Why Serbia’s Election Matters to Israel’s Arsenal

The upcoming snap elections in Serbia on 25 October mark a critical juncture in the country’s political landscape. Called amid heightened political polarisation, prolonged public protests and intense institutional pressure, the vote is widely seen as a major test for President Aleksandar Vučić and the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). The decision to head to the polls prematurely follows months of societal tension, rising economic demands and an increasingly vocal opposition seeking to capitalise on growing public discontent.

Locally, the ramifications of this vote extend far beyond a mere allocation of parliamentary seats. A shift in the political balance could trigger policy re-evaluations, administrative turnover and shifting legislative priorities across key state industries. In a country where central authority heavily influences economic and industrial planning, domestic political friction directly affects governance, regulatory predictability and institutional continuity.

Yet, while the immediate focus remains on Belgrade’s political future, the consequences of this domestic contest extend far beyond the Balkans.

Serbia’s election matters to Israel because political continuity in the country, or a lack thereof, could be a test for a European defence-industrial partnership of ever greater strategic significance. Serbia is not just a friendly government or another arms customer. It is a potential production hub within a wider network that could give Israel a broader production base during a prolonged conflict.

The vote is, therefore, a strategic question for Jerusalem, not just another political episode in the Balkans.

An Emerging Defence-Industrial Link

At first glance, the strategic logic is not exactly obvious – Serbia is a small, landlocked country on the edge of Europe, whereas Israel’s security concerns are overwhelmingly concentrated in the Middle East. Yet the two countries are forging a defence-industrial relationship of mounting consequence.

Having the cleverest weapons is not the way to win a modern war. They are won by having enough of them. Ukraine has revealed the brutal arithmetic of industrial warfare: artillery shells, drones, missiles and spare parts are consumed at extraordinary speed. That being the case, sophisticated armies need something less glamorous than cutting-edge technology – factories capable of producing more.

Industrial capacity is military power.

Serbia matters because it has that capacity.

According to official sources, Serbia has a sizeable defence industry, with nearly 200 public and private companies producing weapons, ammunition, and military. Serbia's defence sector comprises around 200 companies and remains central to both national defence capabilities and export performance. The sector is central to Serbia’s defence capability and a major source of export revenue. Israel, meanwhile, has established itself as an important supplier of advanced defence technologies to Serbia, reflecting the increasingly strategic nature of the bilateral relationship. Cooperation, however, has moved beyond the procurement of military equipment. In April 2026, President Aleksandar Vučić revealed plans for a Serbian-Israeli combat drone production programme, signaling a new phase in defence-industrial cooperation between the two countries. Furthermore, the launch of the Serbia-Israel Strategic Dialogue in April 2026 formalised cooperation across strategic sectors including technology, innovation, and economic cooperation, entrenching a commitment to a deeper long-term partnership. The trend culminated in September 2026 with the opening of a joint assembly facility for Israeli-designed combat drones in Serbia, suggesting a deeper stage of defence-industrial integration and the localisation of advanced defence production capabilities.

This potentially carries far greater weight than a conventional arms contract.

It creates a defence-industrial partnership bringing together a state with advanced military technology and a European country that can offer well-developed manufacturing capacity, a skilled workforce and an established defence sector.

Belgrade’s Balancing Act

Which brings us back to the Serbian election.

President Vučić, who resigned on 27 September, had spent years practising a distinctly Balkan form of geopolitical balancing. Serbia aspires to membership of the European Union (EU), maintaining close relations with the West along the way. It has also preserved the relationship with Russia and deepened its ties with China. More recently, Belgrade has added another dimension to that balancing act by forging increasingly strong defence ties with Israel.

Critics tend to point out that Serbia remains unintegrated into the EU, lagging behind in foreign policy alignment and adherence to institutional norms. Paradoxically, it is precisely the lack of full EU institutional embeddedness that lends exceptional agility to Belgrade’s foreign policy. Unencumbered by collective EU consensus mechanisms, restrictive bloc-wide export vetoes or strict normative mandates, Serbia retains the autonomy to conclude pragmatic defence-industrial deals, export military equipment across geopolitical lines and forge dynamic partnerships with non-EU powers like Israel.

This strategic flexibility has served Serbia well, but it is also highly dependent on political continuity.

A change of government – or even substantial political instability in the wake of the vote – would not necessarily turn Serbia against Israel, or threaten existing defence contracts.

The danger is more mundane – and therefore more plausible.

Governments do change contracts, reconsider export policies or scrutinise procurement decisions. Coalition partners often demand different priorities, and government officials do not hesitate to review arrangements made by their predecessors.

In peacetime, these processes are irritating.

During a war, they can be strategic.

A delayed export licence or a contract review may sound like bureaucratic trivia. But defence supply chains are only as reliable as their weakest political link. A production line disrupted for six months cannot be easily mended by a press release saying that the relationship is as good as ever.

For Israel, this is the central risk of political discontinuity in Serbia: not an abrupt diplomatic rupture, but uncertainty over a defence-industrial partnership that Jerusalem may regard as an increasingly important strategic asset.

Israel has learnt this lesson before. Its extraordinary military capabilities cannot shield it from the vulnerabilities embedded in international supply chains. Indeed, the more intensive the fighting, the more vital the capacity to replace depleted stocks.

This is why Jerusalem should not think of Serbia simply as another friendly government.

Instead, it should see it as an emerging fixture in a wider defence-industrial network, treating the stability of that network as a strategic concern.

Diversification and its Limits

Diversification should be the obvious answer. Israel would want to expand domestic production, maintain multiple suppliers and avoid dependence on any single foreign partner. Serbia should be regarded as an additional source of industrial capacity, not as a replacement for Israel’s own defence industry.

But diversification only works as long as each partner remains politically reliable enough to deliver.

An opportunity for Belgrade lies in this logic, too.

Serbia’s defence industry is an asset that can translate diplomatic relations into tangible economic and strategic leverage. Its ability to manufacture ammunition, weapons and military equipment increases its strategic weight beyond that of a small European state. It may give Serbia a role in strengthening the resilience of Israel’s defence supply chains, as well as in Europe’s broader military-industrial recovery.

But that advantage depends on credibility.

International defence companies may appreciate a charming president, but they build long-term production partnerships because they expect contracts to be honoured, political stability to last and institutions to survive elections.

This is where the Serbian vote becomes consequential.

Vučić has built his political system around an extraordinary ability to simultaneously maintain relationships with several competing powers. A potential successor may attempt to draw Serbia closer to Brussels. Another might put greater emphasis on relations with Moscow or Beijing. An opposition coalition might seek to distance itself from Vučić by reviewing some of his most controversial policies.

None of these outcomes necessarily threatens Israel, but all of them create uncertainty around the industrial relationship Israel needs more and more.

Israel should therefore resist the temptation to personalise its relationship with Serbia. The safest strategy is to make defence cooperation sufficiently institutionalised that a change of government does not automatically become a change of strategic direction.

That means durable contracts, transparent procedures, multiple political channels and production arrangements designed to withstand electoral change. If Serbia is to become part of Israel’s defence-industrial network, the relationship will benefit from a stable, long-term framework that can support continued cooperation.

The Industrial Base as Strategy

There is a broader lesson here as well. The war in Ukraine has reinforced the importance of industrial capacity as a core element of national security. Israel, mindful of the prospect of a prolonged and multidimensional conflict, is reckoning with similar strategic imperatives. Defence production often takes place away from active theatres of conflict, but its contribution to military effectiveness can be decisive. Recent conflicts have made it clear that the ability to sustain production, maintain supply chains, and replenish military stock is a vital component of long-term operational resilience. This makes Serbia's election more than another episode in the Balkan politics. For Belgrade, the stakes have risen well above electoral politics, involving the more pressing matters now - the country's long-term strategic orientation and domestic stability. For Israel, the question the polls have triggered is whether an emerging defence-industrial partnership in Europe can prove dependable and resilient in the long run. Obviously, political continuity in Serbia cannot guarantee Israel's security, but a major political shift may disrupt the regulatory framework and production, licencing and supply arrangements underpinning the bilateral ties in the defence sector. In the larger strategic context, domestic political developments in partner states can test stability, predictability, and long-term viability of strategic defence partnerships.

© Vladimir Krulj, 2026, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

For terms of use, see Website Terms and Conditions of Use.

Have an idea for a Commentary you'd like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we'll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. View full guidelines for contributors.