected to add £3.7 billion annually to the UK economy) and a multi-billion pound defence export market for UK advanced military hardware like the Eurofighter.

European Allies

Turning to Europe, Burnham’s prioritisation of regional stability and endorsement of the NATO First approach taken by the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review is good news for European allies and partners, who expect and need continued UK leadership on Ukraine and in NATO.

Ukraine have momentum on and off the battlefield, whereas Russia is suffering both tactically and economically. Ukraine’s targeted strikes on refineries and warehouses, coupled with a renewal of the oil price cap and interdictions of Russia’s shadow fleet, are wearing on Russia’s already struggling economy. The NATO Summit Declaration acknowledgement that ‘Ukraine contributes to transatlantic security’ and announcement of a €70-billion package of military equipment, assistance and training signal staying power in European support for Ukraine, ahead of what could be a tough winter. Starmer’s approach to UK leadership on Ukraine, which was so critical to continuation of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, rallying a European coalition of the willing, and ensuring continued military assistance to Ukraine, must continue under Burnham. Ukraine’s innovative, battle-tested forces and dynamic defence industry can be enablers in the UK’s plans to integrate unmanned systems into its armed forces. Recent bilateral initiatives – such as industrial cooperation on the Octopus interceptor UAV and a UK–Ukraine defence export facility that allows Ukraine to draw on a specialised British loan facility – are consistent with the Makerfield Test, bringing security and economic benefits to both sides.

As European allies and Canada spend more and assume greater responsibility for European defence, the UK defence industry is already benefitting. Recent wins include BAE Systems’ sale of advanced Type 26 frigates to the Norwegian Navy and Typhoon fighter jets to the Turkish Air Force. To sustain this momentum, the UK defence industry must reject attempts by the Burnham government to introduce a ‘buy British by default’ clause into UK defence procurements. On the contrary, it is greater cooperation on development&D, open architecture designs and friendshoring of supply chains that will cultivate the competitiveness and resilience Europe craves.

While NATO and bilateral partnerships have been the UK’s preferred methods for security and defence cooperation with continental Europe, Prime Minister Burnham, like Keir Starmer before him, has signalled a desire for a closer security and defence relationship with the EU. However, protectionist defence-funding structures, competing defence industrial interests and the EU’s strict regulatory environment on technology could complicate this ambition. A more realistic focus for the UK–EU relationship might be on short-term policies designed to create efficiencies or unlock growth. These could include alignment of energy and carbon markets, harmonisation of data standards or coordination on overseas development aid. The yet-to-be-scheduled UK–EU Summit is also an opportunity to consider long-term alignment on strategic issues such as energy, climate and migration, to bolster both economic and national security.

The Makerfield Test maintains that foreign policy can advance domestic ends without becoming hostage to them. Burnham's early instincts – such as meeting NATO commitments, supporting Ukraine and maintaining strong relationships with both the US and Europe – indicate he understands that British prosperity is dependent on the stability of the wider world. Yet taken too far, these same instincts risk drift toward economic nationalism or default isolationism. The new Prime Minister must recognise that, far from a constraint on domestic ambitions, the UK's allies and partners are enablers of them.

© RUSI, 2026.

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