Wildberries and Refineries: Are Ukraine's Strikes Reshaping Russia's Home Front?
RUSI Europe hosted a closed-door, non-attributable roundtable to examine how Ukrainian strikes on refineries and consumer logistics are testing Russia's economic resilience and the Kremlin's domestic stability.
Introduction
RUSI Europe held the discussion, 'Wildberries and Refineries: Are Ukraine's Strikes Reshaping Russia’s Home Front?'. The closed-door event was led by Natia Seskuria, Senior Research Fellow in Russia and Eurasia Studies, and Petras Katinas, Research Fellow in Climate, Energy and Defence. It examined how Ukraine's long-range strikes against Russian oil and commercial infrastructure affect refinery operations, domestic supplies, exports, revenues and distribution networks. The discussion also considered the costs of repairing, replacing and protecting infrastructure. It explored whether growing economic disturbance is changing the calculations of businesses, regional authorities and the Kremlin.
Key Discussion Themes
Refinery Strikes Are Creating a Domestic Fuel Security Problem
Ukraine's attacks on Russian oil refineries are having an increasingly significant impact on domestic fuel supplies. Between January and August 2026, 204 strikes were carried out against 28 oil refineries, disrupting crude oil production and the distribution of refined products, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). Compared with 2025, refining capacity has fallen by approximately 30%. Petrol production fell by 20% and diesel production by almost 30%. The drop contributed to regional fuel shortages, prompting fuel rationing in several regions and temporary government bans on petrol and diesel exports to prioritise domestic market.
At the same time, wholesale fuel prices rose by around 28%, whilst retail prices increased by 12–14%. Efforts to keep consumer prices in check have shifted part of the financial burden onto both independent and vertically integrated companies, as well as the state. Higher fuel costs are also affecting transport, agriculture, and logistics, meaning the economic consequences extend beyond the energy sector to include these sectors, leading to higher inflation in the medium term.
Crude Exports and Fiscal Support Are Cushioning, Not Eliminating the Damage
Russia has partly offset reduced refining activity by increasing crude exports, which rose by 9% year-on-year in January-August 2026, while refined-product exports fell by 28%. However, Ukrainian strikes on export terminals have also constrained crude shipments. Fuel imports have helped alleviate domestic shortages, but at additional cost. Supplies from Belarus arrived by rail, while South Korea, Turkey and India were among the main sources of seaborne fuel imports. Meanwhile, repeated attacks have increased the need for repairs, equipment replacement and infrastructure protection.
Furthermore, oil-related federal revenue declined year-on-year from RUB 4.69 trillion ($55 billion) to RUB 3.68 trillion ($48 billion), partly reflecting a RUB 0.23 trillion ($3 billion) increase in fuel-damper payments to oil companies These payments are designated to stabilise domestic petrol and diesel prices by compensating refiners when exports would be more profitable. Although falling revenues cannot be attributed solely to Ukrainian strikes, the combination of weaker receipts, higher subsidies and infrastructure repair costs is placing additional pressure on Russia’s public finances.
Pressure On Consumer Logistics Tests the Kremlin’s Promise of Normality
Ukrainian drone strike on Wildberries warehouses marks an expansion of the campaign beyond energy infrastructure to Russia's commercial logistics networks. Kyiv argues that these facilities support military supply chains, while the attacks also disrupted civilian deliveries and imposed costs on business, exposing more Russians to the economic consequences of the war. Across western Russia and occupied Crimea, 22 incidents affected 21 sites. Damage to major warehouses reduces distribution capacity and at the same time forces deliveries through other centres. This puts additional pressure on already stretched logistics networks, leading to longer delivery times and higher transportation costs.
Small businesses and franchise operators are particularly hard hit by delays, rising delivery costs and lost sales. Limited insurance coverage for stock destroyed in drone strikes, together with uncertainty over compensation, has placed further financial pressure on affected sellers. Regional authorities and businesses are also facing an unevenly distributed burden as disruptions spread through distribution networks and fuel markets. This is significant from both political and economic perspectives. The Kremlin has sought to portray small and medium-sized enterprises as the resilient, self-sufficient backbone of a wartime economy. Repeated disruptions to day-to-day trade challenge the assumed domestic consensus, under which many Russians continue to enjoy their usual consumption patterns, whilst the human and material burdens of the war are distributed unevenly across society.
However, greater uncertainty does not in itself lead to stronger opposition to the war. The results of one survey, carried out by the Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia (IKAR), which show that 81% of respondents would support ending the war as early as the following day, should not be confused with support for Ukraine’s terms or a willingness to defy the authorities. Attacks on Russian territory may also reinforce the Kremlin’s narrative that the country faces an external threat, triggering short-term ‘rallying 'round the flag’ reactions and providing justification for tighter control.
The parliamentary and regional elections held in September 2026 further reinforced this ambiguity. The United Russia party retained its constitutional qualified majority, anti-war political alternatives such as Yabloko were sidelined, and political veterans were promoted within the ruling party. In a repressive system with a weak independent media and limited electoral competition, the official election results reflect the Kremlin’s ability to organise and demonstrate loyalty, rather than public opinion on the continuation of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Growing economic hardship may also fuel political dissatisfaction, particularly if the authorities struggle to protect businesses and maintain essential services. However, political repression and the limited opportunities for public dissent make it difficult for such discontent to translate into organised political action.
Looking Ahead
Participants broadly agreed that Ukrainian drone strikes were disrupting Russia's energy infrastructure and imposing additional economic costs. However, disagreements emerged over how Western countries should approach Russia. Some questioned whether existing sanctions were sufficiently effective and called for additional measures to increase pressure on the Kremlin. Others argued that Western countries had already gone far enough and cautioned against further escalation, including discussions about designating Russia a 'terrorist state'.Â
Participants broadly agreed on the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone strikes in disrupting Russia’s energy infrastructure and imposing additional economic costs. However, disagreements remained over how Western countries should approach Russia. Some advocated a more assertive policy, while others favoured greater caution. The effectiveness of sanctions was another point of contention, particularly whether existing measures are sufficient and to what extent they have influenced Russia’s behaviour.
Another point of disagreement concerned the geography of potential Russian hostile activities. While the focus has largely been on NATO’s Eastern Flank, some participants argued that the region was not Russia’s most likely immediate target. Instead, they suggested that Moscow could conduct hostile operations in Western Europe, particularly below the threshold that might trigger NATO's Article 5. This raised wider questions about where Russia might seek to test NATO’s resolve and how Western governments should respond to such activities.
Looking ahead, attention should focus on the evolving scope of Ukrainian drone strikes and Russia’s ability to repair damaged infrastructure, strengthen its defences and adapt its supply chains. An important question is whether repeated disruptions will generate lasting economic pressure on businesses, consumers and public finances, or whether Russia can continue to absorb these costs.Â
The planned EU phase-out of Russian LNG from 2027 also raises questions about whether Russian natural gas infrastructure could become a target. The planned EU phase-out of Russian LNG from 2027 raises further questions about whether Russian natural gas infrastructure could become a target. Further research should examine the cumulative impact of Ukrainian strikes, their interaction with Western sanctions and the potential for Russian retaliation, including hybrid operations against European countries below the threshold of NATO's Article 5.
FEATURING
Natia Seskuria
Senior Research Fellow, Russia, Eurasia, and Black Sea Security
International Security
Petras Katinas
Research Fellow in Climate, Energy and Defence
International Security


