Syria’s First Post-Assad Election: Analysis from Damascus

Since 8 December 2024, Syria has witnessed a rapid transformation. Considering that less than a year ago, interim President Ahmad Shara’s area of influence was limited to Idlib; that a Syrian Interim Government supported by Turkey existed in the north of Aleppo; and that three-quarters of Syria was governed by the Assad regime, we can better grasp the speed and scale of the changes inside Syria.

Despite notable progress, significant challenges to Syria’s transition persist. There were significant clashes in Latakia in March and in Suwayda in July, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. The northeast and south of the country are not under the control of the Syrian government. Moreover, there is no clear formula for how these regions will be integrated into the new Syrian administration. Nevertheless, there are steps being taken toward stabilising Syria.

Almost every week, Damascus hosts high-level visitors. Shara became the first head of state in decades to speak at the United Nations on behalf of his country. Significant steps have been taken toward lifting the US and international sanctions imposed on Syria. Syrians who had fled their country due to the civil war have begun to return, at least partially. Most importantly, the ongoing transition period has not witnessed a major security crisis or political breakdown. In summary, Syria is experiencing neither a flawless transition nor a descent into chaos and instability. It is trying to stand back up amid the turbulent inter-state tensions of the Middle East and fragile domestic social and political balances.

It is important to analyse Syria’s recent 5 October parliamentary elections within this context. The election was not a celebration of democracy. In fact, for some analysts, it was far from being democratic or inclusive. However, despite all its shortcomings, holding the election was an important step in advancing the transition process.

Why Was the Election Held?

Shortly after the end of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, a caretaker government was established in Syria. This first government was little more than a slight variation of the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS’s) ‘Salvation Government’ in Idlib. About three and a half months later, President Ahmad Shara announced a transitional government to manage the process. Yet before this announcement, Shara and his team had already taken steps that reflected the same mode of political action. For instance, on 29 January, during the ‘Conference for the Declaration of Victory of the Syrian Revolution,’ attended entirely by military commanders, Ahmad Shara was proclaimed president. Shortly thereafter, a constitutional committee drafted an interim constitution, which was also ratified by the president. All these steps had a similar character: the victorious side of a prolonged civil war was making appointment from its institutional base and among close allies as the new rulers while simultaneously seeking to avoid international criticism regarding political inclusiveness.

Hence, the reason for holding the recent ‘indirect’ election becomes clear. The same factors that influenced the drafting of the interim constitution and the formation of the government also underpinned the decision to hold elections. One of the armed groups that had waged a long struggle against the previous regime finally won and initiated the process of establishing its rule. However, since it was impossible for a political-military leadership that controlled less than one-tenth of the country just a year ago to govern the entire nation by force, a controlled mechanism of political participation was constructed to satisfy as broad a portion of the public as possible. Viewed this way, Syria’s recent institution-building process does not fundamentally differ from post-conflict transitions in other regions of the world.

Managed Elections?

It is impossible to claim that the elections were conducted within a flawless democratic or legal framework. Criticisms directed at the new parliament fall into two main categories.

The first set of criticisms relates to the conduct of the elections. The legal regulations concerning the election law were not made by an elected president, which serves as the basis for objections. There is also widespread criticism that the president directly appoints one-third of the parliament and indirectly influences the rest. To summarise: the new parliament consists of members either directly appointed by or indirectly selected through the influence of the president. Another major criticism is that the elections were conducted not by the general Syrian public but by approximately 6,000 delegates across electoral colleges. The lack of clear criteria for candidate eligibility is also cited as a problem. Furthermore, elections were not held in areas that have not yet been integrated into the new administration – such as Raqqa and Hasakah, controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Suwayda, controlled by Druze militias. Even within Aleppo province, Ain al-Arab (Kobane) could not practically participate in the process due to SDF control. In summary, sceptics argue that these were local committee-based elections where two-thirds of the members were elected and the entire country was not represented.

The second main criticism concerns the parliament’s powers. Some analysts argue that in a system where authority is concentrated in the presidency, the parliament’s role will remain limited to certain issues. While presidential decrees will decide all critical matters, parliament will contribute little beyond legitimising the new order. These criticisms are largely valid and legitimate.

However, the Syrian government’s counterarguments also deserve attention. The new parliament is a special, temporary body and therefore does not need full legislative powers. Moreover, organising a nationwide election involving all citizens is almost impossible under current conditions. Millions of Syrians were displaced during the war. Over one million people live as internally displaced people in Idlib alone. Millions more live abroad – three million in Turkey and hundreds of thousands elsewhere. Tracking the addresses of one million returnees in the past ten months is nearly impossible. Given these circumstances, holding a direct popular vote was not feasible. Thus, the only realistic option was a delegate-based representative election.

Indeed, while the criticisms have merit, their timing diminishes their impact. If one wishes to criticise the Shara administration for not conducting democratic elections, that criticism comes too late. It would be unfair to accuse a government that is now recognised by major global powers, has gained international legitimacy, and represents Syria at the UN of lacking democracy at this stage. Arguments aimed at undermining the recent election on the basis that it lacks full democratic legitimacy despite the pressing challenges Syria still faces is unlikely to produce practical results that will advance the demands of the Syrian people at this critical and fragile phase of the transition.

The Election Process

As an observer who had the chance to directly witness the vote in parts of Damascus, Aleppo, and Idlib shortly before the elections, I must say the process did not generate much enthusiasm among the public. Since voters were represented by a small group of delegates, most citizens remained distant observers. Even among delegates, excitement was limited. Campaigning was confined to small-scale delegate outreach, the campaign period was short, and many delegates did not attend candidate meetings. In many cases, delegates based their choices on personal recommendations from election committee members or local acquaintances. Since each voting district had multiple seats, small-scale local alliances were inevitable – turning hotels and meeting rooms into the main hubs of political negotiation.

In some districts, the number of candidates was so high that nearly one out of every three delegates ran for parliament. For example, in the Aleppo district centre alone, a week before the election, out of 700 delegates, more than 250 declared their candidacy for 14 available seats. Experienced small groups used their political skills to stand out. In major urban centres, several candidates received far more votes than their delegate base due to their command of ‘salon politics’. This explains, for instance, why some Muslim Brotherhood candidates achieved unexpected success, particularly in Aleppo. Still, reducing the election outcome solely to clique politics would be overly simplistic.

Election Results

A tone of scepticism, present in criticism of the election running up to the event, persisted in assessments made after election results were announced. Many observers emphasised that the parliament failed to reflect Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity. This claim is not entirely unfounded. At first glance, the new parliament appears to include four Kurds, four Turkmens, two Ismailis, five Alawites, and one Christian, with the remainder being Sunni Arabs. The number of women members is also significantly below expectations. Thus, rather than just noting the demographic imbalance, a deeper analysis is needed.

Examining the profiles of the winning candidates reveals several insights. First, the majority of winners are not from HTS backgrounds – though this does not mean they oppose the Shara government. This fact serves as an important reminder: less than a year ago, HTS directly controlled only Idlib city and a few surrounding towns. Although HTS and its allied armed groups remain influential in the state-building process, local opposition networks are still politically relevant, especially in cities like Hama, Homs, Daraa, and Deir ez-Zor. These local actors – well-known figures, activists, and prominent families – remain key social and political stakeholders.

Another notable observation is the sharp contrast between major cities and districts. Almost all winning candidates from districts were born there. While unsurprising, this suggests that despite years of displacement, candidates chose to run in their hometowns rather than where they resettled – highlighting the deeply local nature of Syrian politics.

Finally, many HTS-aligned figures avoided participating in the elections for three likely reasons. First, since the president directly appoints one-third of the parliament, HTS leaders preferred not to confront powerful local families in competitive politics. Second, many local politicians perceived presidential appointment as a more prestigious position than election, discouraging participation. Third, many HTS-linked individuals already hold senior government posts, making these limited parliamentary roles less appealing.

After the Election

President Ahmad Shara was expected to announce his 70 appointed members immediately after the vote, but an unexpected event delayed the process. The day after the election, two major incidents reminded everyone that politics in Syria goes far beyond elections – and can even trigger new crises. On Monday morning, tensions erupted in Aleppo’s Kurdish neighbourhoods of Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud, controlled by the SDF, after Syrian forces destroyed a tunnel. The resulting clashes caused casualties among both soldiers and civilians. Ironically, on the same day, US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack met with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and expressed optimism that issues with the Damascus government would soon be resolved.

The tensions were quickly contained, and on October 7, Mazloum Abdi arrived in Damascus for high-level talks. While no official statement has yet been made, discussions continue intensively. Two possible scenarios stand out: first, an agreement between Shara and Abdi that would allow SDF-linked figures to be among Shara’s 70 appointees – potentially realising Ambassador Barrack’s vision of reconciliation. The second scenario involves the PYD (Democratic Union Party) reviving its postponed local elections from summer 2024, leading to a de facto federalisation of Syria. Therefore, the parliamentary election should not be viewed solely through the lenses of inclusivity and representation but as a catalyst for new dynamics that could shape Syria’s future.

© RUSI, 2025.

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