Southern Yemen’s Power Shift: the Houthis and the UAE-Saudi Rivalry

The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched a rapid military offensive across southern Yemen on 2 December 2025, seizing control of key districts in Hadramout, the country’s most resource-rich governorate, and consolidating its hold over Aden, the seat of the internationally recognized government, and large stretches of the southern coastline.

The operation represents the most consequential territorial shift since the 2022 UN-brokered truce, reshaping not only Yemen’s internal balance of power but also the broader security architecture of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The UAE views southern Yemen as a key area of influence due to its resources and proximity to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and major global shipping routes, placing it in a strong position to broaden its ambitions as a maritime security actor. The STC’s rapid territorial expansion risks consolidating Houthi (also known as Ansar Allah) control in north-western Yemen, further marginalising the internationally recognised government. The takeover of large swathes of the south has created friction with Saudi-backed government forces and complicated the UN-backed fragile ceasefire with the Houthi movement and broader peace efforts in Yemen. If this dynamic hardens, it could entrench a de facto North-South division, overturning Yemen’s unification of 1990.

The offensive brought STC forces into direct confrontation with the Saudi-supported internationally recognised government, represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and its allies, including the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance, led by Sheikh Amr bin Habreish. In late November, Habreish deployed fighters to the PetroMasila oil infrastructure, Yemen’s largest oil company, resulting in the facility halting production. Sources in PetroMasila interviewed for this piece noted that the Saudi committee has urged the company to resume production to ensure that the Yemeni government can continue meeting its obligations towards the public sector.

Established in 2017 and composed of a coalition of southern armed factions and allied tribal groups, the STC is formally part of the UN-recognised Yemeni government but also presents itself as a representing a southern national movement. It is largely trained, supplied and financed by the United Arab Emirates, drawing on the support of Emirati-sponsored paramilitary units such as the Security Belt Forces, Giants Brigades and Hadrami Elite Forces.

The STC claims that its Operation ‘Promising Future’ aims to disrupt and dismantle the smuggling operations that have become entrenched in Hadhramaut ‘benefiting the terrorist Houthi militias and into hotbeds for the activities of extremist organisations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda . . . Given this reality, we state unequivocally that the South will never be a corridor for threatening regional security, a haven for terrorism or a logistical lifeline for the terrorist Houthi militias.’

However, the collapse of Yemeni government authority in the east and south-territories – areas outside Houthi control – creates a strategic vacuum that undermines stabilisation aims. With the PLC increasingly unable to consolidate governance and maintain security and public service delivery, its legitimacy erodes. This means the Houthis face fewer constraints in consolidating their western coastal strongholds and disruptive capabilities in Red Sea shipping lanes. The fragmentation within the Saudi-led coalition, now intensified by the STC takeover, solidifies Houthi dominance in the north-west and heightens risk to maritime security.

Saudi–UAE Competition and Diverging Objectives in Yemen

Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE entered the Yemen war as coalition partners, their strategic goals have diverged substantially. Since joining the Saudi-led coalition, the UAE has viewed the Yemeni government, especially its Islah (Muslim Brotherhood-aligned) components, as an ideological and security threat. As a result, Abu Dhabi systematically obstructed efforts to consolidate Yemeni government authority, instead empowering local armed actors to curb Islah’s influence. This approach culminated in 2017 and the creation of the STC.

Conversely, Saudi Arabia has sought the preservation of the Yemeni government and a negotiated settlement with the Houthis that protects its borders and prevents further missile or drone attacks on its territory. Riyadh’s focus is to hold together a coalition of Yemeni groups as a counterweight to the Houthi threat, who continue to threaten cross border attacks and have strong hold over a big percentage of the Yemeni-Saudi border.

Today, the PLC, a fragile coalition of tribal, political and military actors opposed to the Houthis, risks disintegration following the STC takeover of Hadramout. Riyadh’s leverage rests on the existence of a cohesive anti-Houthi bloc. As the authority of the internationally recognised government erodes, that cohesion frays. From the UAE’s perspective, bolstering the STC means leverage, via an effective surrogate, ahead of any future national political settlement negotiated between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis.

UAE-Israel Interests in the Context of Southern Yemen

A key pillar of the UAE’s regional policy is securing maritime influence across the Red Sea basin, including southern Yemen, and the Horn of Africa through commercial ports, military bases, logistics hubs and island territories that enhance its control over some of the world’s most critical sea lanes. The UAE has invested in radar systems, runway extensions and surveillance infrastructure on Abd al-Kuri and Samhah, two islands that are part of the Socotra archipelago (Yemeni territory administered by the STC), and Mayyun Island, in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait off Yemen, enabling wide-area maritime monitoring.

From the UAE’s perspective, the consolidation of an aligned political-military partner in southern Yemen could enhance maritime surveillance across key areas, including Aden, Mukalla, Al-Mahra, and the approaches to Socotra. This represents a pattern of economic securitisation in the UAE’s regional approach, where security and commercial strategies are fused.

The Socotra archipelago has become one of the most strategic maritime assets in the region. Historically used by the Soviet Union for radar installations monitoring the Indian Ocean, the islands today occupy a central position between the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. Multiple UN reports and investigations document how the UAE has expanded its security footprint there since 2018, partnering with STC-aligned authorities to establish local governance, upgrade ports and install advanced early-warning surveillance systems concerning Houthi missile capabilities. These facilities can track ship movements across vast distances and provide data relevant to regional counter-smuggling, counterterrorism and missile early-warning systems.

An underexplored dimension of the current situation is how the security and political dynamics in southern Yemen, shaped in large part by UAE involvement, could overlap with Israel’s maritime security priorities. The Abraham Accords in 2020 established a framework of formal Emirati–Israeli coordination, with reports of growing defence-industrial partnerships, as well as cooperation on multilateral cybersecurity initiatives, most notably, an intelligence-sharing platform known as the Crystal Ball Platform.

Following the 7 October attacks and Israel’s subsequent operations in Gaza, Israel has increasingly identified the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as an extension of its broader confrontation with Iran, viewing Houthi missile and drone capabilities as a direct threat to Israeli-affiliated shipping and commercial vessels transiting to Eilat and the Suez Canal. In a sign that Washington seeks to situate Yemen within its broader regional strategy, recent reports indicate that the US asked Yemen to join an International Stabilization Force (ISF) that is planned to deploy in Gaza as part of President Donald Trump’s proposed peace plan.

According to analysis shared with the authors by Tel Avivi based think tank, Mind Israel, from Israel’s perspective, the most immediate outcome of the STC’s advance is a partial reduction in the Houthis’ ability to acquire advanced weaponry. Disruption of smuggling routes through Hadhramaut and al-Mahrah places pressure on Iranian logistical networks and limits the flow of materiel required for long-range capabilities. Yet this is only a limited tactical gain. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated resilience and adaptability in rebuilding supply chains, and the broader strategic environment continues to favour them as long as regional actors opposing them remain divided.

While STC controlling the majority of Yemen’s southern littoral may constrain the Houthis’ ability to operationally expand attacks into the Gulf of Aden, the benefit may outweigh the costs and be short-lived. The strategic effect is likely to result in a stronger Houthi political centre in the north-west and a weaker, divided coalition arrayed against it, leading to Yemen’s further political fragmentation.

Challenges Facing the STC

Despite its territorial gains, the STC now confronts a set of daunting internal and external challenges. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains active in remote areas of Hadramout and Shabwa. The UAE has mounted effective counterterrorism operations against AQAP, but critics argue that counterterrorism narratives have sometimes been used to justify broader territorial consolidation.

At the local level, Hadramout is governed as much by tribal consensus as by formal institutions. The Hadramawt Tribal Alliance and local power brokers are unlikely to accept long-term STC dominance without negotiation. Hadramout’s oil infrastructure represents both an opportunity and a risk. Control over resource flows may strengthen the STC’s administrative capacity but could also create new conflict lines with other southern groups or with Riyadh. And if the UAE succeeds in stabilizing an autonomous southern polity, the Houthis may intensify maritime operations to compensate for constraints on their land-based smuggling routes. Consequently, the security of Red Sea shipping will depend heavily on whether the STC and the UAE can stabilize the southern theatre or whether fragmentation deepens and introduces new maritime risks.

While the STC may have de facto control of the south, it lacks international recognition. An evolving dynamic has to do with speculation over the STC’s outreach to Israel. STC head Aidaros al-Zubaidi stated in an interview on 24 September 2025 that a future independent South Yemen would consider joining the Abraham Accords as long as ‘Gaza and Palestine regain their rights’. While the STC’s desire for external recognition is clear, its outreach to Israel risks becoming a significant liability.

The strengthening of a southern, Emirati-aligned entity may also feed into the Houthis’ ideological narrative portraying the UAE as aligned with Western and Israeli interests. Should the STC move closer to a state-like status, Israel may find itself in a delicate position. On one hand, indirect cooperation with a southern entity could enhance maritime monitoring, improve oversight of smuggling routes, and bolster Red Sea security. On the other hand, such a development may intensify regional rivalries, such as between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and between the Houthis and the southern bloc, potentially offering the Houthis renewed justification for attacks against Israel or Israeli-linked maritime assets. Moreover, the STC’s openness to the Abraham Accords framework may complicate Israel’s position if it clashes with American or Saudi strategic preferences.

Policy Implications

The current lull in direct escalation by the Houthis is likely temporary, and their pretexts for action may shift according to circumstance, whether developments in Gaza or Israeli policies in the West Bank. The UK should intensify maritime coordination and information-sharing through the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Task Force 153, focused on countering Iranian-linked irregular warfare activities and promoting US-Gulf maritime security cooperation in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden.

At the same time, UK maritime security planning and diplomacy should account for long-term risks from destabilisation should Yemen’s territorial and political fragmentation become permanent. Second, the UK should focus efforts to deescalate Saudi–UAE competition in Yemen, which could complicate maritime operations. Finally, international support should prioritise the preservation of Yemen’s remaining state institutions and supporting the resilience of the internationally-recognised government. Preventing fiscal collapse is central to maintaining any viable governance structure capable of engaging with regional security mechanisms.

© RUSI, 2025.

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