Why it Matters to Recognise Palestine

The UK, along with France and Canada, plans to recognise Palestine as a state when the UN General Assembly convenes next month. The announcement came days after the last round of ceasefire negotiations stalled, and as images of widespread hunger and starvation in Gaza revealed the unprecedented humanitarian devastation in the Strip. But the recognition decision is one that has long been debated across party lines, hinging on the key question: will it make any difference?

I have spent the last month in the Middle East, witnessing the ever-worsening conditions in the West Bank and meeting with Palestinians, Israelis and internationals to discuss what type of political vision might be possible. From this, it is hard for me to see recognition of Palestine changing facts on the ground, at least in the short term. But even symbolic recognition matters. At the very least, it demonstrates both a moral and diplomatic commitment to Palestinian self-determination at a moment when that vision has never been more threatened.

The Question of Impact

While 147 countries already recognise Palestine, the announcements from France, the UK and Canada mark the first time that any G7 states fully endorse Palestinian statehood. The fact that France and the UK are also permanent members of the UN Security Council also adds to the diplomatic significance of the announcement. Still, full statehood recognition in the UN – where Palestine currently has non-voting observer state status – requires the support of all five permanent members of the Security Council, including the US, which would veto such a measure.

Moreover, the announcements are unlikely to change realities for Palestinians any time soon, at least with the current Israeli government. The war and humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues to grind on, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refusing to entertain any realistic plans for ‘next day’ scenarios. At the same time, the Israeli government is considering plans for annexing parts of Gaza, transferring Gazans to other countries, and moving Gazan civilians into a ‘humanitarian city’, which former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert has likened to a concentration camp. Meanwhile, the Israeli occupation in the West Bank has only intensified with forced displacement, land seizures and unsanctioned extremist settler violence. The Knesset, Israel’s parliament, also has voted to explicitly reject any moves towards Palestinian statehood.

But it is largely because of, and not in spite of, these realities that the UK, France and Canada have chosen to act. Indeed, the British and French governments have framed their decisions as crucial for maintaining any viability for a two-state solution to the broader conflict – envisioning a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The announcements also coincided with a three-day conference at the UN led by France and Saudi Arabia to bolster international efforts towards a two-state solution, which saw all 22 members of the Arab League calling on Hamas to disarm to enable the creation of a Palestinian state.

The UK also indicated that it would refrain from recognition if Israel met certain conditions. While two of the conditions focused specifically on Gaza – reaching a ceasefire and addressing the humanitarian crisis – the others related to a two-state vision, including engaging in a sustained peace process and making clear that there would be no further Israeli land annexations in the West Bank. While some criticised Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s decision to introduce conditions, the approach represented an attempt to enhance the immediate impact of the announcement, while also underscoring for both domestic and international observers that the decision aims to bolster rather than shift existing British policies on a Gaza ceasefire and a broader two-state solution.

In reality, neither the UK’s conditions nor the act of recognition will lead to negotiations anytime soon. But recognition will better position Palestinians for any future talks by changing the long-accepted sequence of setting statehood as an endpoint rather than a starting point. Instead of debating steps that may or may not lead to a Palestinian state, negotiations would take statehood as a given, with discussions focusing instead on how the state would be constituted to ensure the dignity and security of both peoples. Such talks, if they happen, are no doubt quite far off, but when the time arrives, international recognition could help assuage the asymmetry that has characterised previous rounds, while in the meantime empowering actors in both communities who are working for a sustained peace.

In the short term, recognition enables states like the UK to pursue short-term measures that demonstrate recognition of statehood beyond the announcement itself. For example, the current Palestinian diplomatic missions to London, Paris and Ottawa can be upgraded to embassies, and the countries can in turn explore ambassador-level representation in Palestine. More substantively, recognising Palestinian sovereignty also provides the UK and other states with a responsibility to firmly reject Israeli settlement expansion and land annexation, and establishes a clear rationale for revisiting trade agreements with Israel that include settlement goods.

Responses and Critiques

There are of course many critiques of the recognition decisions. Some Israelis argue that international recognition of Palestine rewards Hamas in the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 attacks; British-Israeli Emily Damari, a freed hostage, has called the decision a moral failure. Some also say that the announcements could make it harder to get Hamas to agree to a ceasefire. (Starmer’s announcement also included conditions for Hamas, such as reaching a ceasefire, releasing all remaining hostages, disarming and agreeing to play no role in future governance. But it’s likely that the recognition will go forward in September with or without Hamas compliance.)

Some suggest that the international community could take additional steps such as setting a public deadline for Hamas to release the hostages. But Hamas has maintained for months that they are ready to release all the hostages if it means an end to the war, and in reality, ceasefire talks have stalled repeatedly due to the intransigence of both parties. Moreover, shoring up other alternatives for political renewal, including the two-state vision, is the best strategy for side-lining Hamas in the long run.

On the other side, many Palestinians I have spoken with in the West Bank in recent weeks, while generally welcoming the moves towards recognition, are wary if they will have any effect. There is palpable disillusionment here with international declarations and rulings that have failed to stop the atrocities in Gaza or change the course of the occupation in the West Bank, where a two-state solution no longer seems feasible.

As such, many are waiting to see if the decisions are the first steps in real, concerted engagement from the recognising states, or if the announcements are merely ends in themselves, thus amounting to nothing more than virtue signalling. This underscores the need for British, French and Canadian diplomats to work concertedly with Palestinian counterparts to outline what tangible mutual steps towards statehood could look like, and to situate recognition in a broader strategic vision for Palestinian renewal. At the same time, external actors must tread carefully to ensure that processes are locally driven and not imposed to avoid further undermining the perceived legitimacy of governing structures and institutions, whether new or reformed.

In the UK, legal questions have also been raised regarding Palestine meeting the requirements for statehood as articulated in the Montevideo Convention of 1933. These include the capacity for diplomatic relations, a permanent population, a defined territory and an effective government. But Palestine arguably meets these criteria. Most clearly, Palestinians have engaged in international diplomacy for decades, and there is a permanent Palestinian population in the territories (though the relation of Palestinians in the diaspora to a recognised state would need to be clarified).

Questions regarding borders and governance are murkier, but recognition can serve as an impetus for addressing them head-on. Permanent territorial borders are not fully defined, but the two-state solution has long been premised on the borders that existed prior to the 1967 War, notwithstanding the Israeli settlement blocs in the West Bank that have threatened those borders in recent decades. As for governance, the Palestinian Authority (PA), while weak and unpopular, has served as an internationally recognised governing body in the territories since the 1990s, while the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) remains the official representative of the Palestinian people more broadly. While the future role of Hamas (which has controlled Gaza since 2007) in these bodies is still undetermined, recognition could shore up efforts for reforming the PA and/or the PLO into more trusted and representative bodies.

Finally, there is acknowledgement by all parties involved that the impact of any European and Canadian moves may be limited given the outsized influence of the US on the conflict. But diplomats I have spoken with are clear-eyed about their relative leverage, and they recognise the need to work with the options available, including diplomatic pressure, to better align policies in the region with their national interests and values. In the current context, that means developing pathways to realise a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

© RUSI, 2025.

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