UK and Israel Relations, Where Do We Go From Here?

It has been 600 days since Hamas launched its devastating attack on Israel, killing 1200 Israelis and setting off a chain of events that have upended regional security, and ushered in a prolonged period of conflict.

To date, Israel’s conduct of the war – with claims from the Hamas-run Gaza health ministry that over 53,000 Palestinian civilians have been killed – has caused outrage among supporters of the Palestinians, many of whom have marched across Britain’s towns and cities on a near weekly basis, accusing the Jewish State of committing Genocide.

But beyond this, the political support for Israel from the current government has remained cast iron solid with both Conservative and Labour governments reaffirming Israel’s right to defend itself, and to seek the return of Israeli hostages held in Hamas captivity.

Britain has been one of Israel’s strongest allies in Europe. Up until the attacks of October 7, Israel’s relations with Britain had flourished in spite of the lack of any progress towards a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Britain is now one of Israel’s biggest export markets after the United States. In January 2021, the UK established a Trade and Partnership Agreement (TPA) with Israel and followed this up with the signing of a new memorandum of understanding to expand cooperation in a number of areas such as cyber, technology, trade and defence. These strong commercial ties and the growing bilateral security cooperation were an expression of the warm bilateral relationship.

Immediately after October 7, Britain joined the United States in dispatching military forces to the Eastern Mediterranean to support Israel, and deter Hezbollah and Iran from an attack on Israel. Additionally, both Britain and France were involved in the interception of Iranian attacks against Israel in April and later in October 2024.

But recently the political winds have dramatically changed. Following the collapse of a tenuously observed ceasefire in March, Israeli military policy has sought to turn up the pressure on Hamas to release the remaining hostages. But as the Israeli military has upped the tempo of its operations and put in place an aid blockade on the Strip, political goodwill among Israel’s diplomatic allies has rapidly begun to drain away. While Israel’s prime minister has declared that the war in Gaza is intended to destroy Hamas, the remarks of his extreme coalition partners suggest that the wider aim is the expulsion of Palestinians and the annexation of the West Bank.

As early as April, there were signs that patience had run out. The Conservative MP Mark Pritchard, a longstanding supporter of Israel, stood up in the House to ‘withdraw’ his support for Israel ‘for what they are doing right now in Gaza’. However, the coup de grace was delivered a couple of weeks later with the UK’s announcement that talks for a UK-Israel Free Trade Agreement would be suspended.

Supporters of Israel have pointed to Hamas’ intransigence in releasing hostages, its hijacking of aid supplies, and its use of human shields to deliberately raise the cost of the conflict on its own civilian population to win international support. And while these arguments have some merit, they are now largely falling on deaf ears.

Where do we Head from Here?

There is no doubt that relations between Israel and the UK have deteriorated significantly and could worsen in the coming months. Central to this would be any further escalation of the war in Gaza or expediting moves to annex the West Bank. The Netanyahu government has quietly been initiating legislation that will pave the way for the large-scale expansion of settlements inside the West Bank. It has just announced plans to establish 22 new Jewish settlements in the West Bank, including the legalization of settler outposts that were constructed without government authorization. It has forced out tens of thousands of Palestinians from their homes while allowing violent settlers to run riot. There is also feverish speculation about a possible Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

There will be growing calls for an arms embargo against Israel. Prior to the return of Donald Trump to the White House, there were warnings by former Trump officials that such a move would result in a rift between the UK and the US. However with signs of growing impatience with Israel within the Trump administration, the Starmer government may feel there is more freedom to take action.

Yet such a move could do more harm than good. Israel passes on important intelligence information to the UK on Iranian activity which is becoming a growing concern in London. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2019 and 2023, around 99% of Israel’s arms imports were from the United States and Germany. An arms embargo is a measure that has symbolic significance but will make little practical difference to the ongoing conflict, and will alienate the wider Israeli public.

This is particularly important given that the UK has an interest in signalling to the wider Israeli public that its actions are directed at Netanyahu’s government, but not the country as a whole. At a time when Israel is facing ongoing missile attacks from the Houthis in Yemen, and with a possible resurgence of a military confrontation between Israel and Iran on the horizon, an arms ban would be counterproductive. Under the previous Conservative government the former foreign secretary Lord Cameron argued that this would have looked ‘ridiculous’ in the wake of Iran’s attack and that halting arms sales would give Britain ‘less leverage rather than more.’

In fact, it was the Conservative government which initiated the imposition of sanctions on violent settlers. Here the Labour government may find that there is space to tighten the screws. So far, the additional sanctions it has placed on settler activists are not a large step beyond what was already in place. However there remain options to escalate this further by sanctioning the patrons of these settlers within the current Netanyahu government, which would signal Britain’s frustration with Israel’s current administration, rather than its people.

At the same time, the signalling of British resolve over the freezing of trade talks and possible sanctions in this area could be more effective – in particular, if this happens while there are threats of wider European sanctions against Israel. The threat of sanctions is certainly receiving extensive coverage in the Israeli media, reflecting the depth of concern within the country. In 2011, former prime minister Ehud Barak warned that Israel would face a ‘tsunami’ of sanctions because of a lack of progress towards peace with the Palestinians. In May 2025, the tsunami may have finally arrived.

There is also talk of growing cross-party support for recognition of a Palestinian State, which would be easier for the UK to do in concert with another major European actor such as France. However, again this would alienate many Israelis, including those who are opposed to the war in Gaza, and who would view the recognition of a Palestinian State as a ‘prize for Hamas.’

This does not mean abandoning a two-state solution, far from it. A more promising approach could revolve around a push for the revival of the Arab Peace Initiative. Such a move can be viewed as a win for both the Palestinians and the Israelis, while acknowledging the ever-growing role of the Gulf States in regional politics. It would advance the prospects of a Palestinian State while also breathing new life into the regional normalization process which remains a key goal of the United States.

At this point, it appears that only the Trump administration retains any meaningful influence with the Netanyahu government which is increasingly unconstrained and hardline in its mindset. However, a majority of Israelis are clearly ready to end the war if this results in the return of the remaining hostages who are stuck in Gaza. It is these Israelis that the Starmer government needs to have in mind as it considers its future steps.

© Azriel Bermant and Michael Stephens, 2025, published by RUSI with permission of the authors.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the authors', and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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