RUSI JournalVOLUME 170ISSUE 3

The Operational Level of War: The Northern Command and the 1967 War

Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (centre) with Defence Minister Moshe Dayan (sitting, centre) and senior staff officers visiting the northern border area on the Golan Heights. To the left of Dayan, sitting, is David Elazar, who leads the Northern Command, 10 June 1967. Courtesy of Eli Nissan/Israeli Government Press Office/Wikimedia Commons

Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (centre) visiting the northern border area on the Golan Heights. To the left of Dayan, sitting, is David Elazar, who leads the Northern Command, 10 June 1967. Courtesy of Eli Nissan/Israeli Government Press Office


A historical analysis of the operational level of war during the 1967 War.

On 9 June 1967, the fifth day of the Six-Day War, the Israeli Defense Forces launched a frontal attack on the Syrian army’s fortified line on the western slopes of the Golan Heights. Tal Tovy analyses the operational-level actions of the Northern Command, under the leadership of Major General David Elazar, in developing operational plans in the years leading up to the 1967 war, and their implementation with the breaching of the Syrian defence line (9 June) and the conquest of the Golan Heights (10 June).

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WRITTEN BY

Tal Tovy

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