Evaluating Sanctions as a Tool to Disrupt Organised Crime

The first phase of this project sought to identify factors influencing the effectiveness of organised crime-focused sanctions, and identified political will (or the lack thereof) in the host country as key in two cases: Colombia and Libya. In Colombia, political will to support sanctions designations was central to the perceived success of sanctions use; in Libya, by contrast, limited domestic cooperation hindered sanctions use in this space. The limited scope of the project and timeframe, however, prevented in-depth examination of factors affecting the differential levels of political will in these cases.

The second phase of the project dives deeper into the crucial question of political will – one that is underexplored in the literature. The project looks at political will from two perspectives: that of sanction-sending states/multilaterals and that of the home states of individuals targeted by sanctions.

In both cases, the project considers what factors drive or hinder political will to support SOC-related sanctions, such as alignment with domestic and foreign policy goals, geopolitical considerations, targeting strategy (e.g. state/non-state actors), domestic capacity and clarity on the objectives of sanctions use.

Sanctions are increasingly used to tackle a range of specific issues. These include sanctions to respond to human rights abuses, combat corruption and address malicious cyber activity. As sanctions use has broadened, the question of their application to organised criminal activity has been increasingly raised, with expanding sanctions use seen in this space.

However, little research has been undertaken to assess the impact of sanctions against organised crime. With US sanctions used over almost three decades to disrupt cross-border trafficking, the lack of a body of rigorous relevant research is a key shortcoming. Similarly, few past initiatives have sought to assess the lessons these experiences hold for future sanctions issuers in this space. With interest mounting in the wider use of organised crime-related sanctions, this represents a critical limitation.

This paper represents the first effort to target this knowledge gap, by reviewing existing evidence on the use and impact of sanctions to disrupt organised criminal activity. In the first phase, the project focused on two case studies, Colombia and Libya, in differing regions of the world and with different exposure to organised crime-focused sanctions. Here, the objective was to identify factors influencing the effectiveness of sanctions use, analysing organised crime-related sanctions data and examining the current state of knowledge on the implementation and impact of these sanctions.

In the second phase, the project’s core objective is to strengthen the existing knowledge base on the factors determining political will among governments and other actors to impose and cooperate with sanctions linked to serious and organised crime. In doing so, it seeks to provide policymakers and practitioners with evidence-based guidance on the options for effective, politically feasible sanctions use against key crimes. Throughout the project, a key objective is to ensure that practical application and policy relevance act as guiding principles, informing the diplomacy that accompanies sanctions use.